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This thesis is an interrogation of the viability of transitive production, which I associate with the 
Aristotelian term hylomorphic. The central axiom of hylomorphic production that will be 
targeted for critique is that the agent of production must be distinguished absolutely from the 
product. The thesis follows the thought of production primarily-but not exclusively-in its 
characteristically modem instantiation in the Kantian transcendental. The argument seeks to 
demonstrate that the productive aspect of the operator of transitive production is incompatible 
with the transcendental element, and that Kant was himself increasingly aware of this problem. 
The Third Critique, under the rubric of an aesthetics, it will be argued, manifests this awareness 
in its problematic of a manifold of empirical laws. That this constitutes a difficulty for 
transcendent idealism means that the transcendental operators of the First Critique have failed to 
constitute experience in a relevant and important way. Furthermore, it is possible to see in some 
of the famous slogans of the Third Critique, an indication of another mode of production which 
is immune to the difficulties of the axiom of transitive production. In conclusion I suggest that 
the consequences of this new mode of intransiti ve production, associated with materiality, is 
destructive of the thought of the axiomatic otherworldliness of production operators. Production 
is not operated at all. Some suggestions are then made as to the explanation of the error 
embodied in the axiom of transitivity. 
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Abbreviations and References 
Four texts by Kant will be referenced under the following abbreviations: 
Critique of Pure Reason: first Critique Apage;Bpage, where A and B pages refer to the 
pagination of the first and second editions. 
Critique of Practical Reason: second Critique Ak. vol:page, where Ak. refers to the Prussian 
Academy edition pagination. 
Critique of Judgement: third Critique §number, where §number refers to the numbered 
paragraphs; except in the case of the first introduction, which will be referenced by its 
individual sections (ID and then the Ak. pagination. 
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics etc.: Prolegomena §number, where §number refers to 
the numbered paragraphs. 
Other notations will be explained in the text. Full bibliographical information is contained in the 
Bibliography. I have attempted as much as possible to use reference codes that are common to all 
or most editions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The sun, I think you will agree, not only makes the things we see visible, but causes 
the processes of generation, growth and nourishment, without itself being such a 
process .... 
The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the 
objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality 
but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power. 
Plato, Republic 509b 
With this masterpiece of Socratic logic, a certain thought of production is introduced into the 
West. This thought may be summarised by the following quite simple axiom: the condition of x is 
not an x. The sun is the condition or cause of the processes of the world, but it is itself not such a 
process; the good is the condition or source of objects, and yet is not such an object. Production 
is importantly theorised as transitive, and the operator of this production is specifically 
differentiated from what it produces. 
There can be no doubt that one extremely important instance of this thought of production is the 
God of Christian monotheism. In accordance with this, the world is thought as the set of created 
things, and God as the creator. God is therefore the name for the operator of a production, which 
operator must be conceived-if possible-as absolutely different from everything. The dominant 
part of the Western tradition can be represented as merely the attempt to think through the rigor 
of this absolute difference from everything. In the modem era such thinking centres around Kant, 
whose notion of the transcendental was designed to show how naive it had been to think that one 
had represented absolute difference as God. God had, in the Scholastic tradition, for instance, 
always been thought simply through the infinitisation or perfection of worldly predicates. But 
worldly predicates could not possibly do justice to absolute difference from the world. More 
recently, even the conceivability of the operator of transitive production is regularly called into 
question. And on the basis of the axiom: as producer, the operator of production (naively 
identified with God) must also produce conceptuality. But it follows from the axiom that the 
condition of conceptuality cannot itself be a concept. 
This thesis is an interrogation of the axiom of transitive production, which I associate with the 
Aristotelian term hylomorphic. It follows the thought of transcendental production primarily-
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but not exclusively-in its definitive modern instantiation in the Kantian transcendental. The 
argument seeks to demonstrate that the productive aspect of the operator of transitive production 
is incompatible with the transcendental element, and that Kant was himself increasingly aware of 
this problem. The third Critique, under the rubric of an aesthetics, it will be argued, manifests 
this awareness in its problematic of a manifold of empirical laws. That this constitutes a 
difficulty for transcendent idealism means that the transcendental operators of the first Critique 
have failed to constitute experience in a relevant and important way. Furthermore, it is possible 
to see in some of the famous slogans of the third Critique, an indication of another mode of 
production which is immune to the difficulties of the axiom of transitive production. In 
conclusion I suggest that the consequences of this new mode of intransitive production, 
associated with materiality, is destructive of the thought of the axiomatic otherworldliness of 
production operators. Production is not operated at all. Some suggestions are then made as to 
the explanation of the error embodied in the axiom of transitivity. 
These explanations draw on two hypotheses: one in Marx, and the other in Freud. The former is 
that of exploitation; the latter that of narcissism. According to the former a dominant class 
appropriates the productive energy of an exploited class and presents it as its own energy. 
According to the latter, a dominant mental agency (the ego) is constituted as a modification 
(under certain conditions) of primary productive (the id). My use of these theories is to argue 
that transcendental-theological operators are in the same position as the dominant class or the 
ego. Their productive energy must come from somewhere else, and this somewhere else cannot 
be productive in a way that reproduces the structure of transitive production. l 
Marx's theory is useful here also for a second reason, which directs the structure of the thesis. 
What distinguishes modernity, Marx argues, is that it is difficult to tell that energetic 
appropriation happens. Under feudalism, the dominant class, the aristocracy, appropriates 
surplus labour directly through the mechanism of serfdom: the serf is simply compelled to labour 
for the vassal lord for a certain proportion of the year.2 Marx calls this the directly social nature 
lIn chapter 7 I will suggest some shortcomings of Marx's account in the light of the argument about 
Kant. 
2 Although arbitrary and increasing proportion. See Capital Vol. 1 trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: 
Penguin 1976) pp. 347f. 
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of economic production. Under capital, however, the fetishism of the commodity makes it 
difficult to tell that energy is appropriated at all. Capital is cunning, indirect. Broadly, the 
fetishism of the commodity presents an exchange of equalities that is supposed, mysteriously, to 
be autonomously productive. This exchange structure, Marx argues, covers up the productive 
(and I would argue intransitive) base of capital. I suggest that the fetishism of the commodity 
may be aligned with the dominance of representation as the primary theoretical model of modem 
thought, and that it plays a similar role of covering up a profound complicity of modem thinking 
with primary production. Kant, again, can be seen as the most important apologist for the coup 
of representation theory, and its most important instance is the negativity of Kantian critique. 
According to this kind of critique, the exchange of equalities at the level of representation makes 
the representation of the unilateral and intransitive base simply impossible: as condition of 
equality and representation, the unequal and intransitive condition of representation is itself not 
capable of being (re)presented. The relation to the axiom of transitive production should be clear. 
Following this analysis of Marx's, I start the thesis with an account of a feudal energetic 
appropriation, that follows the same trajectory of decay from ideal hylomorphic production 
(creation) to material immanent production, but without the added difficulties introduced by 
representation theory. John Milton's epic, Paradise Lost, contains a relative disinhibition of 
thinking through poetry (itself not unimportant for Kant's account) which summarises and 
introduces the trajectory of descent that the rest of the thesis addresses in the work of Kant. The 
next chapters deal with the impact of representation on production (chapter 3); the importance of 
this for one selected recent example of neo-Kantianism (Saussure, chapter 4); Kant's own 
scepticism about his account of transcendental production (chapter 5); Kant's implicit alternative 
account of production (chapter 6); and the thesis concludes with a re-evaluation of the models of 
Marx and Freud in the light of the earlier analyses (chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2: Milton's Wilderness 
Milton, who wrote Paradise Lost for £5, was an unproductive labourer. 
Karl Marx, Theories of SurpLus Value, Part I 
Introduction 
Plato's eidos in fact contains two almost completely incompatible concepts of transcendence that 
feed into a Christianity equally imbued with two radically different Gods. On the one hand there 
is the originary thought of an absolute transcendence, the dream of an absolute stability, 
autonomy and independence: autarkeia. On the other hand there is the thought of productive 
efficacy. Plato makes the mistake o/the West in trying to present these as one and the same: 
transcendence as the ground of production. Plato writes: 
The Good differs in its nature from everything else in that the being who possesses it 
always and in all respects has the most perfect sufficiency and is never in need of any 
other things. (Philebus 60c). 
And the thought is identical in Aristotle: 
One who is self-sufficient can have not need of the service of others, nor of their 
affection, nor of social life, since he is capable of living alone. This is especially 
evident in the case of god. Clearly, since he is in need of nothing, God cannot have 
need of friends, nor will he have any. (Eudemian Ethics vn 1244b-1245b). 
But the question is obvious: if God is self-sufficingly perfect, what need can He have of the 
world, escape from whose mire He represents? The more God's transcendence is valorised as a 
source of much-needed stability, the less can He be presented as the productive ground of just 
that world. Production, it seems, is about something else. The contradiction between these two 
thoughts is preserved through the Christian tradition in the notion of the transcendent but creator 
God.1Milton is in that part of the tradition that takes seriously the difficulties posed by this 
dilemma: he is under the influence of the Manichees, the Cabala, and the Gnostics. This chapter 
I Arthur 0 Lovejoy demonstrates this nervous co-existence of these two thoughts within Christianity, 
and especially in Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius. His name for the second thought--of productive 
efficacy-is the 'principle of plenitude'. See The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Havard 
University Press 1936 & 1964), especially chapter 3. 
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shows that the standard theory of (God's) production-that it is both efficacious and 
transcendent (or in the vocabulary I develop here, efficient and lucid)-is subjected to an 
interrogation that becomes increasingly intense as Milton passes from his official theology to his 
poetic theology. 
Irresponsible Creation 
It seems obvious, theologically at least, to suppose that if God is the creator of the cosmos, He 
creates responsibly. Responsible production is indeed the canonical formulism of ideal 
production theory. The aim of this section is to show Milton makes the responsibility of God's 
production severely problematic. To define terms: a 'responsible act' is one that is 
simultaneously efficacious and lucid. That is, it is an act performed by an agent in which the 
consequence of the act is directly intended by the agent. In other terms, more reminiscent of 
Kant, the responsible act is concept-bound or rule-governed. The primary model for this type of 
action is evidently jurisprudential: one is responsible for those actions which one intentionally 
carried out. 
Paradise Lost abounds with events which can only be described as irresponsible; that is to say, 
events which are not both lucidly intended and actually effected by the same agent. It is no 
coincidence that the first signs of disruption in the production theology of Milton's Paradise Lost 
come with Satan.2 Satan engages in three irresponsible activities. The first is the birth of Sin: 
All on a sudden miserable pain 
2Satan 's irresponsible actions are significant because Romantic readings of Paradise Lost have 
consistently suggested that Satan is the hero of the epic. Blake's comment in 'The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell' (at Plate 5) that Milton was "a true Poet and of the Devils party without knowing it" (in The 
Complete Poems ed. Alicia Ostriker [London: Penguin 1977], p. 182) is only the most extensive of 
valorisations shared by, for instance, Shelley and Hazlitt. This romanticism is nevertheless an 
ambiguous move: on the one hand it records the efficacy of evil; but on the other it anthropomorphises 
tlle indifference of evil and matter. In effect I argue here that Chaos is the hero of the epic (although the 
tenn is clearly inappropriate by this stage). Satan's individuality and subjectivity, his anthropomorphic 
character, has often heen remarked by Marxist critics (see e.g. Catherine Belsey, John Milton: 
Language, Gender, Powcr [Oxford: Blackwell 1988] pp. 85f.). chapter 7 shows tllat to the extent that 
suhjectivity is at issue at all with Satan, it is the unconscious rather than bourgeois subjectivity that is at 
stake. See helow pp. 182ff. 
II 
Surprised the ... till ... 
Out of thy head I sprung. (ll 752-8) 3 
she reports.4 Satan's surprise registers this as a production not governed by him and not intended 
by him. The second instance of irresponsible creation is the construction of the bridge across 
Chaos after the successful seduction of Eve. Sin and Death address Satan thus: 
... these are thy magnific deeds, 
Thy trophies which thou viewest not as thine own. (X 354-5) 
In both of these cases, Satan is producing unintentionally (whether the consequence is welcomed 
by him or not); he is thus creating irresponsibly. The last similar case of such activity on Satan's 
part is more complex. It is the origination of evil: Satan is the "Author of evil unknown" (VI 
262). This must have been unintentional since if Satan had known what he was doing in creating 
it would not have been "unknown". 5 This is a more difficult case because it broaches the general 
issues surrounding the problematic of evil in Puritan theology, and especially the doctrine of the 
felix culpa. Nevertheless, one can at the very least say that it is irresponsible: Satan did not 
consciously intend to create evil, it is at best an unintended by-product of a responsible action: 
that of his more or less carefully planned rebellion against the tyranny of God. 
This is the most unsophisticated, and today familiar, example of irresponsible creation: the 
unintended consequence. It is irresponsible, from the definition: the agent of the act has no 
definite concept of the product, the creative act is not subsumable under a general rule for the 
production of such objects, etc. But it decomposes into the unintended by-product of another 
action which is responsible. This is not the case for the second irresponsible agent of Paradise 
Lost: Milton himself. 
3References to Paradise Lost are to the book numbers of the second (expanded and now accepted) 
edition, and then to the line numbers. 
4Satan has actually forgotten these events; his memory is nudged by Sin's own recollections. See II 
727ff. 
)This is radicalisation of the problem faced by Adam and Eve in understanding the nature of the 
sanction of death for disobeying God's orders; paradisiac, they do not know what death is to be warned 
of it (IV 423, IX 282; 694). 
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Milton's irresponsibility is in fact endemic in the epic. His interventions in the narrative schema 
of the poem are complex and ambiguous, but here I want to focus on one such set of 
interventions, the invocations. These occur at the beginnings of Books I, III, VII and IX. In 
these he performs (among other things) a theoretical justification of the mode of production of 
the epic itself. The first thing to note about these passages is that they are traditional; but not in 
the sense of traditional Christianity; rather they represent a continuation of the pagan (classical) 
tradition of poetic inspiration.6 This causes the classically trained but equally Puritanical Milton 
not a few problems (see note 8 below). How can Milton appeal not only to a pagan system of 
thought-as he does in the invocations, but also, famously, almost everywhere else as well-but 
specifically to a pagan muse (whom he names in the third invocation as "Urania" (VII I)? And 
this, moreover, in an epic not only devoted to Christianity, but even to the legitimisation of 
Christianity: to ''justify the ways of God to man" (I 26)? 
I want to note here first the general significance of the tradition to which Milton belonged; then 
to specify the advances that Milton makes within the general structure of this tradition; and then 
suggesting what consequences the attempted merger of the pagan and the Christian has in this 
context. 
To begin, the general significance of the tradition is relatively easy to state. In terms of 
production theory, the tradition of musal inspiration is a case of irresponsible production. What 
the classical thought suggests (and this goes back at least as far as Plato's Ion) is that the author 
of the work of art does not lucidly, intentionally and efficaciously produce the product qua art-
work. Instead, the author acts as the conduit for an intention which surpasses the apparent 
author, an intention located precisely at the level of the muse. Supposed authors, in an important 
sense and an equally important formulation, do not know what they are doing, in producing the 
work of art. This is important. It is, in fact, not just an instance among others of irresponsible 
production; it also embodies a significant theoretical element. The bare evidence of irresponsible 
creation is just the existence of an act performed by an agent (often otherwise lucid) the concept 
for which we cannot in this case justifiably locate in the consciousness of the actual agent. The 
ancient account of inspiration goes beyond this-and is to this extent theoretical-in supposing 
60f course the pagan is also at issue in Satan's irresponsible productions whose force is something like 
the atlllgllorisis of Aristotle's analysis of tragedy. 
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that the mere fact that artists cannot be held responsible for the work that they produce warrants 
the introduction of another agent who, whilst being the locus of the intention, actually does 
nothing. To describe this situation, I shall introduce the vocabulary of the supposed agent to refer 
to the physical locus of the act; and the virtual agent to refer to the newly posited (dare one say 
fictional?) locus of the fugitive intention or actual creative capacity. 
We can briefly note that this is once again today a very familiar idea. The Romantic notion of the 
genius evidently has a strong connection to inspiration. Kant's theorisation of this thought for the 
German Romantic movement will be vital in the considerations of chapter 6 where the third 
Critique will be dredged for evidence of a suppressed materialist production theory. But also, it 
is far from clear that more modem theorisations of literary and artistic production have come 
fully to terms with this Romantic heritage. Marxist and Freudian readings of literary texts take 
this irresponsibility for granted; but even (post)modem theorists are operating with this classical 
dialectic of fugitive productive capacity. The structural movement locates the purported space of 
such creative capacity in linguistic structures (the structures of consciousness writ large, and 
hence unconsciously); and the negative critical impetus of deconstructive critique locates this 
capacity in a semi-impossible space of quasi-transcendental efficacy. The argument of this 
project will be to show that this theoretical impregnation of the bare evidence of irresponsibility, 
which starts with the notion of inspiration as deployed by Milton, is in fact, erroneous. The 
interpretation of irresponsibility made by the thought of inspiration is incorrect: there is no lost 
intention, and hence no need to posit either its displacement, or the locus for that displacement. 
There is still, one might say, a certain nostalgia for the loss of this intentional capacity, as if it 
could somehow, and perhaps only impossibly, be made up, on heaven if not on earth. But 
already the Platonic knot binding production to transcendence is beginning to loosen. 
Given this general background, how then does Milton mobilise this theoretics of irresponsible 
creation? Milton's particular realisation of this idea is striking mostly because of the extent of 
Milton's abjection before the Muse. If the essential structure of inspirational irresponsible 
creation is that the apparent agent is the tool of the real agent, then Milton must have readily 
enjoyed being used and manipulated in this way. The final invocation in Book IX of Paradise 
Lost expands self-consciously upon the mechanism of inspiration (as well as describing a 
somewhat libidinal encounter): 
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... my celestial patroness, who deigns 
Her nightly visitation unimplored, 
And dictates to me slumbering, or inspires 
Easy my unpremeditated verse (21-4) 
In this depiction, Milton goes beyond a refined gesture toward a classical forrnulism of which he 
is nevertheless obviously fond. He achieves instead a kind of limit case of inspiration: the actual 
transcription of someone else's words. All inspiration is involved with the abrogation of 
responsibility for the product on the part of the apparent producer or agent. But in this instance, 
the abrogation achieves such an intensity that one can scarcely call Milton's agency that of an 
actor at all-whether real or apparent in the technical senses introduced above. It appears rather 
as agency in the sense of agent/or someone else. The source of inspiration is thought as the 
location of the rule, factor or plan which governs the production of the work and which remains 
in a relation of complete exteriority to the apparently producing subject. This is evidently an 
example of irresponsible creation; but it also shares with the notion of inspiration the 
interpretation of irresponsibility which defers the supposedly missing intention. The absence of 
such a rule in the actually efficacious agent (even if introduced only through the conventions 
attaching to the classical epic form) is seen as demanding the positing of another in which to 
locate the rule. This is what restricts the producer to the role merely of the agent a/the other. 
The transcription of another's words as the constitution of the production of art supposes such 
an utter submission of the supposed author before the will of that other that it becomes more than 
merely irresponsible, it achieves the rank of pure zombie-ism.7 
The third aspect of Milton's account, the merging of the pagan and the Christian, is the most 
interesting. There has been much scholarly debate about the intertwining of pagan and sacred 
7William Hunter and Steve Davies, in their article 'Milton's Urania: "The Meaning, Not the Name I 
Call,'" (reprinted in William Bridges Hunter, The Descent of Urania: Studies in Milton, 1946-88, 
London & Toronto: Associated University Presses 1989) describe this state as "d~monic possession ... 
The Muse now possesses him as his automatic companion" (p. 37). Indeed Milton himself uses the 
model of possession in his personal papers. See James Holly Hanford, 'That Shepherd, Who First 
Taught the Chosen Seed', University of Toronto Quarterly viii (1939) pp. 41.lf. 
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references in the invocations.s However, what is assured, and all that is necessary here, is that 
Milton effects a slippage from the classical muse to the monotheistic God. In the first invocation 
especially, where he does not specifically invoke Urania, the appeal is made directly to God in 
the form of the Holy Spirit. He writes of "the heavenly muse" (I 5), and addresses his orison 
thus: "chiefly thou 0 Spirit" (I 17, italics added). 
This is problematic: Milton is going beyond a conventional analogy of the authorship of world 
with authorship proper, of the text.9 The assimilation he proposes provoked an outcry among 
contemporary critics who condemned "such saucy familiarity with a true God."JO In fact the clear 
implication is that he is identifying the source of the creation of Paradise Lost with the source of 
the creation of the world, and directly imploring God to re-create in the epic of His creation. By 
eliding the Pagan and the Christian, by appealing to the Muse as God, Milton puts the creation 
of the epic on the same footing as the creation of the universe. One can see the interest of this. 
The conventional analogy, which has not been thought through enough, implies that the creation 
of the cosmos is, like that of the inspired classical text, not responsible. 
This is evidently a very interesting result. But surely it is misplaced. The essential thing about 
the structure of the irresponsibility of inspired acts is that they are mediated. For there to be a 
distinction between the apparent and virtual agents of an act there must be two such agents. But 
in the creation of the cosmos, God is usually thought to have created directly and without 
mediation; only in the case of artistic inspiration does God create through an agent, and hence 
irresponsibly. This is, however, in Milton's account, not the case. Milton clearly and explicitly 
makes cosmological creation share the same mediated structure as artistic creation. And thus, the 
8See for instance Walter Schindler Voice and Crisis: Invocation in Milton's Poetry (Hamden, CN: 
Archon Books 1984) who remarks on "a long tradition of anxiety about invoking a pagan muse ... 
among Christian poets" (p. 6); and ER Gregory (Milton and the Muses Tuscaloosa & London, 
University of Alabama Press 1989, pp. 94f) or Davies and Hunter (ibid.). 
9The generalised-and rigorised-form of this analogy prompts Kant to treat aesthetics and teleology in 
the same work. See chapter 5. 
\(Uavenant, cited in John B Broadbent Some Graver Subject: An Essay on "Paradise Lost" (London 
1960) p. 67. 
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strong analogy stands. Amongst Milton's heresies is the Arian. II In its extreme forms this heresy 
was the denial of the divinity of the Son. Milton, however, held, and increasingly throughout his 
life, a reduced form of this which maintained the divinity of the Son; but asserted his separation 
from God the Father. This is very significant here because, in the epic, God delegates the actual 
production of the world-to the Son. 12 Thus the two creations--cosmological and artistic-are 
brought directly into contact with one another. In both cases God acts (if this is an appropriate 
word) only as the planner of the productions; in both cases there is another agent who involun-
tarily performs the activity. Milton and the Son: God's pair of zombies. Both creations are, in 
this extended sense, irresponsible. The irresponsible creation of the world is a thought pregnant 
with consequences. It is the first hint of an alternative mode of production which comes to infest 
even the core of theological presumption. 
William Empson, in his fine pagan and Oriental book on Paradise Lost, Milton's GOd,13 argues 
that Milton's Arianism is motivated by a basic moral concern. The danger which Milton faces, 
and which makes him see the project of justifying the ways of God to man as a project, is that 
God turns out to be wicked. For Milton to think that God needs (moral) justification before man 
contra the tradition of man needing to be justified before God, demonstrates that Milton thinks it 
is at least possible that God is evil. Where Empson emphasises the moral aspect of 
responsibility, I want to do the same with the productive aspect. Thus Milton tends, on Empson's 
lilt is notoriously difficult to classify Milton's heresies; they were worked out (like those of many of his 
contemporaries) in the exciting vacuum of the Interregnum, taking advantage of the absence of 
ecclesiastical authority, and the flourishing of ancient heretical doctrines whose history is opaque; and, 
in good Protestant (sola scriptura) spirit, often from basic exegetical work on the Bible. The results do 
not fit the established categories of traditional heresy. Perhaps Milton is not an Arian exactly. What is 
clear, and apropos here, is that the Son is not essentially one with God that and the Son is the 
instrument of creation. See The Complete Prose Works of John Milton under the general editorship of 
Don Wolfe, 8 Vols., New Haven, London & Oxford: Yale University Press & Oxford University Press, 
1956-82 (references in the text are to page numbers of volume 6, edited by Maurice Kelley which 
contains a translation of the Christian Doctrine by John Carey), p. 88. 
12"And thou my Word, begotten Son, by thee / This [the creation] I perform; speak thou, and be it 
done'" VII 163-4. 
I3London, Chatto & Windus, 1965. 
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view, toward a separation of God the Father and God the Son in order to deprive God of a moral 
responsibility which would make him both ugly and culpable; I shall argue that Milton's 
Arianism is motivated by an uneasiness with the possibility that God be responsibly productive 
at all, and in particular, a scepticism about whether God can be simultaneously lucid and active. 
It is, however, not at all clear that Milton can solve the problem of the productive modality of the 
creation by appealing to the theoretical structuring dictated by the analogue with artistic creation. 
The basic problem is that it looks like a logical regression. In the case of the artist it is at least 
feasible to interpret theoretically the evident failure of the artist to be responsible for artistic 
productions as the displacement of the locus of such responsibility onto the muse (or God). In the 
case of the creation, this move is not so easily made. If God is the creator, then He must create 
everything. And this, primajacie, at least, includes the Son. Thus the possibility of God 
engaging in a fully lucid and efficacious (that is, responsible) act of creation devolves onto the 
creation of the Son. 
This is made particularly problematic since, although Milton's private theological writings 
(which were not published until modem times) indicate that he was an Arian at the time of 
writing Paradise Lost, the intricacies of Restoration politics made it impossible to be clear about 
this in the published epic itself.14 However, there are evidently only these two options: that the 
Son be created or not. The created option is itself unstable. IS If He were created, then what was 
the mode of that production? If that mode were fully responsible, i.e. God had both the concept 
for the Son and produced Him out of His (God's) own creative power, then the whole problem 
I.tWhen Milton begins the second invocation in Book m with: "Hail, holy Light, offspring of Heaven 
firstborn, / Or of the Eternal coeternal beam", he is clearly equivocating. The first line argues the 
produced ness of the Son; the second denies it. 
15This argument degenerates into an arcanum on a heresy. Perhaps this is the point: by shifting the 
important moment of the argument onto something as seemingly irrelevant as the mode of production of 
the Son; Milton can evade, rhetorically at least, having to deal with it. The evidence that exists in the 
epic suggests that the Son, if created at all, is created irresponsibly. This evidence is the triple analogy 
between Satan's production of Sin (irresponsible), Zeus' production of Pallas Athene (irresponsible 
again) and God's production of the Son (analogically irresponsible). This in fact tends to indicate that 
God is Himself, in His only now directly productive act, the agent of another (this is the model of 
irresponsible creation). 
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collapses into God qua responsible creator. And then, of course, one has to wonder why Milton 
made the separation in the first place. That is, this option generates no motivation for Milton's 
Arianism. 16 If, on the other hand, this too is an irresponsible creation, then it too must have been 
mediated; and this clearly generates a regression which, if it is not to be infmite, must break 
down into a fork where the mediating agent of the irresponsible production is itself uncreated. 
If the Son-creator (or whatever mediating agent is left; the Son evidently inherits His creative 
power from this agent and not from God) be uncreated, then we are left with a God in the 
somewhat compromised position of full lucidity combined with omni-impotence; a God who can 
think everything, but actually do nothing. Furthermore, the Son begins to be something of a rival 
to God. No longer properly the Son, not having been created, this Being would be a separate 
power from God, rivalling Him in the manner of a Manichean dualism. In fact this Being would 
be the only actual power, and God-this virtual God-would be incessantly dependent upon 
Him for the sullied capacity to perform. The fleshy incarnation of the Son would then become 
His prime characteristic. The new Son would the representative of a corporeal or material 
capacity to create, lacking only the ordering potential of the Father. This new Son would be the 
first representative of active matter; thought, initially, perhaps, as unformed activity. 
I want here to suggest another option: that the whole interpretation or theory of irresponsible 
creation, lodged in the model of irresponsible authorship is itself wrong. The two options above 
would then have the status of being two forks of a triple reductio ad absurdum. If the 
irresponsibility of creation is to be thought on the model of a displacement of responsibility then 
either God is unable actually to do anything; or the regression of agency would be unlimited-
infinite regression. If these two forks are unacceptable, then the premise must be false. Therefore 
production-creation cannot be thought according to the displacement of an absent intention. 17 If 
16This holds as much for Empson's version of responsibility as for mine. 
17Perhaps in fact an infinity of displacements of intentional transitivity is a sort of asymptotic way of 
understanding the intransitivity of creation-production: an infinite regression tending in a calculus-like 
manner toward the intransitivity of fully and blankly irresponsible creation. This suggestion might be 
compared with the proliferation of archontes in Gnostic theology, which remove God so far that at the 
limit He disappears altogether. Freud comments on the notion of endless series: "We have learnt from 
psychoanalysis ... that the notion of something irreplaceable ... frequently appears as broken up into an 
endless series: endless for the reason that every surrogate nevertheless fails to provide the desired 
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Milton is on to something in proliferating examples of irresponsibility through the epic; if this is 
responding to some implicit problematic around the notion of the creation, then perhaps the 
theorisation of irresponsibility as a lack of conceptual lucidity which must be made up elsewhere, 
in another posited agent, the virtual agent, is only an approximation for something else. Rather 
than supposing that our incapacity to explain what is going on in certain situations-our need 
for a concept, rule or intention where there does not appear to be one--demonstrates that we just 
have not yetfound the intention (and that therefore we must posit it in another place), we might 
instead suppose that creation does not happen consciously at all. This nostalgia for something 
lost is, as I have suggested above, still prevalent today. As yet, this something else can only be 
thought negatively: creation without concept, rule intention and so on. One might call this blank 
irresponsibility. In fact, the characterisation of this is not completely negative. It already comes 
across as power or force, some actual efficacy (as opposed to God's lonely and transcendent 
isolation). The next section will take another of Milton's heresies and use it to start to fill out a 
positive characterisation for this efficacy, or mode of production, through the notion of 
materiality. 
Creation and the ex nihilo 
Milton denies that God created the world ex nihilo, out of nothing; and hence introduces a 
concept of prime matter into his heretical theology. The argument is simple, and Milton's 
discussion of it speaks for itself. He writes: 
... it is certain that neither the Hebrew verb bara, nor the Greek 1('t1.~EtV, nor the Latin 
creare means "to make out of nothing." On the contrary, each of them always means 
"to make out of something." ... It is clear then that the world was made out of some 
sort of matter. For since "action" and "passivity" are relative terms, and since no 
agent can act externally unless there is something, and something material, which can 
be acted upon, it is apparent that God could not have created this world out of 
nothing. (pp. 304-5; 305; 307). 
So far Milton is not necessarily registering any novel move: the Aristotelian input into 
Christianity had dictated not just a general adherence to hylomorphism (the doctrine of fonn and 
satisfaction." (' A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men: Contributions to the Psychology of 
Love r PFL 7:236). 
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matter), but also had led even Augustine to think of the prime matter of the universe as at least a 
problem. What is novel is Milton's reliance on the general-grammatical and structural-
transitivity of creation. This deprives him of Augustine's solution (which is also the traditional 
one) to the problem: that is Milton can no longer easily argue that this prime matter was simply 
created by God at some earlier, and unspecified, point. 18 If creation is essentially transitive then 
the creation of this prime matter of the creation of the cosmos would itself demand the prior 
existence of yet another matter out of which the first matter must be created. The danger of an 
infinite regress is obvious; and Milton was aware of this difficulty. However, the most obvious 
solution, that matter exists co-eternally with God, comes dangerously close to Manicheanism; 
and this was also unacceptable to Milton. Thus Milton has to steer his thinking between a rock 
and a hard place. He does it thus: 
Since, then, both the Holy Scriptures and reason itself suggest that all these things 
were not made out of nothing but out of matter, matter must always have existed 
independently of God [i.e. dangerously close to Manicheanism], or else originated 
from God at some point in time [i.e., on the face of it, have been itself created at an 
earlier point]. That matter should have always existed independently of God is 
inconceivable [i.e. Manicheanism is heretical and must be rejected] .... But if matter 
did not exist from eternity it is not easy to see where it originally came from [!] [i.e. it 
could not have just been created, since the argument would demand a regressive type 
of proto-matter etc.]. [Thus] God produced all things not out of nothing but out of 
himself [i.e. matter is, substantially, one with God] ( pp. 307; 310). 
Milton's solution to the dilemma of course pretty much vitiates the point which led him there in 
the first place, the point about the transitivity of creation: if the matter out of which the creation 
proceeds is the same thing as God, then it is really unclear that this creation still counts as 
transitive. Nevertheless, this solution is not without interest. Its relation to Spinoza's God is 
engaging, as is the implication of atheism which such a similarity provokes. Here I want to note 
two things. First, there is a similarity in the problem which Milton faces concerning matter with 
the structure of the problem he faced over the apparent irresponsibility of creation analysed in 
the previous section; and second, that Milton, in the poetry, and especially, Paradise Lost, 
contests the solution provided in the theology. 
18 Augustine's argument comes in the Confessions, Book XU, §22. 
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First: the structure of the problematics that Milton responds to in both these cases is strikingly 
similar. Ifhe is to do justice to the (concealed) demands which motivate these problematics, then 
he is forced into accepting grave limitations on God's creative-productive power. The first case, 
that of the irresponsibility of the creation, forces Milton into thinking the Son as an autonomous 
area of efficacy (and God himself as little more than an infinitely efficient manager who 
delegates all actual tasks onto the Son). The only other solution is to push back the problem of 
the essence of God's creation onto the creation of the Son; and this in tum breaks down into a 
regression if this creation is itself irresponsible, or into a denial of the problematic if this creation 
is itself responsible (why not just make the creation itself responsible? see above). Similarly here, 
Milton is forced into acknowledging the threatening presence of a prime matter independent of 
God. To make this matter created evidently just pushes the problem back into a regress which 
can only be stopped by an ex nihilo creation or by a prime matter. Milton's own solution, in so 
far as it is forthcoming at all, is, in neither case, particularly compelling. 
Furthermore, the problems intersect actually and not just structurally. God appears to be limited 
crucially from both ends: He is on the one hand faced with an intransigent materiality whose 
opacity escapes Him, and on the other with a power or capacity to act (presumably on this very 
materiality) which is itself both independent of Him and autonomous. Power and matter both 
being fugitive to God, His presence recedes into a virtual space of pure consciousness and utter 
ideality as incapable of acting as of acting upon anything. This is a profound insight into the 
nature of ideal production on Milton's (implicit) part. 
Second, concerning the relation of Milton's poetry (or poetic theology) to his (prosaic) theology, 
I have already disregarded Milton's theological suggestion for the solution to the second dilemma 
(of materiality). But it is not clear that it is even his preferred solution. I would like here to 
reiterate the importance of a distinction between prose and poetry. Prose, or theory (here 
theology) is the domain of a thinking constrained, almost transcendentally, by an ideal rigor, of 
logic (the principle of non-contradiction, for instance) which renders it inhibited in the face of the 
unknown. Poetry is, although not in a complete or necessarily thorough-going way, an attempt at 
disinhibition in the face this danger. Thus, the original presence of materiality could not be 
proclaimed propositionally in his theology: it would have amounted to Manicheanism; and that 
was one heresy too far for Milton. But prime materiality is present in his poetry. This materiality 
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goes under the various names of (Eldest) Night, the vast abrupt, the abyss, and most often of all, 
under the name Chaos. Moreover, Milton writes this of base matter in Paradise Lost: 
... the wide womb of uncreated night 
Devoid of sense or reason. (II 149-151) 
Here everything is said at once: the context is exploratory, Satan is setting off on his voyage 
across Chaos to the 'New World' (this one-but the resonance is obvious), into the unknown; 
matter is presented as the origin of nature (I will discuss this later). Matter is unreasonable, and, 
most important here, uncreated. The materiality which traverses and transects the pages of the 
epic is not even pretending to be that of Milton's theological tract, at one with God's (ideal) 
substance; this matter is explicitly, although poetically, aboriginal. It, like the Son (or agent of 
God in general) vies with God explicitly: in the beginning, God is not alone. 
Milton's Wilderness 
In this section looks more closely at materiality and production in Paradise Lost. The aim will be 
to demonstrate that Milton's thought of matter is indeed a productive one (in both senses). 
Further, its mode of production is that of the blank irresponsibility indicated as a line of thought 
in the first section. This section will, then, attempt to synthesise the thoughts of irresponsibility 
and materiality which were the problematics of the previous two sections. 
Before doing this, however, it is vital to recognise the heterodox constitution of such materiality. 
Matter has been, at least since Aristotle, merely the absence of form; as such it was already an 
abstraction. Milton carefully deploys the traditional hylomorphic distribution of labour between 
form and matter in his prosaic theology: form is active (in creation); and matter is patient. This 
traditional formulation has already been under attack: how far is God actually active if he is 
merely a planner, an intellectual labourer? Nevertheless, this conception of materiality is an 
extremely common and powerful one, extending from Aristotle through Pascal into Kant and 
beyond. Nor is it absent from Milton's poetry (poetry does not need to be consistent). Milton 
writes in Paradise Lost of "the void and formless infmite" (III 12); "the formless mass, / This 
world's material mould" (III 709-10); "Matter unformed and void" (VII 233). I shall introduce 
the technical term dead matter to refer to this traditional conception of materiality. 
There is, however, another kind of matter which infests the epic. A startling introduction to this 
is made at the beginning where Milton glosses briefly (in the course of the first invocation) the 
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first verses of Genesis. The register is that of the sexualisation of hylomorphism (itself utterly 
immersed in the tradition; it is the first 'metaphord9): spirit, ideality, form, and God are male in 
their apparent activity; and matter is gendered female in its apparent passivity. This distinction is 
troublingly dislocated when Milton writes of the Spirit that it: 
Dove-like sat'st brooding on the vast abyss 
And madest it pregnant. (I 22-3) 
Here the "vast abyss" is the representative of matter; and "Spirit" is the formative principle and 
subject of the citation. But within the space of only two lines the genders are confused: Spirit is 
obviously masculine and matter feminine in the impregnation of the last line, but the dove 
"broods",20 which is already both to conceive or meditate and also to nurture an already teeming 
matter. The bizarre implications of this last are made clear in the next Book. There the 
preliminary confusion of the division of creative labour is converted into a complete vitiation: in 
Book I God has to impregnate unformed matter with Its (His) form, to make it (her) pregnant; 
but by Book II It (He) discovers that it (she) is in fact already pregnant: "All these [elements] in 
their pregnant causes mix' d" (II 913, italics added). This scene of God's cosmic cuckoldry is 
dramatically as well as cosmologically compelling. It points to the notion of active matter. 
Actually, the notion of cuckoldry here is only approximate. It is not that God has been duped, 
and one of His peers (Lancelot-like) has impregnated matter, rather than that God Himself 
performed the impregnation of matter, as it were, conjugally. This would be no more interesting 
than a substitution of operators. Instead, the point is that matter is itself imbued with an activity 
which has nothing to do with form. There has been no cuckoldry, then, in which the terms of 
masculine activity and feminine passivity remain, with only the operator changing. Instead what 
has occurred is an unseating of the structure of hylomorphism and its attendant sexualised 
division of creative-productive labour which as been replaced by what amounts to a 
parthenogenic seizure and reconfiguration of the means of (re)production. 
19P1ato, Timaeus 50. 
2°Milton is referring to Genesis 1.2 and correcting what he regards as a mistranslation in the 
Authorised Version with reference to the Vulgate incubat. At VD 234-5. in the section of the epic 
depiction of creation corresponding to this passage of Genesis, he makes the allusion evident: ..... but on 
the watery calm / His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread". 
24 
These gender dynamics of materiality provide, however, only Milton's fIrst revelation of active 
matter. There follow a number of others. The fIrst, and most extensive, is in the scene of Chaos 
that Satan faces in his heroic explorations at the end of Book II. A second, and what one might 
call intensive, intervention is in the wilderness. I shall take these in order. 
First, let us take the presentation of Chaos. Between lines 889 and 1037 of Book II, Milton gives 
a precise and extended description of Chaos and old Night, the primary representatives of active 
matter in the epic. The passage is based on the opening of Ovid's Metamorphoses, and has its 
ultimate ancestor in Anaxagoras. It borrows from Ovid a martial register: "endless wars" (897) 
whose protagonists are the elements themselves ("Hot, Cold, Moist and Dry" 898). The locus of 
this war is fluid: an "illimitable ocean" (891) through which Satan must fly (928). However, 
Milton is sensitive to the problem of the constitution of a locus which presupposes the 
combatants (the elements): the space in which this battle occurs cannot be itself fluid when the 
elements themselves constitute fluidity. Milton pays attention to this by citing the indeterminacy 
of the space for the combat: "neither sea / Nor good dry land" (939-40). However, the difficulty 
is evidently more radical than this. The elements themselves are not quite elemental. In a 
departure from Ovid who references them as "things [rei]", they take on Milton rather the 
dimension of forces, or as Milton writes: "causes" (913). Even this does not go far enough: they 
are rather pre-forces: "embryon ... causes mixed / Confusedly" (900; 912-3). And in the end 
Milton is in fact compelled to deprive them of even this solidity: "neither Sea, nor Shore, nor Air, 
nor Fire" (912). 
Similarly, the character of the war at issue here must be removed from concerns of territorial 
gain (there is no territory); and even from the (rational-technical and teleological) notion of gain 
itself: the proto-combatants "Swarm populous" (913) and factional victories are essentially 
unstable: "To whom these most adhere / He rules a moment" (906-7, italics added). Milton here 
accelerates the teleological presuppositions of warfare to such an extent that the very thought of 
a goal of warfare becomes absurd. He presents us with a speeded-up fIlm, generated though 
time-lapse photography of the aristocratic warmongering of Early Modem Europe, which 
thereby loses the meaning it has at a slow anthropomorphic pace. To be doubly anachronistic, it 
is a militarism lodged more in Sun Tzu than in Clauswitz. 
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What is at stake in this confusion (which Milton deploys apparently consciously)? The problem 
that Milton is facing here is that of (characterising) radical materiality. Chaos (which is a term 
for prime matter) is a materiality which is more material than the empirical (here represented by 
the term Nature); more, it is beyond even the terms of nature, beyond the field or site on which 
Nature plays itself out. Milton elaborates: Chaos is 
... without bound, 
Without dimension; where length, bredth, and highth, 
And time, and place, are lost; where eldest Night 
And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold 
Eternal anarchy ... 
The womb of nature, and perhaps her grave (891-4; 910) 
Chaos, prime and active matter, is prior (in some sense) to nature. Indeed, one might go so far as 
to describe this priority as a transcendental one; both in the sense of Kant's noumenon, exterior 
to nature qua phenomenon; and also as condition of nature. Chaos exemplifies therefore the 
notion of material condition. This explains the movement of Milton's vocabulary: he is avoiding 
reducing this active matter to the dead matter of the tradition which is inscribed abstractly in the 
ambit of nature. Most particularly here, he attends to the fact that the mode of production of 
Chaos or active matter cannot be that of natural production. This is an important point: natural 
or empirical production is, as a part of the empirical, a consequence (of a certain type) of Chaos 
whose mode of production or activity cannot therefore be the same as that of the natural. In this 
characterisation of the wars of the elements in Chaos, Milton achieves a more rigorous, although 
still paradoxical, theorisation of the interrogations of irresponsible creation. 
To summarise: Milton's characterisation of Chaos in Paradise Lost unites the characteristics 
both of irresponsibility in active creation and of prime, that is pre-natural, materiality, which 
were the subjects of the preliminary investigations of the problematics of artistic production in its 
relation to the creation and the theology of the ex nihilo. There is no hint, in the prose theological 
writings, of this move. Matter there is seamlessly and uniformly thought as dead, passive. What I 
hope to have demonstrated here is not only that Milton has a preliminary characterisation of the 
activity of this matter in the poetry, but that he has one which does not even reduce active matter 
to unformed activity. The deformed military vocabulary of the depiction of Chaos demonstrates 
at once the pre-empirical materiality of Chaos, and its auto-morphogenic capacity. Matter, qua 
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Chaos, is not just active, but also demonstrates mobile traits of semi-formality, fluid coalitions of 
radical elementalities which coalesce and disperse in a proto-morphic manner. The objectality of 
nature is dispersed, but not broken up in a pure nothingness. The accelerated swiftness of these 
transitions approximates to a conception of becoming which aims, intentionally or teleologically, 
at no particular outcome, but which nevertheless acts and produces. 
It follows rigorously that the mode of production of the pre-empiricity of Chaos cannot be 
modelled on a form of natural production (whether casual or teleological-intentional). But this 
would be a merely negative formulation. From the start, Milton resists such negativity. Even in 
the interrogation of irresponsible creation, he demands that irresponsible production be thought 
positively. His venture there at positivity, however, comes down to a desperate attempt to fmd 
some acceptable space for the fugitive intention, which, it is assumed, must be there, for there to 
be action at all. (One might present this as a consideration in the need at all for a God: site of 
supposedly lost intentions). The consequence of this is, as we have seen, that this space, God, 
turns out not to be able to act at all. But Chaos presents a further positive characterisation which 
appears to demand no intention. There is no lost intention, no intention at all; and yet, there is 
activity, production. To conclude this discussion on another anachronistic note: Milton's Chaos 
bears more relation to what recent science has designated by the term, than what is commonly 
designated: Chaotic activity is precisely the site of production of formality, and not its lack. 
There is no lack in Chaos. 
To take the second positive characterisation of materiality and its mode of production: the full 
extent of the infestation of active matter-both its conceptual innovation and its prevalence in 
Milton's text--can best be demonstrated by an analysis of the wilderness. The wilderness in 
general occupies a double positioning in the cultural theology of the frontier, especially in the 
minds of the early American Puritan settlers. It is on the one hand the Atlantic ocean, the space 
of trial, test and temptation through which the settlers travelled in order to reach the new 
promised land; but it became, on the other, that land itself: the densely forested regions of New 
England providing an analogue for the ancient Northern European forests, the annihilation of 
which was always the primary condition for European culture. 
In Milton similarly the thought has a double valency; although one which can only be 
approximated by the problematic elision of means and end which troubled the settlers. Paradise 
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Regained is located, according to tradition, in the wilderness and it is treated as a (meta)physical 
space. In Paradise Lost however, the wilderness is most evident operating in an adjectival way, 
closely bound up with a set of other irruptive adjectival terms supplementing and distorting the 
biblical and barbarian localisations and connecting the vocabularies of external and internal 
topology: wild, wanton, waste, outrageous, extravagant. The two uses correspond to the contrast 
between the desert and the forest; and more generally between the space, or realm, and the non-
spatial or adjectival frontier. The difference between the wilderness as desert and as forest, is the 
difference between Christian and pagan, is the difference between dead and live matter.21 
Chaos is the matter out of which the civilised church must be formed or created; it is the 
universal wilderness. It is therefore un surprising that chaos merits (repeated and prolonged) 
description as wild: it is "a wild abyss," "Dark, waste, and wild;" "chaos wild;" "Outrageous as 
a sea, dark, wasteful, wild;" the "waste / Wild, anarchy of Chaos, damp and dark."n Nor is it 
particularly shocking that Hell should be a "dismal situation waste and wild" (I 60). Indeed, it is 
the wildness of these which informs the unconstrained activity that itself increasingly threatens to 
deprive God's creation of its power. But it is more provocative that every other cosmological and 
mundane topos, including the interior one of the brain23 should also be depicted from the same 
range of vocabulary. Thus "There is wild work in heaven" whose obvious ascription to Satan's 
rebellion is vitiated by the "extravagant and wild" dance which even the elect angels perform (VI 
698; 616). And, most interesting of all, the prelapsarian state of Eden is one where: 
[Nature] Wanton'd as in her prime, and play'd at will 
Her virgin fancies pouring forth more sweet, 
Wild above rule or art. (V 295-7) 
Wild above rule or art: the luxuriance of nature partakes of the same unbounded activity as that 
of "the womb of nature" (II 911), chaos. Milton immediately refers to Eden as "Earth's inmost 
womb" (V 301), recalling the exact formulation of his description of Chaos. The running to wild 
of this garden produces free formations of growth which are not incompatible with the mobility 
21For all this see Roderick Nash Wilderness and the American Mind Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1973). 
2211 917; III 424; V 577; VII 212; X 282-3. This does not pretend to be an exhaustive list. 
23 Paradise Lost V 100f. 
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and flexibility of the elemental surges of chaos; it is imbued with modulations of the extrava-
gance of the wild which are of relative intensity and not of type (as between form and matter). 
And, what is most to the point, this mode of activity is precisely that of Nature: nature does not 
act in accord with natural (responsible) production. This is the significance of the adjectival, 
counter-territorial character of the wild(emess): this mode of activity infests everything, even the 
loci from which it is supposed to be absent. This is a particularly interesting result. We start out 
from a model of natural or empirical production, specifically here that of responsible intentional 
creation. Next we find that this mode does not explain creations which are, in a set of significant 
instances, irresponsible. Then we find that even the recuperation of responsibility in the 
displacement of the supposedly fugitive intention onto another, virtual, agent, does not work 
either; instead we find that there is a pre-empirical materiality which demonstrates both 
irresponsible production and needs no further locus added on in thought to explain what is going 
on. Now, finally, we find that nature (or the empirical) itself, the supposed model for production 
is not natural either; that is to say, nature demonstrates, in this instance, the mode of production 
of Chaos, of the pre-empirical. 
The phrase 'Wild above rule or art' requires particular attention. The wild(emess) is that specific 
type of (material) activity which transcends (in the everyday sense) both the rule or concept of 
active production-that is to say, the intention-and cannot be reduced to art. Thus the mode of 
activity of the wild(emess) is precisely a mode of irresponsible activity which does not 
presuppose the positing of such an intention in the mind of an equally posited entity who would 
recuperate the irresponsibility (converting it ultimately into an automatic zombie-ism) by being 
the implied or virtual subject of the action. This is an extremely important passage. In fact I am 
going to treat it as the definition of the wild(emess).24 It demonstrates that Milton has a concept 
of production which is explicitly unimpeded by intentionality and responsibility, and one which 
he also explicitly states is above the artistic mode of production, i.e. is not reducible to the action 
of a displaced intention. The ubiquity of this mode of action (or production) ought to provide the 
resources not only for explaining the other modes of activity, and hence of solving the regressive 
problems with which Milton grappled more or less openly, and which are here given weight; but 
also, and here, more importantly, for explaining why they went wrong in the first place: why, 
21Indeed, in the same passage, Milton calls Eden the "wilderness of sweets" (V 294). 
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that is, Milton suggests a problematic of creative regression, especially at the material end, but 
also at the ideal end (God). The wild(erness) represents, then, a more adequate interpretation of 
the irresponsibility of artistic production-creation; and therefore warrants our substituting blank 
irresponsibility as the appropriate character of this mode. 
God's only even possible role had already been reduced to that of mere manager, a senile old 
chief executive officer palmed off with the trappings of office; but this defmition of material 
activity appears to deprive Him even of that: the presupposition of intentional deferral, that, 
given a putative instance of irresponsible production, one must somehow account for it with an 
intention, by deferring the locus of the refractory concept, is no longer necessary. There is 
another mode of production which is counter-conceptual in a strong sense: it requires no 
intention at all, rather than lacking one which must be made up elsewhere, by displacement. God 
has finally been made redundant, overtaken by a production which had seemed to pertain to Him, 
irresponsibility, but which turns out to be the mode of production of radical materiality. 
Territorialisation 
This is the position: we have demonstrated that God, posited as the locus of displaced concepts 
on the ground of the unintelligibility of conceptless production, was assailed by a matter which 
exceeded Him, and by a productive force which was not His. We then noted that this conceptless 
production is actually instantiated in the poetic texts of Milton, in the wild(erness) as the mode of 
activity of Chaos. It is true that one must from this draw the conclusion that God is redundant, is 
unnecessary for production; but nevertheless, is there not something else going on? What, for 
instance is the relation between the two types of matter, dead and alive? And if God is not the 
active agent of production, then: what is He doing? what is He even presented as doing? if He is 
not doing anything then what is His role in the conceptual economy of production? This section 
will attempt to answer these questions; and to make another theoretical advance in the model 
offered as a result. 
What God does can be answered by referring to the passage in Paradise Lost where the creation 
(of this world) is actually depicted: the pivotal Book VII. To this end, the notion of the territory 
is instructive. Eden is a walled garden; heaven, a "kingdom," "impregnable," "bounded" (II 
131); Hell, a "region" and a "territory" (I 242). Only chaos occupies no readily assignable 
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spatio-temporal and sealed position; and has no lord but only, in Milton's quaint neologism, the 
miserable "Anarch," Chance (II 988). Chaos is no land but is an 
Illimitable ocean, without bound, 
Without dimension, where length, breadth, and height, 
And time and place are lost. (II 892-4) 
This distinction-between the spatio-temporal allocation of discernible and at least relatively 
stable objectivity, and the pre-spatio-temporal ocean characterised by flows of indiscernability-
is vital. One must add that this is a radical distinction. It operates between the pre-empirical and 
the empirical, it is not contained or bounded (this would presuppose the territoriality of the 
empirical which is at stake here) by the empirical itself. So the fluidity of the ocean is the 
wildness of the wild(erness): it is prior to the constitution of something which flows, it is even 
pre-elemental, pure flow or immanent transition: the auto-production of meta-stable states.25 
So, what does Milton's God-or rather his appointed representative-actually do at the 
creation? So far only the early appearance of prime matter in the description of Chaos as Satan 
travelled across it has been subjected to analysis. What happens in the creation, in the passage in 
Book VII, which parallels the beginning of Genesis? 
On heavenly ground they [God and the Son] stood; and from the shore 
They viewed the vast immeasurable abyss 
Outrageous as a sea, dark, wasteful, wild, 
Up from the bottom turned by furious winds 
And surging waves, as mountains, to assault 
Heaven's highth, and with the centre mix the pole. 
Silence, ye troubled Waves, and thou Deep, peace, 
Said then the Omnifick Word; your discord end! 
Nor staid; but, on the wings of Cherubim 
Uplifted, in paternal glory rode 
25This distinction is a clearly Kantian one: in the first Critique he distinguishes the territory of 
experience from the ocean of the noumenon (A 396). In the third Critique (Introduction III) he develops 
a whole categorisation of the de-limitations of the vocabulary of the territory. The ocean also makes a 
set of interesting and ambiguous interventions in the account of the sublime (§§ 23;29). See below 
chapter 7 pp. 176f. 
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Far into Chaos, and the world unborn; 
For Chaos heard his voice: Him all his train 
Followed in bright procession, to behold 
Creation, and the wonders of his might. 
Then staid the fervid wheels, and in his hand 
He took the golden compasses, prepared 
In God's eternal store, to circumscribe 
This universe, and all created things: 
One foot he centred, and the other turned 
Round through the vast profundity obscure; 
And said, Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds, 
This be thy just circumference, 0 World! 
Thus God the Heaven created, thus the Earth, 
Matter unformed and void: Darkness profound 
Covered the abyss: but on the watery calm 
His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread (VII 209-230) 
Here the relation between the oceanic flux of pre-empirical Chaos and the stability and security 
of the territory becomes clear at the same time as God's actual function does. Milton's God's 
role, the only one that remains to him, is peculiarly restricted. It is that of "circumscribing I The 
universe" (VII 226-7), of simply containing and setting bounds to the ocean, of converting it into 
a reservoir. In his account of the Biblical creation Milton has God perform an act of binding 
upon the active materiality of the "outrageous ocean" whose product is dead matter, the matter 
of the tradition: the "matter unformed and void". And this is the "watery calm" (229) over which 
the spirit may now, and only now, impudently, move. The essence of Milton's heresy is that for 
the creation even to appear to occur responsibly, there must, as condition, be a pre-creative move 
which serves primarily to repress, stunt and constrain the irresponsibly morphogenetic capacity 
of the wilderness I ocean. It is only then that the creation may proceed according to the plan laid 
out in Genesis, and be provided with its now lethargic and receptive dead matter. The creation is 
less an act of production, than an act of (attempted) hylecide. 
The relation between the hitherto incompatible and ambiguous types of matter-the dead matter 
of the tradition and the active matter of chaos-thus becomes clear. The primary action of 
hylomorphism has a presupposition. The two types of matter, dead and alive, are ordered and 
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distributed into a closed hierarchical series. First, matter must be prepared, scientifically, to 
receive form. Live matter must be assassinated; a process of blanching, the induction of anaemia, 
devitalisation. There is thus a product of this process of pre-formation of matter-the corpse of 
chaos. It is this that spirit, bloated with the life-blood of its victim, an impudent and necrophilic 
vampire, may then impregnate.26 
There is a whole repressed history of matter in this short account of the actual process of 
Milton's God's creation. Active matter is primary, signalled by an automatic morphogenesis that 
makes formality redundant. Dead matter is produced-or rather, pre-produced-by a process of 
the extraction and aggregation of all traits of mobile formality, and their condensation into a 
unique locus of pure formality: God, the concept, intentionality. The two types of 'empirical' 
production-mechanical cause and teleological or intentional desire, responsible creation-
mutually imply each other. Once active matter has been assassinated into dead matter, then a 
space of pure formality is necessary for matter to do anything at all. The morphe and the hyle of 
hylomorphism are necessarily connected with each other. They bi-imply each other like subject 
and object: grammatically, transitively. 
Production by means of lucid concepts (God's mode of production, but also that of 
transcendental idealism)27 is therefore only problematically an empirical production. The real 
issue is that of the construction of a zone of pure form (lucidity)which responds to matter 
thought as void of activity. Intentional production, responsible production, artisanal models of 
production, and transcendental production are all responses to this problematic. Once matter has 
been killed, natural production is exhausted by mechanical causation. The operation of the pure 
morphe on this matter in hylomorphism looks unnatural only because matter has been previously 
impoverished to the point of mere mechanism. Much of modem philosophy has been 
characterised by an increasingly vain meditation of the rigor of a thought of a production which 
is no longer natural. This has the effect of continuing the trajectory of theological production into 
transcendence. The demand for a production whose product is natural production (cause )-and 
which therefore cannot be identical with natural production-leads-in the absence of an 
interrogation of nature itself-to a thought of unnatural production (God's production). The 
26This vocabulary is a reference to Marx's theory of exploitation. See below chapter 7 pp. 183. 
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mistake of the West is repeated: the dirty task of production is welded to the thought of 
transcendence. 
But the importance of a mode of production that is specifically distinct from empirical 
productions is not that it is more unnatural than natural production, but that it is outside of the 
scope of both the empirical-mechanical production of dead matter, and of the spiritual, logical, 
lucid, teleological, intentional production which is the direct correlate of dead matter (hylo-
morphism). Such a production is itself natural, Milton's Chaos, Milton's wilderness once again, 
differentiating itself through its repetition. Such a production is also intransitive in that it takes 
no objects and has no subjects. Transitive production is the result of a paralogism which 
illegitimately hypostatises (or in some way refines out of matter) what matter can do, and 
separates matter from its capacities.28 
God's redundancy is therefore marked with a positive sign. He is not even represented as 
producing, but rather reducing the surging energies of proto-formative matter to its abstract and 
dead concomitant. But where could He get even the energy to this, given the earlier arguments 
about His (in)efficacy? This energy must have its origin in the very base matter which He 
constrains. The notion of active matter indicates primarily the immanence of chaotic 
morphogenesis to prime materiality. The result of God's intervention is to present this 
immanence transcendently: He (appears as if He) simultaneously appropriates the energetic 
aspect of prime materiality, and precipitates out the dull residue of dead matter. It is a corollary 
of the production of dead matter out of active matter that all activity is thenceforth the province 
of the ideal, of God (etc.). God's act is that of primal and illegitimate partition (in a juridical-
territorial sense): dividing the immanent efficacy of materiality into a spontaneous (but as we 
have seen nevertheless impotent) ideality and a receptive materiality whose only function is to 
provide the resting place for the formal. Such a move is evidently and interestingly illegitimate 
since its performance presupposes that God has an energy which He can only have after the 
move is completed. This is a rigorous definition of transcendence or illegitimacy: that an activity 
28Deleuze's account of Nietzsche's thought of reactive forces is "force separated from what it can do." 
See Nil,tzsche et fa philosophie (Paris: Presses Universiaires de France 1962) trans. by Hugh Tomlinson 
as Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Athlone 1986). 
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(a synthesis) is applied legitimately only if it does not already presuppose its own application. 29 It 
is the residues of this illegitimacy, the impossibility of formulating ideal production, which we 
have been following up to now. Clearly, although God's actual performance is repressive rather 
than creative, even this repression cannot legitimately be attributed to God's autonomous power. 
Any power is rather predicated upon just this move. One is compelled to broach a thought of 
repression that does not presuppose a dualism of forces. 30 
This section has attempted to show that the best way of understanding the creation is in terms of 
repression. The fundamentals of this are evident from Milton's account. It obviously involves the 
suppression of the activity of Chaos; a suppression whose result is the God / dead matter couplet 
of the tradition. The inadequacy of this view has already been demonstrated. The further 
contention has been that the only way to think even this residue of activity on God's part is on 
the basis of the auto-repression of active matter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed primarily to establish a notion of material production which operates 
according to procedures different from those of the ideal responsible production attributed to 
God. I have named this thought active matter. The consequences of this excavation are 
enormous: not only is God marked by a certain inefficacy as a result, but His (residual) activity 
can best be accounted for in terms of repression; and further, this repression does not presuppose 
a conflict which demands a fundamental dualism of forces, not even that residual force of the 
subject required for repression. 
But this is not to be taken to imply that one must just leave the subject--or representation 
thought, or God--out of the discussion once their redundancy has been demonstrated. Rather, 
there is not a little pleasure which can be taken backwards, so to speak, in perversity, through 
beholding the extent to which subject-thought~ependent as it always is on a theory of 
production-twists itself out of itself into the novel space of active materiality. It is not just the 
case that subjectivity, representation, God and Man (state, ego etc.) are constituted as specific, 
though odd and eccentric and ultimately rather unimportant, configurations of wantonly synthetic 
29This is Deleuze's and Guattari's definition of (i1)legitimacy in Anti-Oedipus, trans. by Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem and Helen R Lane (London: Athlone Press 1984) e.g. pp. 68f. 
3~his thought will be addressed later in chapter 7. 
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productive activity (as in Lyotard's 'Deduction of the Voluminous Body' from the uniplanar 
Moebius band);31 instead, starting from this domineering backwater one always finds it 
disintegrating into joyous fields of immanent intensity, the orphans and statistics of intransitive, 
non-linear, exponential production. This is the central contention of the project here: through the 
central conception of production which traverses the non-distance between representation and 
wilde erness) one can demonstrate the intransigent necessity of the slippage from intention, 
causality and abstract object to auto-configuring urge. 
Starting with chapter 3 I will go on to demonstrate the extent to which a similar thought can be 
found in Kant. Not only does Kant deploy a theory of the production of the object (i.e. of the 
external world) in the transcendental part of transcendental idealism (chapter 3); but, I will 
argue, the third Critique marks, in a manner somewhat similar to Milton's poetry, an 
aestheticisation of the problematic of transcendental and ideal production which persistently puts 
the emphasis back on the productive efficacy of intuitions and not concepts (chapter 6). This 
emphasis responds to a disquiet with the thought of ideal production which Kant outlines in the 
parts of the introduction to this work concerning the unity of empirical natural laws; but it opens 
out onto a more general unease with the capacity of transcendental production to control to 
manifoldness of the manifold of intuition (chapter 5). Kant's unhappiness with the outright 
conceptual production model of the first Critique manifests itself in the Third in a way which is 
provocatively similar to Milton's accounts of the wilde erness) and Chaos. In both parts of the 
critique Kant outlines the necessity for a thought of production which is productively 
morphogenetic but for which there is no rule or concept or telos. 
However, Kant's deployment of the ideal in his production theory is not only theological, but 
privatised. This privatisation makes production something explicitly (although ambiguously) 
human. This reduction of God to human size signifies both a vast over-valuation of the human 
and at the same time a reduction in the grandeur of God. The essence of this over-valuation 
(similar to Freud's account of the over-valuation of consciousness) is the transcendental idealist 
thesis, most baldly stated by Schopenhauer, that the world is representation. This is the sense in 
which 'we' produce: as representation. The privatisation of theology into a humanism 
inextricably welds together the thought of (ideal) production with representation. It is this 
bonding that causes all the problems: not only do transcendental conditions become par 
31 EC01lOmie libidinale (Paris: Minuit 1974), pp. 31 f. 
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excellence what cannot be represented, but also everything which cannot be represented becomes 
a transcendental condition. Philosophy becomes little more than an impossible and always 
essentially preliminary meditation upon the ever-fugitive conditions of this presentation: an 
activity which never actually does anything. By appealing to a pre-critical production theory 
(theology) and demonstrating the inadequacy of ideal production theory, I have introduced the 
central concept of active material production, without having to be interrogated per impossible 
as to the valid grounds for the representation of this concept. In the chapters that follow, though, 
I will try to show that privatised ideal production theory is just as inadequate as its public 
cosmological predecessor. 
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Chapter 3: Privatised Production: Negative Theology 
Kant did not know capital. 
Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, Political Writings 
Introduction 
Foucault begins his text on the penal system, Discipline and Punish, with a famous piece of 
tableau writing in which he sets up a vivid contrast between the feudal and the modem. He 
quotes a wrenching description of the public torture of Damien the regicide, and then a mundane 
catalogue of the day's activities at Leon Faucher's "House of Young Prisoners." A public, 
spectacular penal glory is rationalised. 1 A generalisation of this insight about the difference 
between feudal and modem-that the public, the festal, the spectacular are subjected to 
rationalisation-is given in authors as otherwise disparate as Weber, Heidegger and Bataille. It 
not too far-fetched to suggest that a fortiori God undergoes a similar transition. Neither He-nor 
His enemies-are any longer majestic, splendid, cosmological and sublime. They too have 
become 'rationalised'. 
Within this decline the discourse of early modem philosophy merits a particular attention: the 
rationalisation of God is concomitant with the philosophical regaining its autonomy from the 
church. God more and more comes to play the part of a concept (one among many, subject to 
possible refutation, in need of proof, performing a delimited role in a particular system etc.) 
within the lexicon of a rationality which exceeds Him. At least three of the canonical early 
modem philosophers tended more or less explicitly towards atheism (Hobbes, Hume and 
Spinoza2). Among those who continued to talk about anything even mildly resembling the pre-
modern God, His function is very strictly limited. God does not even any longer pretend to the 
cosmological. 
In Descartes, for instance, God has no role other than that of telling the truth (not allowing us to 
be deceived). He does not have, importantly, any productive function to perform vis-a-vis the 
1 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison (New York: Vintage Books 1979) trans. by AM Sheridan 
Smith, pp. 3ff. 
2Spinoza's 'God' rapidly became a slogan for his own non-existence (something presupposed by the 
Lessing controversy and Kant's intrusions therein). 
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world at aU? In Berkeley, God features simply as a magnified representer, and his role is little 
more than to solve a problem-the problem itself redundant and the solution contradictory-with 
the mere phenomenality of the world as representation: that of the necessity of the spatio-
temporal continuity of objects that are left unconstituted by being unperceived.4 
Doubtless this transition has some internal relation to the development of Protestantism. The God 
of Calvin is the most archetypal God of modernity-a God so vacuously glorious that the mere 
thought of access to Him would be blasphemy. And Nietzsche is surely correct to observe that in 
a sense Protestantism is no longer a religion (Gay Science § 122).5 Luther and especially Calvin, 
were the most intense initial markers of this shift. Its achievement of dominance was not however 
either immediate or evenly spread. But once dominant, the trend, irreversible once it has started, 
brooks no return except under the head of a nostalgia whose presence merely reaffirms the 
impossibility of regression by being its parody. Milton was one of the last exponents of a 
departed theologico-poetic power preserved in a patch of uneven but inexorable development 
which can be signalled by the motto: the hegemony of negative theology. 
This diminished role for God-broached in section 2-appears to vitiate the project of a 
continuing analysis of production in complicit conjunction with theology. How could God, or 
30f course, the epistemological problematic of the Meditations is logically compatible with a creator 
God, about whom Descartes is evidently not very interested. The point is that the functional role-
within the lexicon of philosophy-that the thought of God is actually called upon to play is no longer 
that of a productive agent, but a propositional underwriter. 
4The problem is redundant because it is no more absurd than Berkeley's original hypothesis of 
empirical idealism to suppose that objects are constituted discontinuously. Not only does it follow from 
empirical idealism, but it seems to demand an illegitimate realist assumption to suppose that it is a 
problem at all. The problem is contradictory because it reproduces the problematic that urged Berkeley 
to empirical idealism in the first place. To suppose that objects are constituted continuously by being 
perceived by God raises precisely the same issues of (our) access and evidence as the disjunction 
between real objects and perceptions. And this latter was what motivated Berkeley's empirical idealism 
in the first place. 
5The relation is not however simple: Catholicism, for instance, has had its pietist-and hence 
essentially Lutheran-movement; and Milton, of course, was a Protestant (salvaged by his poetry, his 
paganism and his treatment of Puritanism merely as a liberation from the Church Fathers). 
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anything to do with God, be conjoint with production however construed, when God appears to 
have no philosophically productive role to play? Sections 3 and 4 begin to answer this question 
by showing the extent to which production becomes increasingly important for early modem (and 
especially empiricist) philosophy in general (section 3), and then for Kant in particular (section 
4). This production is, however, at first, to be thought of as operated not by the theological, but 
by the subject-a privatised production. 
It is tempting to suggest that the relation of this privatised production to theology constituted a 
privatisation of theology (along the lines of the relation of Protestantism to Catholicism). Section 
5 nuances this reading arguing that privatising production has two important consequences. 
First, that it increases the intensity with which philosophy confronts the problems of production 
and, second, that it subjects production to an increased intensity of repression. Subjective 
representation-theory forces an intense confrontation with the problematics of production 
because the production of the world thought as representation must be absolutely distinguished 
from empirical production. Privati sed production is compelled to countenance the thought of a 
production that is distinct from empirical production, and does this with more rigour than 
theology, with its ancillary hypostatisations. However, representation-theory also and at the same 
time represses this thought of a new mode of production by assimilating difference from 
empirical production with transcendent inaccessibility. This implies a different set of relations 
between representation and theology. As God is negativised into transcendence (the result of 
Kant's critique), the new operator of production (the transcendental subject) decomposes into a 
transcendence that is indistinguishable from that of negativised theology. 
Kant's Declension of God 
In Kant God's decline is not only accelerated, but achieves both its most sophisticated theoretical 
apology: a systematic logic for the resignation of the theological. This logic not only subdues 
God and acclimatises Him to His new position, but definitively locates this position in a structure 
which makes impossible His escape. If we are to believe Kant's own reports on critique, the 
critical system is oriented architecturally toward the placement of God: the destructive impetus 
of the first Critique is aimed only at clarifying the space that may be legitimately allotted to the 
thought of God in the second Critique. 
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To summarise the indignities to which God is forced to submit: His putative causal relation to 
the world, as prime mover, first cause or actual creator is deprived of any real causal status at all 
in the first antinomy (which is resolved so that both thesis and antithesis are false). His elevation 
out of the realm of empirical causes is attested by the fourth antinomy (resolved so that both 
sides are true). God's relation to the world becomes primarily moral.6 But Kant is equally clear 
that morality stands in no direct need of God. Thus, to use Kant's own rubrics, God qua creator 
God, is theoretically merely a regulative concept which should not be taken as constitutive of the 
real in any way; and God qua locus of moral authority, although constitutive and determinative 
for purely practical purposes, is in fact otiose. Morality can-must if it is to be autonomous and 
therefore moral-be able to get on without him. Indeed the diminution of God's possible 
cosmological responsibilities is evinced with some clarity in Kant's rigorous separation of the 
cosmological ideas-in which God no longer features directly and as such (although this was his 
traditional realm)-and the theological ideas proper which amount only to the refutation of the 
traditional proofs for the existence of God. All cosmic grandeur having departed from him, God 
is left in the merely theoretical-theological position of the object of his own (inadequate) proofs, 
and in a real relation only to practice, of which he turns out to be merely an adjunct, a 
supplement, one of the adiaphora. 
Kant's argument for this is the core of this critical attacks. Concepts are deprived of legitimate 
constitutive application if there is no possible intuition that could be associated with them. They 
are not thereby deprived of meaning; but in Kant's striking metaphor, are blind (A51; B75).7 
Thus, whilst there is a concept of God, there is no application for it within the field of possible 
experience. Hence the concept of God is theoretically and at best merely regulative. This 
bulldozing of the ancient, mystical and visionary cosmological God of the feudal era, the 
destructive component of critique, is of course matched by God's recuperation at the level of the 
practical and the moral. But it is important to realise that this safe recuperation of the theological 
at the level of the transcendent is purchased at the price of utter recession. Kant's negativised 
6Kant uses the phrase "moral Author of the universe" at third Critique §87. 
7The inference that (the concept of) God is 'blind' is a compelling one. Its Schopenhauerian resonances 
are not at all too far-fetched. Kant explicitly contemplates the possibility of a God driven (blindly) by an 
instinct not under His control at §85 of the third Critique. 
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God is ineffectual both in theory and in practice. The narcissism of this structure will be 
important later. 
(1) In the first place, at the theoretical level, Kant is repeatedly and absolutely clear that there is 
no room at all for an argument from design. That is, all attempts to go from nature and the 
phenomenal to God, the supersensible and the noumenal are doomed to failure, and worse to 
fanaticism. In the first Critique this is particularly obvious. The regulative function that God is 
supposed to perform is that of the ultimate account of the unity of experience. But this function 
is actually performed not by God at all, but by the transcendental unity of apperception and its 
objective correlative, the unity of the transcendental object.s 
How problematic this function actually is does not become clear to Kant until the third Critique. 
Once the problem has been set up, as in the third Critique, so that the regulative idea of God 
actually has something to do, one realises quite how futile his theoretical function in the first 
Critique really was. In the third Critique God's role is relatively expanded. He (or His cognates 
and correlates) become entrenched in a difficult argument about the possibility of the experience 
of organised products and the constitution of experience as nexus finalis. The argument is that 
such products, and such a conception of experience, are possible, for us, only on the basis of an 
intelligence (of some sort). But even here, where, in contrast to the first Critique, one can see 
some role for the regulative and theoretical (by the third Critique, the reflective) conception of 
God; even here Kant firmly and insistently recoils from the supposition that God is somehow 
thereby demonstrated. He continues to argue in §§85-91 of the Critique of Teleological 
Judgement that arguments from design are useless. What is authorised by reflective judgements 
of teleology is significantly weaker. 
(2) This suggests what is obvious from the text of the third Critique, and equally demanded by 
the argument, that the moral proof of God is still the only one that works according to Kant (§85 
and ff.). This is the second, practical, case. The argument is probably the most famous of the 
critical works: one defrocks the theoretical God of the barbarians, in order to make way for the 
8The singular importance of the argument of the Paralogisms is discussed below pp. 56f .See also 
Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming 
(London: Verso 1979) from Dialektik der Aufkliirung (New York: Social Studies Association Inc. 
1944), trans. p. 10: ..... the identity of the spirit and its correlate, the unity of nature." 
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rational God of morality. But even here it is far from clear what role God actually has left to him 
to play. Of the practical postulates (the freedom of the will; the immortality of the soul; and God 
himself) one can see why the first can be construed as a condition of moral action. The last two 
are somewhat more opaque. The rational autonomy of morality is the fundamental argument of 
the second Critique. But Kant's argument suggests that one needs the last two postulates in 
order that one be able to think the possibility of reward for the just.9 Since, however, the moral 
is, of course, categorical (i.e. autonomous) the thought of these possibilities can evidently not 
enter into the performance of an action in accordance with duty as an incentive because that 
would compromise the whole basis of the autonomy of the moral and convert the whole thing 
into that ugly accountancy of salvation of which Luther-and Kant-so disapproved. Kant in 
fact makes this point quite baldly and in the very opening words of this book on religion: 
So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent who, just 
because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in 
need neither of the idea of another being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor 
of an incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty. 10 
Similarly, in his discussion of Spinoza in the section of the third Critique concerning the moral 
proof for the existence of God, he admits that Spinoza was the embodiment of the moral being 
who stood in no need of a GOd. 11 There is nothing for God (even the idea of him which is all that 
is left) to do here which would not compromise the very (moral) basis of what was supposed to 
be his proof. In Kant's jargon, the idea of God (or the immortality of the soul, or the kingdom of 
ends etc.) cannot determine the will for it to remain free. God is therefore a consequence of 
morality. He remains at best a problematical theoretical or reflective idea and a determined and 
non-autonomous consequence of a certain type of (autonomous) action. 
9This is psychologically of particular necessity for Kant since he explicitly and theoretically identifies 
the moral with the accretion of pain: "Virtue is only worth so much because it costs so much ... it is in 
suffering that [it] shows itself." (second Critique Ak. 5:157). 
IOSee Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone trans. by Theodore M Greene and Hoyt H Hudson 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks 1960) first Preface, p. 3. 
11§87. Kant is forced to appeal to incentives to make what is left of the argument appear to go through: 
he invokes the "one wide grave that engulfs all-just and unjust, there is no distinction in the grave." 
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God is theoretically just an idea; and practically, a postulate correlate with morality, but hardly 
necessary, a scholium to the practical. This is his diminished status. But at the same time, this 
status is not just invoked, or a (merely) nostalgic or pragmatic utilisation of a dated terminology. 
Rather God is defended in his role as synonym for the supersensible as such. His incapacity to be 
represented, his transcendent location, is the result of the fact that He (is) the supersensible. 
Freedom (which is the key) has a special status of being a supersensible and transcendent 
concept which nevertheless emerges as a "fact" in the empirical world. 12 It is freedom which 
grounds the admission of the other practical postulates (God and the immortality of the soul). 
These two are evidently correlate as the God without and the God within. And God is thereby the 
name for the (merely regulative) cognitive level corresponding to-and correlatively also 
completely subordinated to- freedom as it is revealed in the purely practical field of actual 
activity in the world. 
The position which this God occupies and exhausts is one which, as Kant never fails to 
emphasise, is merely negative. 13 This is just a restatement of the critical analysis: predicates are 
all sensible; God is not sensible; therefore God cannot be determined by any predicates. An 
argument worthy fully of Meister Eckhart. This revival of negative theology, in fact this take-
over of the entire philosphico-theologicallexicon by negative theology, is not at all co-incidental. 
The transcendence of God, which had always been allowed, and which attested to his greatness, 
is radicalised into a God transcendent. God's glory is now kept intact at the infinite price of his 
now theoretically completed recession from the world into a forever inaccessible realm of which 
he is not just the ruler merely in name, but of which he is merely the name (all his consequences 
in the practical realm being subordinated to the autonomy of the individual's practical 
revelation). It is impossible not to recognise here the structure of a theoretical narcissism14 which 
12This "fact," along with its uniquely curious nature, is discussed for instance at third Critique §91. 
13This is the great clarion call of Kant's own critical enthusiasm, and requires little textual 
demonstration. But one particularly significant deployment of the negative argument occurs in the 
section of the first Critique entitled 'On the Regulative Employment of the Ideas' (A460ff.; B668ff.). 
14Kant enthuses that "Pure reason is in fact occupied [beschdftigt] with nothing but itself, and can have 
no other vocation [Geschdfte]." (translation slightly modified). first Critique A680; B708. 
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retracts the fortress of greatness (to an extent so enormous as to be merely thinkable) to an 
inextensive point which gathers the virtualities of the projected space of the supersensible. 15 
The Retention of Production 
But if God's productive relation to the world has been so thoroughly compromised, then where is 
there room for a production theory? Does representation simply obliterate production? In the face 
of the developments of manufacturing capital in Europe, this hardly seems likely. Indeed 
Horkheimer felt compelled to write the following about Kant: 
Kant taught that the thing-in-itself-that is, being as it exists in eternity, apart from 
human or animal perspectives-furnishes the subject with the matter for cognition, 
with the sensible facts, out of which the intellect, with its ordering functions, produces 
the unitary world, just as a machine processes raw material into the finished product. 
This concept of transcendental apperception, with its power and its 'file boxes'-the 
head office, one might say, of the intellect-was modelled on factory and business 
management. The intellect manufactures something conceptually solid out of the flux 
of perceptions, as a factory produces commodities. 16 
This seems a remarkable claim. And yet it is correct to suggest the rigor with, and extent to, 
which Kant made use of a production theory. Although in the long run the vital issue here will be 
what mode of production is intervening, it is nevertheless provisionally important to suggest that 
there is any sort of production theory at all in the midst of the pair of negative theology and 
representation theory, and that production is even central to representation-theology. 
Production is no longer thought through God. Kant does indeed have a production theory-and it 
is in fact central to his claims-but it does not pass through God. It is the (transcendental) 
15Kant employs the termfoeus imaginarius of the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason, see e.g. 
A644; B672. The term 'fortress' is drawn from Schopenhauer's description of representational 
solipsism: "[The ego is] a small frontier fortress. Admittedly the fortress is impregnable, but the 
garrison can never sally forth from it, and therefore we can pass it by and leave it in our rear without 
danger" (The World as Will and Representation 2 Vols. trans. by ElF Payne [New York: Dover 1969] 
Vol. 2 § 19). Freud's use of similar vocabulary is probably itself drawn from Schopenhauer. See 
'Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety' chapter III, PFL Vol. 10 pp. 249f. 
16Critique of Instrumental Reason trans. by Matthew 1 O'Connell et al (New York, NY: Seabury Press 
1974), p. 70. 
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subject who operates this production. The production (and this is something which Horkheimer 
does not go far enough toward emphasising) is however fully theological in its scope: it is 
nothing less than the production of the empirical world, of the universe, as such. There is thus a 
sense in which to start to connect theology and Kant one does not go by way of God; not, 
perhaps especially by way of Kant's God. Kant's theology is a dead end in attempting to 
establish Kant's initial and fundamental relation to the productive theology which preceded him. 
Rather it is Kant's status as an Enlightenment thinker, and hence the very centre of his thought, 
the transcendental itself which constitutes Kant's theology. In this sense: that the creative 
capacity of God, God the creator, is now rendered as Man, in a complex of transcendentalism 
and anthropology. Where God had created; now there stands Man. 
This is not a completely new thought. Modern philosophy was inaugurated in Descartes by 
assigning decisive importance to the thought of a break or caesura-between the pre-objective 
and the objective-to be overcome. This labour of overcoming is in Descartes still theoretical 
and propositional. 17 But the thought of the break between the immediate presentation of the 
object (which is not yet an object) and the mediate or processed presentation of the object spins 
out into the British empiricists. The tradition culminates in Hume's distinction between 
impressions and ideas. Clearly, the thought of the object can even pretend to drop out of the 
picture completely (as in Berkeley); but the caesura, and the concomitant thought of a labour of 
perception never does. The gesture of representation thought is an injunction to work to 
overcome the abyss which yawns between what is given (which is no longer enough) and what 
must be produced. The economics of (epistemic) scarcity infest the modern with an engagement 
in production. 
Like its commodity counterpart, this relative epistemological scarcity is itself produced; and this 
production is what engenders the intensification of the problem of production itself. The more 
l71t is impossible to escape the, admittedly somewhat bizarre, conjecture that Descartes has some secret 
connection to Gnosticism. The Meditations can be read as an attempt to refute Gnostic cosmology: the 
hypothesis of the book is that the empirical world is the creation of an evil demon. This is the primary 
postulate of Gnosticism (the demon was traditionally identified with Jehovah, e.g. by Simon Magus). 
Descartes conclusion is that the world is not the creation of the genie, but of a veridical and beneficent, a true 
God. This is, of course, an orthodox Christian position. One can only imagine what might have been 
motivating Descartes to defend orthodox Christianity against Gnosticism. 
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emmiserated the real becomes, the more one needs to make up that lack at another level. The 
denuding of the empirical to the point of Newtonian mechanics positively demands the spiritual 
as a source of formal enrichment. And at the same time, it make the thought of the spiritual 
increasingly difficult. 
The cognitive success of Newtonian mechanics was unprecedented. It posed a serious problem; 
demanding, as Kant suggests a response from philosophy.18 Under Newton, mechanical 
causation is in a position of cognitive hegemony as the only legitimate locus for production. But 
it is utterly indifferent to form or order: the impoverishment of the real. The success of Newton's 
mechanics installed dead matter not only as a useful postulate, but as an assumption of the most 
assured piece of new knowledge possessed by humanity. Newton himself suggests that the origin 
of formal ordering of systems is incompatible with mechanism. 19 The universality of mechanics 
made naivete about spiritual or formal causes difficult in proportion as such causes were now 
themselves necessitated: a universal mechanics leaves room for nothing other than mechanics, 
precisely at the point where mechanics itself has most rigorously excluded any account of 
creativity (morphogenesis). This makes the production of order a very extensive difficulty. Not 
only can it not be produced empirically (that is by mechanical causation), but any type of 
spiritual cause which is modelled on the empirical will also be inadequate. To the extent that 
such a spiritual cause is thought empirically, then it too will be subject to only mechanical 
causation. A deistic God imbuing a determinist system with initial motricity does nothing to solve 
this problem of morphogenesis. Such a God is just an empirical projection masquerading as 
spirit. 
The displacement of God into an internal theology of the subject responds to these difficulties: an 
emmiserated real is worked up into the world as representation by a cognitive process located 
18Kant remarks pointedly on the scandal of the success of natural science-and most importantly 
Newtonian mechanics-in comparison with the bickering stasis of metaphysics (Prolegomena Preface; 
§§4; 40; 60f.). 
19Newton's basic argument is that the existence of ordered arrangements of matter demonstrates the 
existence of an intelligent creator: the argument from design. He therefore actually bypasses the 
singularity of modernity in which production is devolved onto philosophical subjectivity. See Newton's 
'On Universal Design: From a Manuscript' cited in Sir David Brewster Memoirs of the Life. Writings. 
and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton 2 Vols. (Edinburgh 1850) Vol. 2 pp. 347-8. 
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outside of both that world, and its raw material. Subjective production is more refined than 
theological creation; but ultimately, the only resort of this refmement is to complicate the notion 
of spirituality out of subjectivity and beyond the empirical altogether. 
The need for another type of causality or production than the mechanical was already 
presupposed by Milton; Newton's formalisation of mechanics only exacerbated this need. The 
model for other-than-mechanical causation was a spiritual hylomorphism itself modelled 
importantly on artisanal production or what I shall call desire production: production by means 
of concepts. The contribution of Kant's transcendental idealism is to suggest that the spiritual 
has itself not been thought spiritually enough. 
The epistemological problematic of (especially empiricist) early modem philosophy is a 
function-and often an explicit function-ofthe hegemony of Newton's mechanics. An 
impoverished real is subject to re-processing by human cognition. What marks Kant out within 
this trajectory, and makes him the definitive apologist for the break into representational and 
anthropologistic production is both that he takes seriously the thought of production and that he 
begins to take seriously the problems which attach to this production. 
It is, in this context, suggestive that Kant's (empiricist) impetus for critique came through an 
investigation of Hume's account of mechanical causation that is, empirical production.20 Hume's 
move constituted the boldest philosophical attempt at the denuding of the real yet. Descartes' 
inauguration of the epistemic caesura of representation was still in a binary mould. It effected the 
dramatic lesion of experience as representation from the object, but only in the fashion of a 
simple distinction between the veracity (or non-veracity) of the presentation with respect to the 
object. Under the impetus of the success of Newtonian mechanics the British empiricists utilised 
some of the achievements of Newtonian science, and in the case of Locke, Boyle's hypotheses 
about the constitution of the real in terms of corpuscles, as a way of driving more than an 
abstract wedge between representation and real. Thus Locke lays much store by the distinctions 
between primary and secondary qualities, and between real and nominal essences. Science was 
able to formulate an account of the real whose difference from lived experience (at the level of 
representation) demanded the intervention of specific cognitive production mechanisms. While 
2°This is the substance of the dogmatic slumber account, and is to be found in the Prolegomena Preface 
and §50. 
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the subject is able directly to perceive the primary qualities of gross objects, the secondary 
qualities of objects are not present as such at the level of the object itself. They are rather the 
result of a process of production on the part of the subject which renders the primary qualities of 
the microscopic constituent particles of gross objects as secondary qualities for the subject which 
do not exist as such in the real. Colour, for instance, is the result of a perceptual production 
process taking as its input constitutive particles whose only qualities are solidity 
(impenetrability), extension, figure, motion (or rest) and number.21 The real for Locke is 
therefore constituted exhaustively in terms of substrata and the primary qualities which inhere in 
the substrata. This is not the world of lived experience which is a compilation both of primary 
and secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are able to intervene only on the basis of a 
production by the subject out of primary qualities. The distinction is therefore more 
appropriately thought as that between primary and secondary industrial sectors, with the first 
directly extracting its raw materials from the real; and the latter performing secondary process of 
production on this original raw material. 
Hume, under the aegis of the guiding weapon of critical destruction-the distinction between 
impressions and ideas-was able to add considerably to this set of specific production processes 
(although not in quite the same way as Locke), which now included such metaphysical enormities 
as the self, causation, God and aesthetic and moral values. Hume's intervention is therefore 
significant for two reasons. First, he follows Locke in specifying the points of rupture between 
presentation and the real, which points are the nodes of cognitive processing capacity that make 
up the deficit between formal object and dead real. Second, Hume attacks with indiscriminacy, 
and thus includes for interrogation and remorseless renunciation, precisely those large-scale 
features of experience that have survived previous interrogation. Amongst these, the concept of 
cause is most problematic. Hume makes (implicitly) problematic the notion of the exteriority of 
objects, whose only relation to the subject at the point of impact of the impression, could only be 
itself causal (this is a problem which will, again, somewhat implicitly, tax Kant). Hume's 
substitute concept, that of habit, or of the mind's tendency to spread itself over the world, or 
21This list is from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II chapter VIII (an abridgement, 
selected and edited by John W Yolton [London & Melbourne: Dent 1977], pp. 56ff.) which also 
contains a discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The distinction 
between real and nominal essence occurs in Book III chapter VI §§3, 6 (op. cit. pp. 231 f.; 232f.). 
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projection, functions to raise the question of the production of cause, the production of 
production. Again, this is a problem which will tax Kant; and is interesting not least in 
demonstrating that the dialogue with Hume extends beyond the relatively scarce number of 
passages (although important ones) in which Kant nominally engages with Hume on the problem 
of causation, into the very centre of the critical apparatus, in the deductions themselves, that is, 
in the distinction between the productive and the reproductive functionings of the imagination. 
Kant and Production 
Production infests transcendental idealism in a line of direct descent from the British empiricists; 
it shares with them the use of cognitive processing in the subject as a response to the definitive 
deadening of the real undertaken by emergent natural science. The very initiation of the critical 
enterprise, the first words of the introduction to the first edition of the first Critique invoke the 
theory of production: 
Experience is without a doubt the first product that our understanding produces, in 
which it processes the raw material of sensible impressions. [Erfahrung ist ohne 
Zweifel das erste Produkt, welches unser Verstand hervorbringt, indem er den rohen 
Stoff sinnlicher Empfindungen bearbeitet] (AI, translation modified) 
and in the B edition, the substitution of verarbeiten for bearbeiten draws if anything more 
attention to the industrial register: 
[the activity of the understanding] manufactures out of the raw material of sensible 
impressions, a knowledge of objects that is called experience. [(die 
VerstandesUi.tigkeit) den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Eindrticke zu einer Erkenntnis der 
GegensUinde zu verarbeite[t], die Erfahrung heiSt] (B 1, translation modified) 
Perhaps the most compelling piece of textual evidence of Kant's fundamental commitment to a 
theory of production comes in the First Introduction to the third Critique (at 'lIII). There Kant 
erects a series of tables which purport to summarise the structure of critique. The fourth and 
definitive table has four columns. The first three are entitled (1) the powers of the mind; (2) the 
higher cognitive faculties (3) a priori principles. They detail the faculties of knowledge, the 
feeling of (un)pleasure and the faculty of desire; the understanding, the power of judgement and 
Reason; and lawfulness, end-orientedness and obligation respectively. The fourth column 
contains merely the three words: nature, art and ethics. This column is entitled Produkte. There 
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can be no more significant and extensive textual testament to Kant's commitment to production 
in his thought: he is stating that every domain of possible object of critique-nature, art and 
ethics-be thought of as a product. 
In the Prolegomena he makes abundantly clear what is at stake in the notion the category qua 
transcendental condition of the possibility of experience. He writes of experience: 
... as the product of the understanding out of the materials of sensibility. (§34) 
Similarly, for the negative part of the critical project, in discussing Hume' s attacks upon religion, 
Kant demonstrates the extent to which this same theoretics of production are at issue in the 
thought of the transcendent (and not just the immanent): 
We have no available material for defining the supersensible seeing as we have to 
draw that material from the things of the world of sense, and then its character would 
make it utterly inappropriate to the supersensible. (third Critique §90) 
Here Kant specifically deploys the vocabulary of hylomophism, of matter, form, process and 
product not only to account for the (legitimate) production of experience in an immanent fashion 
where concepts whose validity has been demonstrated are the formal agents of a process of 
production whose material is sensuous (either sensation or intuition), but also to account for the 
(illegitimate) attempt to produce determinate concepts of the transcendent. Legislation alone is 
not able to perform the task of constituting experience; production is always implicated. And it is 
implicated at a more basic level, since the division of productions into appropriate and 
inappropriate always presupposes the productions themselves. The general case (of which the 
above discussion of the pointed special case of empirical causality was a privileged instance) 
demands that all synthetic a priori concepts (and intuitions) are explained as being the formal 
and subjective conditions of possibility of all experience which experience is then of 
appea;ances. Such formal components equally presuppose material elements which function as 
the input to the productive process overseen by forms themselves. 
Production is implicatedJrom the moment that one envisages the synthetic a priori. It is the 
problematic and not necessarily the solution which contains all the originality. Once formulated 
in terms of the synthetic a priori, a production theoretics become inevitable. Such a theory is 
already embedded in the thought of a s.vnthesis, and careers out into the rest of the critical and 
transcendental system. Indeed the process of production itself is simply re-duplicated several 
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times through the mass of the analytic: sensations provide the most nearly raw material for 
formation by the pure forms of intuition; the resulting intuitions (and the special case of the pure 
intuitions themselves) provide the pre-processed material for the application of the pure concepts 
of the understanding via the schematism as process itself; and even the manifold of concepts is 
(although in a more problematic way) subject to a completed unification (albeit a merely virtual 
one) under the ultimate processor: reason. Far from being just a casually deployed model, 
production-theory in Kant achieves the status of well-differentiated and multi-sectored industrial-
bureaucratic economy. 22 
More than this even, the thought of production pans out into the great dichotomies of the critical 
system: it is mobilised in contrast to the reproductive in characterising the transcendental activity 
of the imagination in both the A and B deductions (a contrast about which more will be said 
below); Kant's specific term for the activity which is associated with the faculties as loci of 
transcendental production is spontaneity, a word which stands in persistent contrast to the 
receptivity of the lower faculties, and a distinction based in production therefore includes the 
most fundamental dichotomies of the critiques between concept and intuition and between 
understanding and sensibility; and the correlate terms of activity and passivity in general serve as 
markers of Kant's relation to the Enlightenment itself.23 
What then is the relation of this production theory to the cosmological theology of the creation 
which preceded it? One can make a case for a certain structural isomorphism of theological 
creation with Kant's system of production-relations. The key term in such an analysis would be 
hylomorphism. Kant's theory shares with its predecessor a crucial distinction between the formal 
22In contrast to the retarded state of Germany's actual economy at the end of the eighteenth century in 
comparison with the rest of Europe and Britain in particular. Germany over-compensated theoretically 
for its actual economic backwardness. Marx suggests in his Introduction to 'A Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' that "it was only Germany which could produce the speculative 
philosophy of right-this extravagant and abstract thought about the modern state, the reality of which 
remains in the beyond (even if this beyond is only across the Rhine)" (Early Writings translated and 
edited by TB Bottomore [New York: McGraw-Hill 1964] p. 51) 
BIn his discussion of the sensus communis at third Critique §40, Kant alludes to his primary maxim of 
the Enlightenment ('Selbstdenken') and describes this as 'Die Maxime einer niemals pas s i ve n 
Vernunft. . 
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and the material, attributing, with the tradition, but in a radicalised way, all activity to the 
former, and a sheer passivity unknown in the pre-critical thought of materiality, to the latter.2~ It 
would be a simple consequence of this that the mode of operation of the production would be 
equally transitive. Both theories have the same-and theological-scope: the world itself. 
Production and Decomposition 
This account of the relation of cosmological-theological production and the implicitly novel 
production which Kant introduces is, however, inadequate. It is inadequate not least because of 
its invocation of the notion of a structural similarity operating across difference. This fails to 
attend to the novelty introduced by the variation of the apparent operator of production as 
transcendental production: the subject. Although this seems built into the notion of structural 
comparison (as the element of difference which mediates the possibility of naming this a 
naturalised or privati sed production), in fact, the effects wrought by this privatisation and by the 
subjectivisation of the production of the empirical are more severe and disruptive; and the 
relations between privati sed subjective production and public theology as cosmological 
production are in the end more complex than a structural analysis will permit to be made visible. 
Kant is committed to-but does not always acknowledge explicitly the consequences of-another 
mode of production than that of nature. The nature that Kant seeks to legitimate is that of 
Newton: one whose productions are exhausted by mechanical causation. Indeed, in the 
'Analogies of Experience' mechanical causation plays a pivotal role in the construction of 
Kant's arguments for transcendental idealism. Kant treats the legitimisation of nature as the 
project of accounting for its production (and not taking it as given). The production of nature 
cannot therefore be by the same means as production within nature. Transcendental production is 
not mechanical production, is not causation. 
Neither the idea of-nor the necessity of the idea of -ant i-natural production is new: both were 
present in pre-modem theology. What is new is Kant's argument for this necessity, and the 
potentially unlimited refinement of his thought of anti-nature. The argument is uniquely 
HKant does not use the term 'hylomorphism', but in the 'Deduction' of the first Critique he writes the 
following: ' ... experience contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, the matter of knowledge from 
the senses, and a certain form for the ordering of this matter .. , from pure intuition and thought.' * 13 
A86; B 118. 
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interesting because it does not refer the problem of order to particular ordered products within 
experience (the argument from design), but to the constitution of ordered experience of objects 
itself. The unlimited possibilities for the refinement of this suggestion emerge immediately. This 
anti-natural production (and its operators) must be outside of the whole range of experience, of 
the world. Kant was the first to begin really to think the difficulties of the project of thinking an 
extra-mundane without tacitly referencing the mundane. From the start, Kant's impUlsion to 
think another mode of production than that of the empirical-transcendental production-is 
connected with the impossibility of attaining to its absolute differentiation from the empirical that 
it conditions. 
Kant's transcendental production is problematic. The most rigorous interpretation one can give it 
is the following: an account of the production of a possible object critique is legitimate if the 
application of that critical production does not presuppose its own products. This is, I think, the 
most cogent account of Kant's critique of Hume's analysis of causality. The argument goes like 
this: causality understood as necessary connection of mechanical causes is an object of critique. 
Hume, following the epistemic caesura of British empiricism, argues that it is not possible to 
know that the real contains causes. This is an application of the emmiseration or impoverishment 
of the real that defines the epistemic caesura. Modem scepticism-the result of centring 
philosophical problematics exclusively around epistemology-impoverishes the real. All there is 
in the real-Hume supposes-is constant conjunction and temporal contiguity (and not 
necessary connection).25 Hume argues that although we are not therefore entitled to any notion of 
necessary connection on the basis of the evidence (impressions, the real), we do nevertheless 
have an impression of causation which derives from habit, custom, the imagination or in general, 
from the 'tendency of the mind to spread itself.' We therefore obtain an impression (and hence an 
idea) of causation that is built up by-produced by-subjective processing from a raw material 
of conjunction and contiguity. 
Kant's point may be put like this: what is the mode of this production? If it is itself empirical 
(causal), then the mode of production that Hume uses to legitimate the idea of causation 
2'iDavid Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding etc. edited by LA Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1975), Section 7, pp. 60-79. 
54 
presupposes the prior application of just that mode of production.26 For the mind to be able to 
operate according to custom, habit etc., is for it to be caused to act. As Hume suggests, 
conjunction and contiguity 'lead the mind' to form an idea of the effect given the cause. If this 
'leading' is causal then it presupposes that the idea of causation has already been legitimated. 
But this is precisely what is in question. The mode of production of causation cannot itself be 
simply causal. The transcendental is the name Kant gives to that mode of production that 
produces mechanical production (causation) without being itself causal. 
What is Kant's alternative mode of production? It is crucially split. First, insofar as 
transcendental production in Kant has a model, that model is of hylomorphic desire production. 
To this extent Kant is entirely traditional: the exhaustion of nature in causal mechanism must be 
made up at the level of the spiritual, of production by means of concepts or intentions.27 In the 
same passage (introducing the deductions) in which Kant suggestively refers to Hume's account 
of causation as the problem, Kant also explicitly contrasts mechanical production with a 
transcendental production that is only with difficulty to be distinguished from desire. He writes 
that transcendental production, whilst it is production by means of concepts (i.e. desire) "does 
not produce its object in so far as existence is concerned, for we are not here speaking of its 
causality by means of the will [which would just be desire production]" (A92; B 125). But two 
paragraphs later, he rebukes Hume (in the B Edition): 
since it never occurred to him that the understanding might itself, perhaps, through 
these concepts [the categories], be the author [Urheber] of experience." (B 127, italics 
added) 
Second, however, the notion of transcendental production-and of the transcendental-is an 
important refinement-but equally importantly a refmement operating in the same trajectory--of 
an artisanal creator God-subject. Kant is right to suggest that transcendental production is 
distinct from mere desire production. Transcendental production is the production of the 
possibility and not the existence of objects of experience. Kant's sensitivity to the problem of the 
production of order was heightened by his reading of Hume's scepticism, especially that 
26This is the definition of transcendence given in chapter 2, cf. p. 17 note 31. 
21Kant's definitions of desire are to be found in footnotes: second Critique (Ak. 5:9 note) and third 
Critique (§ 1 note). 
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concerning causation. The tradition (including Newton) took it that dead matter accounted for 
something, but perhaps not much: the real organisation of matter must be referred elsewhere 
than matter. Kant takes it that the rigorous account of dead matter given by Newton itself 
represents a huge ordering, and therefore itself stands in need of something other than that 
account.28 This hyper-sensitivity to the need for order leads Kant not to contest the position of 
traditional ordering agents (who were, like God, based in hylomorphic desire forms of 
production), but only their efficiency. Put succinctly, his point is that such agents have just not 
been thought as outside of nature with sufficient rigor. 
This, 1 argue, makes it difficult to distinguish transcendental and transcendent.29 Take, for 
example, the Paralogisms. They are uniquely significant amongst the objects of critique in the 
dialectic in that Kant quite explicitly suggests that the dogmatic result of paralogistic reasoning 
may be directly replaced with an immanent concept from Kant's own architectonic. The 
substantial soul of rational psychology is a hypostasis of the 'I think' that must be able to 
accompany all representations, of the transcendental unity of apperception. The two are in a 
relation of functional equivalence: both are there to secure the ultimate unity of experience. The 
scholastic hypothesis of a subjectum underlying and unifying its accidents, in the rational 
psychology of the soul,3D is evidently a transcendent hypothesis. Kant demonstrates this in detail 
in the Paralogisms. However, even within the Paralogisms, Kant accedes to the theoretical 
necessity of the problems which this hypostatisation of the subject is supposed to solve?) And 
28Kant was, of course, at a later stage impressed ordered products of a more traditional kind (organisms 
etc.). See below Chapters 5 and 6. 
29Gillian Rose makes this argument out both in general and in particular in Hegel contra Sociology 
(London: Athlone Press 1981) pp. 3-4: "[In general] it follows from a transcendental account of 
experience that certain necessary features of the explanation [i.e. transcendentals] are themselves 
transcendent" and in particular the transcendental unity of apperception. 
JOThe modern avatar of the subjectum makes it a subject rather than the underlying substratum of the 
object. See Heidegger What is a Thing? trans. by WB Barton Jf. and Vera Deutsch with an analysis by 
Eugene T Grendlin (South Bend, IN: Regnery / Gateway 1967), pp. 105f. 
J10f course he also takes seriously the other problem which the rational psychology of the soul was 
supposed, but inadequately, to solve, that of immortality. But this he solves at the level of the practical 
and not the theoretical. 
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Kant has his own replacement for it, under conditions of legitimacy: the transcendental unity of 
apperception, which responds more adequately to the same demands for unity of accidents (or 
thoughts in Kant's vocabulary here) in the subjectum. The unity of experience is misunderstood 
if it is thought to reside in any substance. Substances, like the empirical production of Hume' s 
attempts to underwrite the casual unity of experience, is too empirical. Unity is a form and not a 
substance.32 
It is therefore true that Kant's transcendental production is not the same as desire production 
(although it is production by means of concepts). But the two are not thereby very distant 
thoughts. Transcendental production is like desire production in both its role (as guarantor of 
order) and in its tendency (toward anti-nature); it is unlike desire production only in that it is of 
an even more refined order of spirituality than desire production. Similarly, the dialectical idea of 
the world in the cosmological antinomies functions as the direct correlate of the soul of rational 
psychology. It then would also have an immanent counterpart in the analytic: the transcendental 
object, or the bare thought of the object in general. 
Kant's account of transcendental production is split between a traditional hylomorphism-
bearing an important relation both to theological creation-production, and to empiricist cognitive-
subjective production-and a thought of the transcendental which makes any characterisation of 
this mode of production at worst illegitimate, and at best merely a provisional empiricity. Kant 
transcendentalism means that he is, strictly, neither a traditional theologian, nor a traditional 
empiricist. 
Properly hylomorphic production involves the synthesis of a pure form (as concept) with a 
matter (or representative of matter) given in intuition and is regarded as legitimate. Improperly 
hylomorphic production which takes itself to be of the same type as hylomorphism, but for 
whose form no matter can be given, is regarded as illegitimate. Thus the formal is distributed 
between two exclusively disjunctive and specifically distinct classes: forms pertaining to the 
understanding (legitimate; categories) and forms pertaining merely to reason (illegitimate; ideas). 
The world, become representation to a subject, is properly constituted only as the hybrid of form 
32 ..... consciousness in itself is not a representation distinguishing a particular object [i.e. a hypostatised 
substance], but a form of representation in general." (A346; B 404). Kant even alludes, in the B edition 
version of the Paralogisms to a certain functional equivalence of dogmatic and critical accounts (B 407). 
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and matter, and what is not such a hybrid is no longer presentable, and hence no longer world. It 
is, as Kant says, the Unknown (Prolegomena §57). 
Improperly hylomorphic production familiarises the Unknown by attempting to construct it out 
of material which is already known: the sensible. This deprives it of its status as beyond 
experience, i.e. beyond the world as such. But the point is that transcendental concepts are in the 
same fundamental state as the God of the newly privatised and negativised theology is in. That 
is, we illegitimately approach the absolute whole of the world and the soul as substance by 
thinking them as empirical parts of the world. They are not; they are governing concepts, 
transcendental concepts. To think them empirically deprives them of their transcendent status 
and reconceives them, along the lines of a barbaric mysticism, as derivative from empirical 
objects. This is precisely the content of Kant's critique of superstition: God will be misconceived 
if thought of with empirical predicates, He is too great for that. The same argument works with 
all the regulative ideas, and it follows also, for the concept of the prime matter which is 
implicated by the deployment of a hylomorphic production theory as the ground for legislative 
distinction. This matter too must be thought as independent of sensible predicates. This generates 
a seemingly universal compatibilism. Not only are God, the more unexceptionable regulative 
ideas (like the size of the world) and matter all in the same relation to the sensible world, it seems 
further as if they must be identical: deprived of all positive terms of characterisation, they are all 
negatively the same: the supersensible. 
Once the world has become representation, the other world becomes more radically unknown 
than under its previous reputedly anthropomorphic grandeur: it partakes of nothing sensual and 
is theoretically utterly inaccessible. Simultaneously, though every(thing) which is inaccessible is 
in principle indistinguishable from this other world. Everything is permitted just because nothing 
is. Given that all presentation, and hence all world and actuality, have been removed it is only the 
bare logical condition of non-contradiction which pertains to the transcendent. Thus we can think 
God as at the same time the most spontaneous of all forms, and the most material of all matters. 
It is indifferent (for theoretical purposes) which. Kant makes room for an orgy of concepts whose 
production, a free wheel in the mechanism of production processes, is theoretically unlimited. In 
speculation, which, disabused of the need to make any productive contribution, proceeds without 
fetter, Kant not only makes room for an account of traditional concepts of theological 
metaphysics, but for, in principle at least, for any (non-contradictory) concepts whatever. In 
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combating the delirious enthusiasm [Schwarmerei] of the sensual mystics of the dark ages, Kant 
opens up the realm of a negative enthusiasm [Enthusiasm] for the transcendent, one which, if 
anything contains greater possibilities for heightened stimulation than the mundane could ever 
have offered?3 
The last point to be gathered from this new set of relations obtaining between God (as general 
term for the supersensible, although any other will do just as well now) and the world qua 
representation is that this relation itself is still thought as one of production. The Unknown, the 
real, God are thought as having a relation of causation (taken in the broadest sense) to the 
known, the actual and nature. Kant spends a lot of time on this issue, but the general result, or a 
least the general problematic of the result, is clear enough: 34 however one thinks the 
supersensible, whether as the radicalised matter of the noumenon constituting the final reference 
of sensation in experience, or as the radicalised spontaneity of the Author God, the relation 
between supersensible and sensible is always one of production. In the first case (of the 
supersensible thought as matter) the relation is that of the famous problem (which provides the 
starting point for much of the work of the immediate post-Kantian idealists) of Affektion;35 in the 
latter case (of the supersensible thought as spirit) the relation is that of the traditional idea of the 
transcendent creator God. What is common to both cases, and most important here, is that, 
irrespecti ve of the solutions which Kant provides (or fails to provide) to the problems, the space 
which such solutions must occupy is given beforehand: the mode of production of the 
33Kant suggests that there is "no more sublime passage in the Jewish law than the commandment: Thou 
shalt not make unto the any graven image" which alone can explain the Enthusiasm [Enthusiasm] of 
the Jewish people for their religion. He suggests further that far from it being a worry that this 
transcendence will appear "cold and lifeless," it is rather the reverse, "there would be need of tempering 
the ardour of an unbounded imagination to prevent it rising to enthusiasm [Enthusiasm]." The "childish 
devices" of sense are positive hindrances to this new emotion; delirium is simply not delirial enough. 
This is indeed an insight. (third Critique §29, General Remark). 
3.fHe broaches it in the solutions to the final antinomy (A559ff.; B587ff.); in the Ideal of Pure Reason 
(A567ff.; B595ff.); in the Prolegomena §57f.; and it is the problematic, in a renewed form, of the whole 
of the Critique o/Teleological Judgement, see below, chapter 6. 
YiThis problem is broached by Kant at A68; B93; but the residues its effects on his thought are 
registered in his choice of vocabulary all over the critical works. See below p. 11'+. 
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supersensible with respect to the sensible must be different from any possible mode of empirical 
production. This is in fact all that one can say about it. The delimitation of the space of the 
answer is the answer. This would follow from Kant's argument about the illegitimacy of the 
representation of transcendent entities. Thus, all there are, are empirical modes of production, 
and the relation of the transcendent supersensible to the sensible must rest as indeterminate as 
the supposed subject(s) of the supersensible (God Himself, that is). 
The articulation of transcendental production onto traditional theological production is only a 
suggestive first phase in understanding the relation of privatised production to its (now 
rigorously negativised) predecessor. The second phase demands that account be taken of the 
absolute primacy of the moment of legitimacy and legislation in transcendental production even 
over itself. This is a phase which might appropriately (and with some, not unjustified, paradox) 
be named that of the reverse articulation of negativised traditional transcendent production back 
onto what appears as its condition: that is, transcendental production. 
This systematic conjunction denotes several important things. To summarise the results up to this 
point. God's amputated state has been characterised, his enforced taking up of the divine life on 
a new and lower level which is thought, in Kant, under the confmements of a purely negative 
theology. This diminishment is not correlate with any diminution of interest in production in 
general, however. Instead, a heightened interest not only in production but specifically in the 
production of the world is theorised in the new thought of the transcendental. Thus production 
appears, to a great extent, to by-pass God, and instead be channelled through the subject as the 
ultimate locus and agent of productive efficacy. 
What is the relation between these two, the transcendent negative theology of representation and 
the transcendentally productive hylomorphism of experience? In the first place, the legislative 
proprieties of the (il)legitimate representations of theology are themselves dependent on the prior 
constitution of experience as product or representation, since it is this which warrants the 
distinction between transcendental and transcendent. In the second place, the residue of Kant's 
God's productive power raises the issue of a production that is not empirical and is merely 
negative (as would follow from negative theology in general) which is simultaneously the 
outcome of a decomposition of the properly transcendental. The legislative confinement of 
concepts to legitimate usage only within the bounds of a possible experience is articulated back 
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onto the production theory which had seemed to be its ground, so as to make the mode of that 
production itself into a transcendent, and thus, in the night of negativity, into God's production 
once agam. 
The scope of this decomposition cannot be over-emphasised. Is it possible even to think the 
transcendental-transcendent without surreptitiously borrowing materials for the constitution of 
the thought itself from the illegitimate empirical realm? With the advent of the ubiquity of 
language as a transcendental operator (its own questionable status notwithstanding) this 
possibility becomes irresistible. Language is that transcendental which conditions the possibility 
of both thought and experience equally through the critical interrogation of the pre-critical 
relation of nomination between signifier and a supposedly pre-existing signified (this move will 
be analysed in chapter 4 below). It is thus that thinking can come to install itself in the liminal 
space between an unsustainable dogmatic naivete of the empirical and an impossible critical 
sophistication of the transcendental. At least one thing needs to noted about this already obvious 
labour of the negative: that the legislative inaccessibility of the transcendental (which is at the 
same time categorically demanded) effaces even the possibility of thinking the difference between 
material and ideal conditions. All conditions36 recess into a blank negative theology of 
representation which is itself indistinguishable from negative theology as such as well as from 
the pathological original source of material sensation which, as outside (ultimately one could say 
the same of intuitions even) is identical with the supersensible space whose name is always God. 
The outside of the world as representation is just and only that. 
The Paradoxes of Negative Critique 
Now we are in a position to see the inefficacy of thinking the relation of Kantian negative 
theology with the majestic cosmology of its predecessor as simply a structure (of, for instance, 
hylomorphism). Theological production is privatised into a subjective production just as theology 
is converted in the negative of representation. But the transcendental nature of this subjective 
production means that it too is thought as the other of representation, and is, strictly, 
unrepresentable. Thus the two meet up again in the indistinction of the transcendent. 
360ne may make out the whole decomposition argument is with the etymology of condition: bedillgell, 
to en-thing is a transcendental process of bestowing thinghood which cannot itself be either a thing or 
any-thing empirical (causation). 
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Transcendental production-which must be specifically distinct from all empirical production-
is yoked up to negative theological transcendence: Plato's two God's again. This institutes a 
rupture both in the thought of production and in the thought of theology. The mobilisation of a 
subjectified production in order to ground a legislative relation or correlation between 
(un)representable and (il)legitimate is followed by the reverse articulation of that very legislation 
back onto production itself. This generates a situation in which the necessity of thinking another 
mode of production than the empirical becomes superimposed upon the illegitimacy and 
impossibility of doing so. In this way even Kant's hylomorphism becomes evacuated: it serves as 
a first move (to open up the spaces of the transcendental and the transcendent) only to be itself 
repudiated in the reapplication of legislation onto it. How can transcendental production be 
hylomorphic when hylomorphism is the name form an empirical production? Both the formal and 
the material elements of Kant's hylomorphism are too much for this thought, and they recede, 
insofar as they are legitimately transcendental and not illegitimate applications of the empirical to 
the transcendental, into an indistinction of conditions. The compression of the production of the 
empirical into the production of representation combines with the legislative and the territorial to 
squeeze all exteriority into impossibility. 
This deployment, apres-coup, of legislation onto production-identified so clearly by 
Chapman's engraving with a narcissistic fantasy of auto-consumption37-bears an important 
relation to the fundamental investments of the critical enterprise itself; a relation that 
demonstrates the motivations of negative critique. Kant is famously clear about what is at stake 
in the apparent critiques of God, the immortal soul and heaven: 
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith 
(first Critique B p. xxx) 
Critique is envisaged by Kant not as an instrument of destruction, but as an immunological 
injection which submits what is to be critiqued to a reduced dosage of an infection which could 
37 Circa 1812; it is reproduced on the front cover of the Macmillan edition of Norman Kemp Smith's 
translation of the first Critique, and portrays the great sage within the distended upper portion of a 
figure-of-eight delineated by a snake consuming its own tail. The image is an old one; and probably 
Gnostic in origin; see Jacques Lacarriere La. Cendre et les etoiles (Paris: Andre Balland 1970) pp. 88 
ff. 
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otherwise do real damage, but which in this instance, introduced in dosages of an almost 
homeopathic negligibility, rather serves to strengthen the resistance of the object of critique 
precisely to any further critique. 
The important term therefore in the legislative vocabulary of critique is not the legitimate but the 
il-Zegitimate. God is rendered absolutely transcendent (and in the technical sense of the term) 
only so that being thus he can be indiscemibly compatible with all those supposedly illegitimate 
empirical and anthropomorphic characteristics which he had always displayed. This is the 
primary paradox of critique when it is construed in a relation of identity to the representational 
and legislative theses of transcendental idealism. Critique operates only in an apparently critical 
manner, in fact, a cunningly dogmatic manner. Critique criticises its objects in order to foreclose 
the possibility of further critique of its objects which it then re-Iocates to a domain which is (or 
can become, or rather tends increasingly to become) defmitively immune to objection because 
immune to everything (empirical): this domain is named the transcendent. Take God out of the 
domain of the empirical in order that he be unreachable by empirical concepts and in principle 
unobjectionable. Once there God may sajeZ/8 be invoked in another context, the practical, where 
bodies, unities and energy can be controlled in an increasing mute immanence, the intensity of 
which control increases in proportion to its muteness: one cannot negotiate with the categorical. 
The rearticulation of the legislative and representational components of critique back onto its 
productive foundation has the effect of forcing the assimilation of the transcendental to God and 
the transcendent. The paradoxes and sophistication of the decompositional tendency therefore 
share much with the hypocrisy of the critical program itself. The decompositional impulsion-
and its generation of the results of delicately counter-conceptual paradox-will be lodged and in 
a prior manner within the strategic and speculative disinvestment of the transcendent whose 
result is the infinitised reinvestment at another level of the very same objects. From which it 
follows that the intensity of the paradoxes of the recession of conditions (transcendentals) from 
what they condition (experience) is strictly secondary and dependent upon the primary paradox 
of a critique which, far from destroying, far even from bringing into question, makes its objects 
the stronger. 
38This thought of safety-an incomparably complete. a transcendental safety-is clearly important for 
an analysis of the sublime; and will be addressed in this context in chapter 7 p.176. 
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The critique of production which is at stake in the constitution of critique, is therefore-like 
Kant's critiques of World, Soul and God-not carried through. This is the evident result of the 
collapse of transcendental into transcendent. Critique utilises the distinction between 
transcendent and immanent to open up a narcissistic space of reason which is not just remote 
from experience, but specifically different therefrom, and which is therefore universally and 
eternally secure from any assault launched from the this side. The identification of the 
transcendental with the transcendent will do just the same for the transcendental. The mode of 
production of the transcendental will remain un interrogated and presupposed, although removed 
to the purely negative region of indiscernibility from God himself-in fact because so removed. 
It is not just that thereby the mode of production of the transcendental is not questioned; it is also 
and more disturbingly dogmatically that it is simultaneously assumed and then rendered 
incapable of further thought than that of bare assumption. The hylomorphic and ideal structuring 
of the thought of the mode of production of transcendental is assumed as the occluded productive 
basis of the legislative and representational counter-move which renders it transcendent. Without 
any further interrogation, this mode of production can be disclosed only illegitimately through its 
empirical models, or at the most sophisticated levels, through the bare thought of the empirical 
model as such. So equally the virtual operators will be assumed with the mode of production, 
since empirical productions of all kinds are homogeneously transitive (cause divides its efficacy 
between itself and its effect; desire is of an object)39 and any theory of production which invokes 
them needs to be thought in the traditional tri-partite structuring of production: agent of 
production, product and hence transitive mode of production. The structure of hylomorphism will 
therefore have been already invoked, protected from further investigation and assumed to have 
adequate transcendental efficacy in the productive base, before any of the rest of the argument 
concerning the inaccessibility of transcendentals.can even start. 
The' difficulty' of this move is grafted onto the reversal of the polarity of critique in Kant's 
resuscitation of the objects of critique through critique itself, and the two come to form a reactive 
unity. This happens in the following way. The invocation of the proprieties of subjective 
representation under the banner of the law serves to inoculate the mode of production of the 
39See also Husserl' s axiomatic transiti vity of representation in the slogan "all consciousness is 
consciousness of .. ". 
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transcendental (now decomposed into the transcendent) from any possible further interrogation. 
This is then utilised not just, generally, to recompose reference to just this mode of production 
(etc.) in its indiscernibility from God as the general name for the transcendent-a discourse of 
perpetual de- and re-problematisation-but also to obliterate the difficulties of the retro-active 
effect of legislation upon production which is specific to the decomposed transcendental. Thus, 
the universal inhibition of further critique which is imposed upon the transcendent in general 
functions not just to render the supposed object of critique immune to further or any 
interrogation but also in this case, to block the possibility of the interrogation of the 
paradoxicality involved in the argument itself: that the transcendental nature of the argument 
paradoxically suspends the possibility of the productive base that constitutes its own ground. 
Just because the transcendental mode of production is made indiscernible with God and the 
supersensible (is inoculated) the mode of the relation of the transcendental to the empirical which 
it conditions is itself made transcendent and therefore essentially paradoxical. Thus the fact that 
it seems like a type of petitio princeps--or even a paralogism-to apply the result an argument 
retro-actively to the premise is, in this instance, just made into a special case of the general 
difficulties attendant upon the inevitably compromised attempts to characterise the 
transcendental when all that there are at the level of the empirical is the empirical. Not only is the 
mode of production of the transcendental immunised from further critique by its relocation into 
the inaccessible (and therefore uncriticisable) domain of the transcendent, but also the 
impossibility of the relation which this production maintains with the decomposition is itself 
removed from the range of any further interrogative criticism. 
The transcendent (illegitimate) is therefore the characteristic concept of Kantian critique. It 
permits the relocation of the objects of critique into a safe h(e)aven which preserves them in 
atrophied pure formality and prevents further interrogation of them. The decomposition of the 
transcendental into the transcendent relocates the thought of transcendental production as it is 
presented (that is as ideal and hylomorphic) into the same (non)place and prevents it from being 
interrogated. In this case, however, it also permits the argument from decomposition to occlude 
its own problematic and paradoxical presupposition of the efficacy of a (now immunised) 
production which it implicitly mobilises and then relocates into the safe position of the 
transcendent. The key here is that presupposition and dependence of the decompositional 
argument on the uncritically appropriated dogmatic base of a mode of production whose 
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reactivity is preserved by being made transcendent. All the spurious problematisation and 
argumentative sophistication which the decompositional argument makes possible is subsequent 
to this primary paradox of presupposition and critical-uncritical occlusion of production. It does 
not matter to what extent this type of thinking makes claims at being free from presupposition, at 
not deploying simply transcendental arguments, at not deploying a theory of production (which 
would, of course, be something simply, or indeed not so simply, empirical), at not referencing 
any part of the history of philosophy, or any part of history at all, or anything at all, in a naive 
manner, but always with a cautious awareness (and often it cannot be any more than a mere 
awareness, a trembling, afeeling and that for reasons of principle); it does not matter to what 
extent these moves are made or even only alluded to, because all such moves are the subsequent 
result of the argument which consists precisely in the re-mobilisation of the transcendent 
decomposition of the transcendental in a problematising occlusion of this very mobilisation. One 
always starts from transcendental production; and only then is one able to say how difficult it is, 
how elusive, how complex, how irreducibly and infmitely remote or even how close (but still 
inaccessible) or even the former as a result of the latter.40 It does not matter.41 
Some of the original texts of the critical program can, of course, be read so as to support this 
type of argumentation. (What texts could not?) Take the aestheticisation of the transcendental in 
40"Viewed ontically, we are closest of all to the being that we ourselves are, and that we call the Dasein; 
for we are this being itself. Nevertheless, what is thus nearest to us ontically is exactly farthest away 
from us ontologically." (Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie [Frankfurt: Klostermann 
1975] trans. by Albert Hofstadter as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology [Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1982], p. 220; trans. p. 155) . 
. HEven the complexities of Derrida' s second (half)move whereby the indistinction of the transcendental 
from the empirical is thought as the inevitable infestation or pollution of the empirical by the 
transcendental is subsequent. On the face of it this is obvious. To differentiate himself from the merely 
dogmatic and pre-critical attempt to name the transcendental empirically (anthropomorphism, as Kant 
says of pre-critical theology) Derrida must go through a transcendental phase. All such 'phases' must 
invoke transcendental production. At the end of his essay on Levinas therefore, Derrida is able (with a 
textual straight face) to invoke a certain empiricism; the 'certain' is the trace of the transcendental 
which saves him from (mere) dogmatism. See 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas' Writing and Difference trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1978), pp. 79-153, especially pp. 151f. 
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the third Critique for instance. By referring transcendental efficacy ultimately to afeeling 
(something essentially remote from conceptuality), one can easily see how the transcendental 
itself becomes identically remote from concepts. This furnishes a sort of evidence (as if any were 
really needed) of the decomposition of the transcendental into not only the unexperiencable 
transcendent, but further into the unthinkable transcendent of the beyond of concepts. In §59 of 
the third Critique Kant develops a thought of symbolism which bears the same relation to 
transcendent ideas as the schematism does to immanent ones (and as examples bear to empirical 
concepts). The argument is designed to demonstrate that beauty is the symbol of morality, but 
the symbol is nevertheless entirely general. It effects the presentation ("indirectly ... [by] 
analogy") of an intuition for a concept which strictly does not or (in the case of transcendent 
ideas) could not possibly, have one. The interesting thing is that not only does this symbolism 
refer to transcendent ideas, but also to transcendental ones: Kant himself directly gives the 
example of substance, and his other examples, dependency, logical deduction (flow) and ground, 
are themselves not without transcendental interest. The result seems to be that Kant is envisaging 
the symbolic constitution of the transcendental itself, that is, the elision of the transcendentals 
with the transcendent in their capacity only to be presented indirectly (by means of symbols). 
This is true, but the effect is also, and more pointedly here, that attention is drawn (and in 
specific cases) to the illegitimacy of even thinking these (transcendental) concepts, because they 
appear to be, essentially and in their mere thought, polluted with an empirical referent. How, one 
might ask, can one even think the concept of substance aside from (physical) support? that is 
what it means. 
Most popularly of all, the notion of sublimity as it is theorised in the third Critique also appears 
to authorise a direct intrusion of the supersensible at the level of the aesthetic which mediates 
between the conceptual impossibility of the recession of the transcendent and its transcendental 
necessity. The subject of the feeling of sublimity take itself to be superior to the destructive vast 
of nature because a residual intuition of the transcendental argument of the first Critique 
demonstrates that although nature can reduce the empirical self to dust, nature is simultaneously 
the transcendental product of that same self construed transcendentally. The sublime is the 
theorisation of the untheorisability (unthematisability) of the transcendent(al): it is responsible 
for the Kantian authorisation of the counter-conceptual nature of the possibility of presentation 
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of the supersensible under the general head of its aestheticisation. The plethora of current work 
on the sublime attests to this form of reading.42 
Conclusion 
The decline in the grandeur of the pre-modem God in no way signalled a decrease in the 
importance or significance of production for thinking. One clear-albeit oversimplified-way of 
understanding this change is to regard production as being predominantly undertaken by 
(transcendental) subjectivity rather than by God. Such a (quite traditional) model has the 
advantage of stressing the extent to which modem subjective production has the same scope and 
aspiration as its theological predecessor: the world itself is what must be produced. But it has the 
disadvantage of glossing over a twist, in both the notions of production and of theology, with a 
structural homology. In fact the declension of God-in for instance Kant's theology-answers to 
a reconfiguration of both production and theology at the same time. Subjective production treats 
the world primarily as representation. God's extra-mundane status makes theology a name for 
the study of what is un representable, and therefore makes purely negative theology a dominant 
cognitive strategy. At the same time, (transcendental) subjectivity-in virtue of its conditioning 
or productive relation to the world as a whole-is also liminal with respect to representation. 
Thus, subjective production is theological, but in a sense of theology which has itself been 
specifically modernised. 
This very broad picture can be filled out a little more by considering some of the effects of the 
vastly increasing cognitive power of the material sciences, culminating in the unprecedented 
success of Newton's dynamics. The impetus of such researches was towards an economy of 
explanation whose ontological correlate was the impoverishment of the real-as consisting 
ultimately only of particles in motion. Moreover, the astonishing achievements, particularly of 
42This project is carried out by a large number of recent French investigations of Kant's aesthetics, and 
especially of the sublime. See most notably Lyotard's essay 'Complexity and the Sublime' in leA 
Documents 4 (London: ICA 1986), pp. 10-12, and also his Lefons sur l'Analytique du sublime (Paris: 
Galilee 1991) as well as the collection of articles Du Sublime ([Paris: Editions Berlin 1988] trans. by 
Jeffrey Librett as O/the Sublime: Presence in Question [Albany, NY: State University of New York 
1993]) which contains similar arguments-or ones starting from the same premise-in the essays by 
Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. This topic is broached below in chapter 7, pp.173ff. 
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Newton, lent enormous weight to the supposition of an impoverished real. The discrepancy 
between this real and 'lived experience'-the epistemic caesura-reconfigured the structural role 
that an agent of production could perform. No longer was a creator God required to execute a 
cosmological creation of a world viewed ontologically, but rather a knowing subject equipped 
with cognitive processing mechanisms was demanded to persecute an epistemological production 
of the world viewed as representation. 
A phenomenology-of Lockean secondary qualities for instance-is however not the only 
problem raised by the epistemic caesura. It also tables a much more general problematic of 
order. The newly revealed dynamics of nature were-as Newton himself admitted-
incompatible with any notion of the origin of the organisation of matter. The success of 
dynamics is also its weakness: a predictable and regularised nature is purchased only at the cost 
of presupposing conservation (of momentum, of force, and ultimately of ordered organisation). 
Because of the startling accomplishments of mechanics-and its universal scope-the problem 
of morphogenesis becomes increasingly stark: if the whole of nature is dynamic (and hence 
inimical to changes in organisation), then there is nowhere natural where the processing 
mechanisms that imbue nature with order can be located; there is nowhere for the subject to be. 
There is indeed-as Kant showed-' a great deal of difficulty in locating the conditions of the 
production of even the minimal ordering capacity inherent in dynamics itself. 
The subject is therefore the (impossible) name for an ordering agent that cannot rigorously be 
thought as belonging to the universe at all. Kant's account of productive subjectivity as 
transcendental is central to this understanding. In one sense the transcendental subject (or the 
transcendental unity of apperception) is in a direct line of descent not only from Cartesian 
subjectivity, but even also from Platonic ideality. This is the sense in which the subject can be 
thought of as a homologue of God. But in another sense, the notion of the transcendental marks a 
definitive shift. The thought of the transcendental is that of the unlimited critique of attempts to 
model the origin of ordered experience from within that experience; to model the transcendental 
on the empirical. The effect of this-as this chapter has shown-is to decompose the 
transcendental in the Kantian transcendent, and thence to ensure the negative identification of 
transcendental (subjectivity) with the also recently modernised and negativised theological. 
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The most primary model for subjective production is that of desire-production by means of 
concepts or artisanal production. The transcendental turn enables this model-hylomorphism is 
its most general name-to be deployed with a principled ambiguity. On the one hand, it is the 
only way of thinking the possibility of ordered products; on the other it is clearly inadequate-
the world as representation is, at the very least, not produced consciously by the subject. The 
assimilation of transcendental to transcendent pennits this ambiguity to remain uninterrogated by 
arguing that ultimately the mode of production of the transcendental is unknown (transcendent), 
but that it is at the same time an unknowable limit case of a trajectory of refinement of something 
that is known: desire production. Thus desire production is affirmed as the only alternative to 
natural or mechanical production (in keeping with the tradition) whilst at the same time any 
actual identification of this mode of production with desire is treated as dogmatic and naive. This 
is the structure of Kant's redemptive or negative critique of theology. Applied to production it 
argues the necessity of thinking another mode of production, but by negativising that mode it 
allows the old dogmas to be reproduced, modifying them only to the extent that one must always 
add that they are indeed dogmas. 
In the terms which are of interest for this project, such a move contemplates, and then botches a 
new thought of production. Novel production is broached by applying the arguments concerning 
transcendental subjectivity to its productive relation to the world. This relation-transcendental 
production-cannot be itself empirical, for then it would presuppose the prior constitution of its 
product (the empirical itself). But this thought is botched because a production which does not 
presuppose its products is then negatively identified with the transcendental itself, and hence 
becomes indiscernably correlate with God and the subject once again. The rhythm of this 
argument-inevitable empiricisation of the transcendental, cadenced by refined 
acknowledgement of its illegitimacy-has many resonances with contemporary thinking which 
will be briefly readdressed in the next chapter, and again in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4: National Production-A Note on Saussure 
Introduction 
Before returning to Kant in chapter 5, I would like to address briefly a more modem version of 
critique in its subordination to representation. Clearly the vocabulary and tendency of chapter 3 
have been oriented to developments in the 20th century; and I would like to make one of these 
references fully explicit. In particular, I would like to address a form of positive critique, 
associated with the structural movement, which needs to be rigorously distinguished-despite 
certain limited advances associated more with Saussure's text than with the general movement-
from the further arguments about Kant and positive critique in chapters 5 and 6. I want to 
suggest here the extent to which this form of 'positive' critique ('naive' 1 positive critique) is 
based in the fundamentally negative critical moves made out in the previous chapter, before 
going on to address Kant's own scepticism about transcendent idealism in chapter 5. In short, the 
substitution of language for concepts as primary transcendental operators does not arrest the 
decomposition of transcendental into transcendent. 
Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique generaie,2 reconstructed from the notes of his 
pupils at Geneva in the years before the outbreak of World War I, is an inordinately influential 
text 3 it initiated a revolution in linguistics which is comparable in extent with Kant's revolution 
in philosophy. And after World War II, Saussurian--or more broadly structural-linguistics 
became the model for a whole range of intellectual activities in the (by then) hegemonic French 
academy. Claude Levi-Strauss's anthropology, Jacques Lacan's psychoanalysis, Louis 
Althusser's Marxism and Roland Barthes' literary criticism represent only the hard-core of 
I Derrida suggests this term: "C'est pour eviter de retomber dans cet objectivisme naIf [of structural 
linguistics] que nous rMerons ici a une transcendentialite ... " (Jacques Derrida, De La grammatologie 
[Paris: Minuit 1967], p. 90). 
2Paris: Payot 1962; trans. by Roy Harris and edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye with the 
collaboration of Albert Redlinger as Course in General Linguistics (La Salle, IL: Open Court 1983). 
Subsequent Payot editions retain the pagination of this edition, which is in addition reproduced in the 
margins of the translation. Unt1agged references in this section also refer to this pagination of the 
Cours. 
'~And is often compared with this. See the introductions to the cited editions. 
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convergent structural re-readings that find their ultimate base in Saussure's work; Saussure's 
dominance also spreads-although in a more contested way-to characters as disparate as 
Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva.4 
This chapter argues that it is not only the extent of Saussure's sphere of impact that can be 
helpfully compared with Kant, but that his work is fundamentally a re-configuring of Kant's 
transcendental production theory. In this perspective, Saussure is even more significant than his 
explicit influence suggests. Saussure's key move is to re-naturalise transcendental conditions , 
making them empirical once again (although not thereby intending to remove from them a fully 
transcendental efficacy). Saussure's empiricism of choice is language: language as an object 
capable of empirical study, and-qua the condition of thought and therefore experience-
language also as transcendental condition. But this move is clearly not necessarily restricted to a 
choice of empirical transcendentals ordered around linguistic structures and structures explained 
on strict analogy with language.5 
The attraction of such naturalised transcendentalism rests on the possibility not just of 
characterising the transcendental, but of putting empirical disciplines to work in that 
characterisation (without losing the sense of transcendental production). Perhaps, therefore, the 
most general case of the application of this thinking (that it is still possible to say that Saussure 
started) is the social construction of reality. This hypothesis (quite often rather ill-defined) is 
common in contemporary American cultural studies.6 Its relation to the objectives of Kantian 
40f course, many of even the inner circle of the structural movement were quite critical of Saussure, 
looking rather to Jakobson for their linguistics; this in no way reduces the importance of Saussure 
without whom Jakobson's-perhaps more rigorous-brand of linguistics would itself not have been 
possible. 
5Levi-Strauss' kinship patterns for instance. See Chapters II-IV of L'anthropologie structurale (Paris 
1958) trans. by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf as Structural Anthropology (New York: 
Anchor Books 1967). 
6See, for instance, Gayle Rubin 'Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex' in Ranya 
Reiter (Ed.) Toward an Anthropology o/Women (London & New York: Monthly Review Press 1975) 
pp. 156-210. The suggestion is usually politically motivated. The axiom is that if something is socially 
produced (as opposed to 'naturally' given), then it is open to political contestation. Thus theory is 
oriented towards uncovering the produced status of what has previously been taken for given 
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transcendental production is evident: the real (the empirical-phenomenal) is constructed, that is to 
say produced. The agent in this case, the social as such, invokes the entire range of the social 
sciences as its naturalised transcendental operator. 
This tendency to re-introduce the empirical at the transcendental level constitutes a sort of 
positive critique. In it, the tendency of the transcendental to decompose into the transcendent is 
(temporarily) arrested, and a certain space for the positive characterisation of transcendental 
operators is opened up. To distinguish this mode of positive critique or attempted transcendental 
empiricism from the view I am defending here, I call it naive positive critique. Because it fails to 
interrogate the mode of production of the transcendental, and therefore more or less implicitly 
retains the organisation of transcendental production to be found in the first Critique, it is wide 
open to strong objection. 
Naive positive critique responds to the inadequacy of even (especially) the most refined forms of 
transcendental spirituality. It responds to a naturalising tendency; but it does so badly. By 
retaining the transitive mode of transcendental production it takes the terms of its naturalisation 
from transcendental idealism, and merely re-imposes phenomenality on the transcendental. 
Transcendental efficacy, or at least reference, is retained only through the suggestion that the 
linguistic operator produces reality. This operator is itself clearly a part of just that reality. This 
chapter argues that naive positive critique sustains itself only with much bad conscience between 
a transcendentiality whose sole rigor lies in the negative, and an empiricism crushingly 
vulnerable to transcendental critique. 
The specific difference of transcendental and empirical requires that operators of transcendental 
force not be empirical; but Saussure clearly asserts that transcendental operators are empirical 
'naturally'). The relations to transcendental idealism of the theoretical gesture are clear. The notion of 
production however is evidently subordinated to a technical-intentional notion-i.e. it is equated with 
what Kant calls desire-which identifies what is produced with what is capable of political re-
engineering. A more recent intervention suggests, with some wit, that today one would be in a better 
position to have a political programme to change something if in fact it turned out to be natural, on the 
ground that, for instance advances in the technology of bioengineering make such 'facts' rather more 
tractable to politics than the great instances of social production (patriarchy, capital etc.). See Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick 'Axiomatic' from Epistemology o/the Closet (Berkeley: UC Press 1990). It is 
noteworthy that this latter suggestion comes from the domain of queer studies. 
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(in his vocabulary, the objects of a science). The more one emphasises the empirical-phenomenal 
elements in the constitution of the real, the more the position seems to regress to that of Hume' s 
empiricism, and therefore cries out for a critique analogous to that Kant gives of Hume. As 
empirically accessible, the supposedly transcendental operators are a part of the product that 
they are supposed to produce. This force of this objection has been analysed in detail in chapter 3 
as an application of critique to the structures of Kant's own architectonic. There I argued further 
that respect for the specific difference of transcendental and empirical tends in the direction of 
the fully negative, which denies any empirical basis for the transcendental, and therefore 
identifies the transcendental with the Kantian transcendent, in being just the other of the 
empirical. 
This chapter therefore attempts first to show the extent to which Saussure's account of 
linguistics is dependent on Kant's philosophy, and specifically on the re-deployment of a 
paralogism of substantiality on language. This redeployment involves an implicit 
acknowledgement of the productive nature of linguistic structures. Second, I argue that the 
productive-transcendental base of structural linguistics is effaced by dominant use of another 
economic term: exchange. Interestingly, this method of repression itself is of Kantian origin. 
Lastly I argue that the attention paid by structural linguistics to the synchronic part of 
Saussure's text itself downplays the extent to which Saussure was conscious of the problems of 
the naturalised transcendental. This consciousness obtrudes most strikingly in the longer part of 
the book devoted to diachrony, to the material pressure of time as historical decay. Chronological 
decay provides a hint about the construction of a production theory that is positive, like 
Saussure's, without being subject to the problems of re-naturalised empiricism 
The Paralogism of the Substantiality of Language 
The echoes of Kant's terms, vocabulary and interests reverberate across all of the Cours: 
linguistics searches for the universal (20; 44); requires the self-delimitation of a terrain of 
legitimacy (20; 118); is conditioned by unity (145; 166; 249) and is defined by a "faculty" (25). 
Most pointedly, Saussure often polemics against the 'given'. This term refers to the pre-critical 
state of linguistics in which etymological knowledge is accreted in haphazard form, with no 
machinery for yielding general laws of the functioning of language. It is of no little importance 
that in Saussure, illegitimate empiricity is tagged as historical, temporal and diachronic. The 
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Cours is characterised by insistent calls for the eradication of the given. Saussure writes: "in 
linguistics natural givens have no place" (116, translation modified). This movement is centrally 
Kantian, and critical: it contrasts a critical account of the production of what appears, to 
empiricism, as merely given. Structural linguistics even has its own forms of the dialectic. There 
is a dialectical "antinomy" between synchrony and diachrony (129, translation modified; 251-2). 
Most importantly there is a paralogism of substantiality "langue is a form and not a substance". 
And all the errors of linguistics stem from this "presupposition" whose "involuntary" character 
attests to a Kantian necessity of paralogistic illusion (169, translation modified). There is even a 
properly Heideggerian setting for this issue when the editors' notes claim "langue is not an 
entity" but that 'ontic' metaphors are inescapable (19 note). Lastly, there is the standard 
correlate of Kantian production theory: a thought of unformed matter: a "masse informe" (55). 
This matter (equally the object of linguistics before Saussure's critique and the bi-zone of white-
noise white-thought) is: 
a confused mass of heterogeneous things without ties between each other ... an 
amorphous and indistinct mass of thought .. chaotic by its nature ... nebulous ... 
plastic matter. (155-6) 
The founding distinction of Saussurian linguistics is that between langue and parole. 7 Langue is 
the systematic unity of parole, differentiating it from the unformed mass of statistical white 
informational noise. Parole is something like everyday speech. Said simply, langue is the 
transcendental condition of parole. Saussure argues compellingly that the base units of language 
are not positive entities at all, derivable from the wave-formal composition of sounds. Rather, 
linguistically significant phonological units (phonemes) are determined as differentiated by 
means of the imposition of the structure of langue on the unformed mass. Differences of dialect 
between what count as identical phonemes can be objectively more extensive than objective 
differences between what count as different phonemes. It is langue that formally structures the 
unformed phonological mass, and which makes possible parole by investing certain arbitrary 
differences with meaning, what Saussure calls value. The formal structuring capacity of langue 
produces the possibility of parole. The emphasis on the fundamental activity of formal 
7No really satisfactory English equivalents have been found for these; and I will simply retain the 
French terms. 
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structuring as one of differentiation8 makes Saussure appeal to a vocabulary of primary 
articulation (26, 1561). Articulation is evidently, however, a form of production: langue 
produces meaning through the articulation and differentiation of the mass. As Saussure writes: 
"difference produces value and unity" (168, translation modified); or in an obviously Kantian 
register: "the accumulation of all these details has no value on its own; only the synthesis 
matters" (77). The capitulation of Saussure to Kant's transcendental complication of theology in 
this production theory is explicit enough for Saussure to resort to a biblical echo: "In each 
[synchronic] state, spirit [l' esprit] breaths itself into a given matter and vivifies it" (122, 
translation mOdified).9 The correlation between (transcendental) production, hylomorphism, 
theology and a thought of matter as dead could not be clearer. 
For Saussure, the accession of linguistics to the mantle of an autonomous science depends upon 
the (itself transcendental) delimitation of its proper object as a unity (16; 25). Closely following 
Kant's distinction between the historical and systematic elements of a sCience,1O Saussure 
suggests that this object is langue, and that it has never been isolated in its purity by any 
previous linguistics (25). Saussure undertakes a critique of linguistics. This critique takes the 
form of a paralogism. Pre-critical linguistics treats langue as a substance and not a form, just as 
for Kant, pre-critical rational psychology treats the ego as a (pneumatic) substance and not a 
(transcendental) form: 
The importance of this truth cannot be overemphasised. For all our mistakes of 
terminology, all OUf incorrect ways of designating things belonging to language 
originate in our involuntary supposition that we are dealing with a substance when we 
deal with linguistic phenomena. (169, translation modified) 
The unique status of the Paralogisms among the elements of the dialectic in the first Critique has 
already been noted. 11 The Paralogisms establish a relation between pre-critical rationalism and 
critique; the rest of the dialectic demolishes equally dogmatic rationalism as dogmatic 
empiricism. In the Paralogisms, Kant suggests that the rationalist thought of the ego merely 
needs sophistkation or complication from the thought of substance or res into the thought of 
MThe empha~is is obviously important for later French thinkers about Saussure. 
"Ezekiel 37:5. 
Il'First Critique 'The Architectonic of Pure Reason' A832f.; B860f. 
11 See chapter 3 pp. 56f. 
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transcendental fonnality in general. Saussure's demonstration that pre-critical linguistics 
depends on a paralogism of the substantiality of language evidently has its core in Kant, but its 
precise relation is treated ambiguously, and in an important way. 
Saussure presents this linguistic transcendental as having no relation its experiential precursor-
referent is not a tenn drawn from his vocabulary; but a later grafting. 12 This, however, is 
something of an evasion since representations are only and primarily made possible on the basis 
of the transcendental activity of langue. The pre-critical or Augustinian picture of language 
which "supposed ready-made ideas to pre-exists words" (97) must be subjected to a critical 
interrogation. This follows the same train as Kant's critique. In pre-critical linguistics, ideas are 
taken as given, and language construed as merely pointing toward these givens. In pre-critical 
metaphysicS, objects are taken as given, and representations as merely pointing to these givens. 
In critical linguistics ideas are themselves produced in language; in critical metaphysics, objects 
are themselves produced by representations. 13 It seems inescapable that Saussure' s analysis of 
the conditions of language be in at least some relation to the traditional arguments of 
transcendental idealism. 
The two possibilities might be thought diagrammatically. In the first case there is a quadrilateral 
of proportion between Hume and Kant on the one side and Augustine14 and Saussure on the 
other: 
(Hume : Kant) : (Augustine: Saussure). 
Thus Hume supposes that the object exists prior to its representation in the subject; and Kant 
performs the critical or Copernican revolution in arguing that the conditions of representation 
necessitate the production of the object. The object is produced in the representation of it, and 
12Benveniste performs this grafting by arguing that Saussure's arbitraire du signe should be thought as 
operating not between signifier and signifier, but between sign and referent. See Emile Benveniste, 
Problemes de linguislique generale 2 Vols. (Paris: Gallimard 1966-74). 
DThis is the gist of Kant's "Copernican revolution" in philosophy. See first Critique B xvii; xxiii note. 
140r any pre-critical linguistic theory. Augustine's is discussed by Wittgenstein at the beginning of the 
Philosophicallnrcsligarions (trans. by GEM Anscombe [Oxford: Blackwell 1963]) in a way that bears 
interesting comparison with Saussure's Kantimlism. See Part I §§ If. (pp. 2ff.) 
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can have no (phenomenal) existence prior to the representation. So, in a proportional relation, 
Augustine writes of meanings which pre-exist their linguistic (or verbal) expression: 
For when I tried to express my meaning by crying out and making various sounds and 
movements, so that my wishes should be obeyed, I found that I could not all that I 
meant to make myself understood by everyone whom I wished to understand me. So 
my memory prompted me. I noticed that people would name some object and then 
turn towards whatever it was that they had named. I watched them and understood 
that the sound they made when they wanted to indicate a particular thing was the 
name that they gave to it. (Confessions 1.8)15 
And Saussure's point is that the articulation of a meaning or value is dependent upon the 
conditions of linguistic representation; that the meaning is produced in the process of 
articulation, and in no way pre-exists it as something to be expressed indifferently. 
Alternatively, to mark out the continuity of the two projects with each other, the extent to which 
Saussure merely stretches the critical representationalism, and does not just transport the critical 
skill onto another, discrete, object of critique, one might present a line of representation-
hierarchy: 
object--condition of object (representation)--condition of representation (langue) 
Here the model is one of increasing sensitivity to conditioning. In the first place, objects are taken 
as given (pre-critical empiricism), and representation is thought as ancillary. In the second place, 
objects are thought as produced, and representation is thought as the condition of the object. In 
the third place, representation is thought as being essentially conditioned, and itself no longer just 
given. Representation takes place only in language. The consequence of this would be that 
langue, as the direct condition of representation, is also the mediate condition of experience (of 
objects, or referents) which themselves are only possible on the basis of a representation thought 
as linguistic. This in tum has the important consequence that Kant's distinction within 
representation between (mere) thought and experience is effaced. For Kant the outside of 
representation was thinkable, but only that. With the linguistic tum, even the thinkability of the 
outside is made impossible. Empty or transcendent concepts, just as much as any others are 
conditioned by the tr,illscendental activity of langue. One is entitled no longer even to the thought 
I.~trans. by RS Pine-coffin (London: Penguin 1961), p. 29. 
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of the outside. Even as Saussure inaugurates a form of regional positive critique, he vastly raises 
the stakes of negative critique. 
It is wrong to suggest that Saussure is engaging in a cover-up through this ambiguity (although 
he could have been more explicit about his Kantian heritage). The first interpretation-that 
Saussure's move is merely an application of Kant to a new domain--correlates with the 
formation of linguistics as an autonomous scientific discipline. The second interpretation-that 
Saussure implicitly extends critique--corresponds to an awareness of the consequences of this 
for philosophy. Saussure himself was-in spite of the bredth of this influence-a quite 
specialised student of linguistics, and had no obvious aspiration to draw any excessive 
conclusions from this closely delineated goal. Saussure himself is not strictly ambiguous about 
the two possible relations to Kant, he is simply not interested in the second one. Nevertheless, it 
is true that this facilitates a marginalisation of the primary issues of the confrontation of 
transcendental linguistics with the problems of its neo-Kantian heritage. 16 Saussure focuses on 
the professionalisation of a regional discipline. This sites his relation to Kant-and hence the 
production theory that he takes over from Kant-as one of regional appropriation (the first 
model above). He takes himself merely to be using critical instruments from Kant, and applying 
them strictly to a different, and smaller area: the constitution of the object of linguistics as a 
SCIence. 
The result of this transportation of critical techniques, however, is more widespread, and 
corresponds rather to the second model above. The conclusion of the critical paralogism of 
language is that langue, as form and not substance, is irreducible to either signifier or 
signified1\concept). Instead, langue, as transcendental, conditions both signifier and signified. 
This transcendental argument resists a pre-critical rationalist linguistics, which would 
compromise the scientific autonomy of the discipline by risking its reduction to concepts 
(signifieds). And it also resists a pre-critical empiricist linguistics, that similarly compromises the 
16 A marginal isation that persists in many of the authors influenced by Saussure. Some of the strongest 
thought in post-World War II France was not undertaken by philosophers, but by thinkers who, whilst 
by no means unphilosophical, were nevertheless representatives of other disciples: anthropology, 
psychoanalysis, Marxism, linguistics etc. 
17 Sigllijiant and sigllijie in Saussure's French. The translators use 'signal' and 'signification.' I have 
opted to retain the more familiar 'signifier' and 'signified' even if these are technically less appealing. 
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autonomy of linguistics, but this time by reduction to phonetics (signifiers). Langue, to be 
autonomous and transcendental, must condition both signifier and signified: 
Linguistics, then, operates along this margin, where sound [phonetics, signifiers] and 
thought [conceptuality, signifieds] meet. The contact between them gives rise to a 
form, not a substance [i.e. nothing reducible to thought or sound]. (157) 
Signifier and signified, therefore, cannot be prised apart. They are, in Saussure's famous phrase 
from this section of the Cours, like the recto and verso of a single sheet of paper (156). This 
clearly entails that all thinking has its primary condition in the structures of langue. And this, 
equally, clearly locates structural linguistics in a line of extension of Kant, and not (just) a 
regional, professional transportation of some of Kant's critical machinery. 
Saussure attempts to limit the scope of his production theory by sealing it up in a local 
discipline. This enables him to evade the difficulties of this sort of positive critique. Langue may 
be the condition of the object of linguistics properly conceived, but it is evidently also a fully 
transcendental condition: it makes possible conceptuality, or thought, and therefore experience or 
objects as such. The obvious problem that attends the naturalisation of transcendental conditions 
is: how can this be distinguished from a pre-critical empiricism open to standard Kantian 
transcendental objections akin to those advanced by Kant against Hume? In this case, how can 
transcendentally active and productive langue be specified so that it is different from the 
concepts it makes possible? This problem is particularly acute with the choice of language as 
naturalised transcendental operator. If langue is the transcendental condition of conceptuality, 
and therefore distinct from conceptuality, it follows that it is no longer a concept-and therefore 
no longer even thinkable as such, let alone the object of a possible science. Although the 
machinery that made possible such a move was already constructed in Kant, Saussure made this 
explicit, and raises the stakes of negative critique-negativising it to counter-conceptuality-in 
his attempt at positive critique. 
Market and Factory 
In Volume 1 of Capital, Marx suggests that the phase transition to capital is not fully achieved 
until the means of production have been revolutionised by capital. 18 For Marx, the single most 
IS"It by no means suffices for capital to take over the labour process in its given or historically 
transmitted shape, and then simply to prolong its duration. The technical and social conditions of the 
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important evidence of the completion of this transition is the development of the factory. Prior to 
this, while capital is still self-assembling, Marx suggests that other, not essentially capitalist, 
means of production can co-exist with the development of capital understood as the form of the 
fetish of the commodity in the market. 19 In the period in English history that Marx calls 
'Manufacture', an essentially feudal structure of production-notably the guild system-is 
retained even through the increasing capitalisation of markets.20 Similarly, slavery in the 
southern US was not abandoned until the pressures of the European cotton market demanded a 
revolutionisation and not just an exacerbation of the means of production.21 Exchanges on the 
market, in a sense, temporarily mask the future destruction and revolutionisation of the means of 
production by capital. 
Marx generalises this in his account of the fetishism of the commodity, whereby production, and 
importantly, the history of production, is always covered over by the functionings of the market 
in commodities.22 Today this is an increasingly significant argument. The internationalisation of 
the division of labour and the globalisation of capital increasingly concentrates intellectual 
labour in the core, whilst maintaining productive labour in the periphery. The 
process and consequently the mode of production itself must be revolutionised" Karl Marx Capital 
Volume 1 trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin 1976), p. 432, italic added. 
19" ... [C]apital subordinates labour on the basis of the technical conditions within which labour has been 
carried on up to that point in history. It does not therefore directly change the mode of production." op. 
cit. p. 425; "But capital ... is at first indifferent towards the technical character of the labour process it 
seizes control of. At the outset, it takes it as it finds it." p. 358. 
2°"With regard to the mode of production itself, manufactures can hardly be distinguished ... from the 
handicraft trades of the guilds." op. cit. p. 439. 
21Marx also analyses the retention of the corwie system in the Danubian Principalities op. cit. pp. 345f. 
22This is an important point for Marx, it determines his structuring of the text of Capital: beginning 
with an account of the commodity and its fetishism, and only then going on to deal with the 
revolutionisation of the mode of production under capital. He guides the reader from the realm of 
exchange and property relations into production thus: "Let us therefore, in company with the owner of 
money and the owner of labour-power, leave this noisy sphere [of exchange], where everything takes 
place on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow them into the hidden abode of production 
on whose threshold there hangs the notice 'No admittance except on business'. Here we shall see, not 
only how capital produces, but how capital is itself produced" op. cit. 279-80. 
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embourgeoisfication of the core proletariat is a correlate of the proletarianisation of periphery. 
Compounded by a racist problematic of the invisibility of the Other to the West, the masking of 
production (which occurs increasingly only in the periphery) by a core increasingly devoted to 
exchange and consumption (to the loops of the market that are fetishistically divorced from 
production) has achieved the dignity of the theoretical. Not only do bourgeois economists 
regularly efface production, but even Marxist-influenced social theorists (early Baudrillard, for 
instance) now suggest a re-orientation of Marxist theory away from production and toward 
exchange and consumption. Indeed, large segments of what is sometimes called post-modem 
theory seem to be dominated by this concentration on the economics of exchange and 
consumption as against production. There is similarly a whole real history of the construction of 
the thought of matter that can be brought into relation with Marx's analyses here; the thought of 
matter as dead and essentially the object of sciences of conservation (or exchange). 
Even in Kant, the centrality of production to whose thought has already been demonstrated at 
some length, this very centrality is compromised and repressed by appeal to a structure of 
exchange.23 In Saussure' s neo-Kantianism, this tendency toward the suppression of production in 
favour of and by a theory of exchange is exacerbated in preparation for the theoretical 
reconfigurations of late capital. As in Kant, the productivity of transcendental forms is 
characteristically subordinated to a process of reciprocal exchange. In fact the very efficacy of 
the transcendental operator in Saussure is in its role facilitator of exchange. Langue is the 
"intermediary" between signifier and signified (156) and at the same time-in virtue of its 
wholesale position-productive (157). Saussure envisages the site of production of language 
(experience) as simultaneously a site of exchange between the transcendental (concept; 'mental 
image') and empirical (intuition; acoustic image) facets of the sign. Similarly, in Kant the 
23Kant argues that it is time as a common form (of medium of exchange) between concept and intuition 
that enables them to be brought into contact. The notion of a productive exchange, essentially 
mercantalist, achieves even greater prominence in the third Critique when imagination and judgement, 
faculties occupying intermediary positions and exercising exchange functions, take on much of the 
transcendental work-load of constituting experience. Heidegger's 1927 reading of Kant (Kant und das 
Problem de,. Metaphysik [Frankfurt: Klostermann 1973] trans. by Richard Taft as Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1990]) demonstrates 
at some length the transcendental primacy of the imagination. See chapter 6. 
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imagination of the schematism in the ftrst Critique increasingly becomes the primary locus of 
production of reality in the third Critique. Factory is improbably reduced to market. And 
Saussure is as coy as Kant in designating the potency of the exchange / production as "somewhat 
mysterious" (156); Kant writes of it that it 
is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity 
nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover (A 142; B 180-1). 
Whilst the vocabulary of transcendental commodity production is not so manifest in Saussure as 
it is in Kant, the attribution to Saussure of a founding theory of exchange is not limited to his 
reproduction of the structures of Kantian thought. He is explicit not only about the signiftcance 
of the theory of exchange, but also about its origin in the economics of capital. 
Saussure in fact draws an exact parallel between the sciences of semiotics and political economy 
because, "as in political economy one is faced with the notion of value" (115). This parallel is 
thought in terms the identity of the mechanisms of exchange under capital: 
it is a question of a system of equivalence between things of different orders: in the one 
labour and wage, in the other signified and signifier (115) 
This approximation of signifier to wage and signifted to labour refers us to the analysis carried 
out by Marx in the first chapter of volume 1 of Capital; and to Baudrillard's semiotic reading of 
this.24 Baudrillard's semiotisation of use-value had, in effect, already been performed by 
Saussure himself. Saussure establishes a relation of exchange and hence equalisation which 
substitutes for and masks relations of transcendental production which must underlie the 
pretended transcendental efftcacy of exchange. 
The consequence of Saussure' s use of the vocabulary of exchange is to disable any possible 
interrogation of the functioning of those relations of production, and of the mode of production. 
The mystery associated by Saussure (and by Kant) with this productive exchange is clearly self-
imposed: exchange is used to make production mysterious and thereby immunise any critique of 
its constitution.25 Saussure's appeal to the economics of exchange is a form of transcendental 
HSee Jean Baudrillard, Pour ulle critique de l'ecollomie politique du signe (Paris: Gallimard 1972) 
trans. by Charles Levine as For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis: Telos Press 
1981 ), chapter 7. 
25This is Marx's argument op. cit. e.g. pp. 139,149. 164. 
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mercantilism: envisaging production as occurring merely through exchange.26 Horkheimer's 
casting of Kant as a theorist of the factory becomes Saussure's naive escape into a merely 
merchant-capital past. This mercantilism does, however, have a point of internal decomposition. 
The mere need for equalisation signals a problem that Kant attached much importance to over 
several of his later texts: that of the difficulty of getting the transcendent to be productive at all, 
of getting the transcendental to make productive contact with the empirical, from which it is 
specifically different. Saussure raises this blandly with his mention of "things of different orders" 
(115), but only pursues its difficulties when the orders concerned are systematic synchrony and 
. h' 27 tIme or lstory. 
History 
There is a point of breakdown of Saussure' s circle of reciprocal exchange; a point which is 
symptomatic of the larger breakdown of transcendentalism. Saussure matches economics and 
semiotics as co-sciences of value in order to effect a radical disjunction in both-as sciences of 
value-between the synchronic and the diachronic.28 A science of value for Saussure is 
characterised by its transcendental constitution. Value is the general term for the object of 
transcendental argument, or critique in general. Value has its genesis in a transcendental 
operator, langue in the case of linguistic value, and the economic monetary system in the case of 
fiscal value. Value cannot be accounted for empirically, because the constitution of the empirical 
realm (parole) is possible in the first place only on the basis of the transcendental operator. The 
argument is that of Kant against empiricism: it is impossible to account for the production of the 
empirical if one presupposes its constitution in the mode of production of the empirical. History 
is the irrational action of parole (the empirical of language) on the system of language itself 
(langue). Since parole is produced by langue, to suppose that langue has its (causal, historical, 
empirical) origin in parole is to beg the question. One cannot give a causal, that is to say 
historical, account of language as a system of values; the causal historical genetic question "is 
26Marx, op. cit. p. 651. 
27For Kant time was the medium of exchange, and therefore not an item capable of being exchanged. 
The problem did therefore not arise for Kant in the same way as for Saussure, although the reference to 
system in Saussure makes a compelling comparison. 
28This is the context of the quotes from pp.114f. 
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not even a question to be posed" (105), there is no "rational nonn" from the perspective of which 
one could even frame the question (106). 
Saussure presents synchrony as a time-slice; but this is not strictly accurate. Synchrony, the 
transcendental locus of langue-being a "fonn and not a substance" (169)-is not actually 
within time at all. This transcendental argument is marked, defmed, by a central and apparently 
insoluble antinomy. In Saussure's case this is ultimately just the re-statement of the 
transcendental argument itself and the eruption of the point of collapse of the system of 
exchange: 
The radical antinomy between evolutionary and static facts has for its consequence 
that all the notions relative to one or the other are to the same extent irreducible to 
each other (129, translation modified) 
This point is one of the failure of exchange, none of the concepts relating to one side may come into 
contact with any of the concepts relating to the other. This failure is the basis of the transcendental 
manoeuvre, its presupposition. It is only by the rigorous segregation of the two areas of transcendental 
and empirical that the argument can propel itself; and one which releases an insoluble (analytic as 
opposed to dialectic) antinomy. 
The analytic antinomy of production in Kant is that the relation of empirical production to its 
transcendental counter-part is unthinkable in the frame of an empirical production governed by 
the fetishism of the commodity and the dominance of the market. Even in Saussure empirical 
causation is still "one of the most difficult problems of linguistics" (202), and one which leaves 
an awkward sticky "residue" (196) of indigestible semantic efficacy. The effect of Saussure's 
linguistic transcendentalism renders impossible the location of organisational potency at the level 
of consciousness (Saussure's term is more properly l'esprit) and compels a thought of the 
impersonality of form. But this forces langue out from the speaking individual to appear only as 
tradition, which in tum makes it seem to depend upon history: 
LLlIzgue is necessary in order that parole be intelligible and produce all its effects; but 
the latter is necessary in order that langue establish itself; historically, the fact of 
parole always precedes (37, translation modified) 
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And we must add that transcendentally langue must always precede parole. Empirical and 
transcendental production operate in opposing senses, that is against each other. (See below, chapter 7, 
pp. 178f.) 
Saussure attempts to resolve this problem, as does Kant, by providing a fictive-repressive 
dialectical antinomy which he regards as transcendentally soluble. In fact the solution is, in 
Saussure's case, provided by his editors. The antinomy numbered third in Kant's organisation, 
between freedom (the characteristic of transcendental causation) and determinism (that of 
material causation) is reproduced in Saussure as one between the mutability and immutability of 
the sign. The editors comment is: 
One would be wrong to reproach F. de Saussure with being illogical or paradoxical in 
attributing to langue two contradictory properties. By the striking opposition of two 
terms he wanted only to emphasise the fact that langue transforms itself without there 
being subjects having the power to transform it (108 note) 
It is as a "blind" (127; 209) or "unconscious" (127) force that Saussure invests the historical. 
The most intensive instance of this force is the historical function of agglutination. Saussure 
describes this as "processus" and not "procede'" because "the latter word implies a will, an 
intention, and the absence of will is just the essential character of agglutination." (244). This 
synthesis "is a mechanical process [processus], in which the assemblage constitutes itself' (244; 
177) and the synthesis is unconscious-belonging to "a whole latent system ... held in reserve" 
(179). 
This is the real specificity of the linguistic tum which Saussure did much to inaugurate. It is not 
just that the tum raises the stakes of negative critique by effacing the distinction between thought 
and experience. It is rather that the staking out of a transcendental ground that does not merely 
include time (and hence temporality and history) as merely phenomenal. The mysterious power 
of the noumenon in Kant can now erupt again into thought as a fundamentally historical power; 
but only on condition that it appear in a naively (as opposed to transcendentally) empirical way 
and that as such it should, by virtue of its empirical nature, be rigorously excluded from 
consideration: "The intervention of history can only falsify ... [the linguist's] judgement" (117). 
This thesis is not completely parochial; it does not apply only to Saussure. To take a single 
example, the use of history in Foucault's work up to the later volumes of the History of 
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Sexuality, far from contesting the dominant structural Saussurianism, rather reinforces it. In both 
authors history appears as the master of the irrational, irrupting into the relative stability of what 
Saussure names synchrony, and what Foucault (when he refers to it explicitly) names as 
episteme, and disrupting it. The difference appears in the celebration with which Foucault greets 
this in contrast to Saussure's tight-lipped attempt to remove history from consideration. 
Just as pre-critical empiricism in general gives a clue for understanding transcendental 
empiricism; so the effect of history as a factor of annoyance for the transcendental in Saussure 
may provide a similar clue for the understanding of the problems that might be faced by an 
unrepression of history . 
The most primary role of the historical is again at one with that Foucault ascribes to it; at least in 
the late essay on (Kant on) the Enlightenment where he admits the immersion of his thought in 
Kant's practice. There Foucault describes the function of history as an interminable process of 
disessentialisation: it disperses givens. Foucault is describing the movement of primary critique, 
accounting for the production of what is dogmatically taken as given.29 Saussure writes, in his 
apparently more limited mode: 
The action of phonetic change is unlimited .. .it is puerile to think that the word can 
only transform itself up to a given point as if there were something in it which could 
preserve itself. (208) 
But also, more generally, "permanence is an effect of chance" (306). The full implications of this 
remark are usually overlooked. Saussure thinks of the motor of linguistic history as an indefInite and 
impersonal procedure of decomposition of language; even to the point of its self-obliteration: 
In effect the system of langue rests on the irrational principle of the arbitrariness of 
the sign which, applied without restriction, would end up in a state of the utter chaos; 
but spirit [/' esprit] attempts to introduce a principle of order and of regularity in 
certain parts of the mass of signs, and this is role of the relatively motivated. (182, 
translation modified) 
This double movement is initiated by "the two opposed currents which partition the moverrent of 
language". The system of langue, "naturally chaotic" only becomes systematic through "a limitation 
29Foucault's method does not, however, identify what is produced with what can be the object of a molar 
politics (see above note 6). 
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of arbitrariness" (183). The force of history is always primarily that of altemance which tends toward 
the completely lexicological, the severing of all relations between words on which the systematicity of 
the system is based. It is only the attempt, on the part of l' esprit-through the importantly Kantian 
mechanism of analogy-to control and regulate this infInite division that enables langue to be a system 
at all. It is in this context that Saussure resorts to the biblical echo already mentioned to confIrm the 
theological model to which he adheres: "In each state l'esprit breaths itself into a given matter and 
viviftes it " (122). 
Langue tends toward the breakdown of its system; which is at the same time a tendency toward 
its complete unrepression. The eradication of system is the eradication of "the whole latent 
system" (179) of associative relations, the unconscious of langue-and this process is held up 
only by activity of the egoic system, l' esprit. It is the same with the system of languages. The 
multiplicity of languages "tends toward an indefInite fragmentation" (268) whose end point 
would be the end of language, its privatisation to the point individual singularity-aptly named 
as idiolects. This process too is retarded, and this retardation is another condition of language, by 
a counter-operative force which Saussure names, benevolently enough, "literary language" 
(267f); but by which he means both civilisation itself (268) and the paranoid colonial mechanism 
by which civilisation, in its paradigmatic from of the nation-state, is able to arise. 
Saussure in fact performs the same manoeuvre as does Freud with his "two opposing currents of 
mental life"; that is he reduces them to modes of the same force. He posits initially "force of 
intercourse and a spirit of closure". Clearly the apparent distinction of type between force and 
spirit is important; the two are also distinguished as nomadic and sedentary (280); and 
"contagious" versus isolated (283). But the course of the discussion renders the dual hypothesis, 
as in Freud's theory of narcissism, otiose:30 
One can refer everything to the single unifying force without the intervention of the 
spirit of closure, the latter being nothing other than the force of intercourse 
appropriate to each region ... only the intensity of their action varies. (285) 
The reference to unity here is obfuscatory. The more salient character of intercourse is its capacity for 
contagion; for contact has the effect of accelerating the singularising of phonetic change. In all three 
cases the spirit which reimposes order on the always collapsing tendency of language itself emerges 
.
10See below chapter 7, pp. 179ff. 
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from that tendency. Closure is openness or intercourse between appropriately distinct entities or 
territories; it is a secondary repressive symptom. The single force of exploration appears as a function 
of two already adequately distinguished entities or territories. Thus one of the effects of contact is the 
production of relatively discrete units between which empirical contact may take place. This is 
dependent on a prior and primary repression of the force of contact which makes no such 
presupposition. The same is true of the other two effects of history: in each case the repressive 
capacity of spirit is conditioned by the potency of the impersonal and deterritorialising historical force 
which it purports to repress (as a condition of civilisation etc.). Spirit borrows its forces; or rather it is 
predicated upon a violent colonial appropriation of forces for itself; after which it can present itself as 
a pre-condition for the very history from which it borrows. 
The critical fold of philosophy in upon language retains its fierce hold on thought only to the 
extent that it elides and forgets the difference between its extension of the ideal dimension of the 
Kantian project and its transportation of the critical algorithm to a new domain. By excavating a 
new ancillary condition for thought it constitutes merely a modish version of Kantianism. But by 
a process of selective forgetting of this fully transcendental origin, by attending to the weight of 
the new axis which is provided by language, it manages a reintroduction of the power of 
temporality which was obliterated by the traditional accounts of time as form of the phenomenon 
in Kant. 
This re-emergence of history is strictly incoherent: it is reduced to the level of an empiricism that 
it cannot possibly inhabit if the transcendental status of language is to be respected. Nevertheless 
it guides the possibility of a properly materialist theory of time. Saussure's theorisation of time 
as a drive toward death, the death of language and thought, implies that its only mode of contact 
with spirit must be through the agency of a repression. Exchange is counted out from the start. 
The non-linearity of the relation demonstrates the involvement of the exchanges which constitute 
and produce language with a non-exchange. The orientation of the non-reciprocity toward death 
denotes time not as a medium of exchange as in Kant, not as, in general, reversible as the 
scientific jargon has it, but as irreversible. 31 It is not capable of travelling indifferently in either 
J I See Jlya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers La nouvelle alliance (Paris: Gallimard 1979), 2nd edition 
with preface and appendices, 1986, I st edition partially trans. and somewhat rewritten by the authors as 
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direction-but insists upon a unidirectional sense; an entropy. This conception of unilateral 
temporality is the correlate of transcendental hylozoism or intransitive production. It is that time 
in which the productive causality peculiar to hylozoism may operate. Its articulation comes in 
Deleuze's thought of the "life proper to matter itself ... dissociated by the hylomorphic model.,,32 
Conclusion 
The structures of structuralism are the categories writ large. The supposed antinomy in French 
thinking before 1972 (the publication of Anti-Oedipe) between a more or less humanist 
phenomenology very obviously derived from Kant, and a more or less anti-humanist structural 
movement less obviously derived from Kant, is a completely false one. In both cases a 
transcendental production is implicated which is determined as hylomorphic. The domain of the 
morphe remains substantially unchanged through the switches from cosmology (God as form) 
through apparent privatisation in Kant (supposedly subjective categories) which could never be 
thought as such (the subject is transcendently indiscernible from a negative God) through re-
nationalisation again into ambivalently social or linguistic transcendental structures. 
What the succession of modifications of the morphe does achieve is a raising of the stakes of 
hylomorphism. Saussure, for instance, prepares a path toward a rigorous negative critique by 
drawing attention to the inescapability of (linguistic) representation, and obliterating what little 
was given by Kant in his distinction between experience and thinking. This effect makes the 
appeal to a phenomenal investigation of transcendent(al) structures the more brittle. The actual 
processes of production and history are therefore almost completely sunken under the weight of a 
concentration on an exchangist surface which is only mysteriously productive and on the regional 
Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (London: Heinemann 1984) especially Chapters 
4ff. 
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and disciplinary nature of the claims. History itself, though it preoccupies Saussure himself, is 
thinkable only as the irruption of the irrational: chaos. 
32Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Capitalisme et schizophrenie: 2. Mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit 
1980) trans. by Brian Massumi as A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
1987), p. 411. 
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Chapter 5: Transcendental Sclerosis 
Introduction 
The theologians, by assimilating God to a pure spirit, have betrayed that they have no 
feeling for the process of creation, of doing in general. Spirit as such is ill-equipped 
for production; it plans, but to execute its projects, there must be an impure energy 
which comes to put it into motion. It is spirit, and not the flesh, which is feeble, and it 
becomes strong only when stimulated by a suspect thirst, by some condamnable 
impulsion. 
Emile Cioran La Chute dans Ie temps 
This chapter discusses the deployment of Kant's increasing scepticism with respect to the 
efficacy of hylomorphic production, a scepticism that cuts away the productive base from the 
arguments of negative critique. A short note on law demonstrates that even when Kant attempts 
to make the transcendental legal rather than productive, the same scepticism is in evidence; 
although it is of a rather mitigated variety. 
The discussion of the third Critique centres on the relation of the problematics of the third 
Critique and their performance in the body of the text. This chapter aims, in this respect, merely 
to prepare the way for the analysis of the third Critique in the next chapter by emphasising the 
importance and the difficulty of the suggestions Kant makes in the introductions (and especially 
the First Introduction). 
Kant's scepticism about hylomorphic production is manifest in the two major formulations of the 
problem that Kant makes in the introductions to the third Critique: the problem of system; and 
that of the capacity of judgement. In both cases the content of the third Critique is in a difficult 
and sometimes opaque relation to its explicit problematic. This difficulty sometimes leads (even 
in the case of Kant himself) to an underestimation of the full, indeed transcendental, scope of the 
problems. 
System 
From the start Kant's problem presented itself as the guarantee of stabilities and unities in the 
face of the disaggregation of flows. lAs early as the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 
lReferences back to Milton's, and forward to Freud's analyses of fluidity are clear. 
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and the Sublime, in a marginal note hand-written in his personal printed copy, we fmd Kant 
expressing the investments that were later to be those of critique: 
Everything goes past like a river and the changing taste and various shapes of men 
make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where do I find fixed points in nature, 
which can not be moved by men, and where I can indicate the markers by the shore to 
which he ought to adhere?2 
By the time of the first Critique and the initiation of the critical project, Kant had exorcised this 
Herakleitan river from the interior of the continent of political and epistemological stability, and 
defmitively delineated a continuous coastline of experience within which knowledge was secure, 
and without which there is nothing (nihil) but an unknown ocean of transcendence.3 Critique 
takes the specific form of a transcendental rationalism--combating the sceptics4 who had raised 
him from rationalist dogmatism-and reconfiguring the investments in stability and order (both 
political and epistemological) at the new, and far more sophisticated, level of the transcendental. 
As the Prolegomena makes clear, the aim of the positive phase of transcendental idealism is to 
underwrite and guarantee the stable forms of knowledge of geometry, pure mathematics, and 
Newtonian mechanics. Kant's hylomorphic production theory betrays its rationalist and 
theological origins here. Transcendental conditions rethink the old guarantors of unity (God and 
the soul primarily) as formal agents of production necessarily presupposed by the construction of 
nature as experience. 
The introductions to the third Critique, and especially the First Introduction, make prima facie 
devastating claims against the efficacy of Kant's transcendental production theory and its 
capacity to underwrite the unity of nature. There Kant re-invokes a distinction from the end of 
2Sammtliche Werke ed. Hartenstein (Leipzig 1868) vm, p. 625; cited in Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's 
Pre-CriticaL Ethics (Evanston & Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press 1938), p. 73. 
3At A396 Kant invokes the Pillars of Hercules at the boundary of the rigidly delimited zone of 
immanent knowledge, the "continuous coastline of experience," in which is inscribed the nihil ulterius 
gesturing toward the "shoreless ocean" of the transcendent. 
~"A species of nomads despising all settLed forms of life, [breaking] up from time to time all civil 
society" (A ix) and hence hardly committed to the project of securing integral unities either in cognition 
or civil society. Given the stakes of Kant's rejection of Hume as a sceptic, the consequences of Kant's 
own scepticism about transcendental production must be very serious indeed. 
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the first Critique, and re-invokes it with extreme scope. The distinction is between unity 
conceived as an aggregate [Aggregat] or more often mere aggregate, and unity as system 
[System]. In the first Critique, and especially in the section entitled 'The Architectonic of Pure 
Reason' (A832-851; B860-879), this distinction is set up between two types of know ledge, 
ordinary knowledge which is an aggregate, and science which is system. The knowledge of pure 
reason is the paradigm of the system. Kant defines system like this: 
By a system I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one 
idea. This idea is the concept provided by reason-in so far as the concept determines 
a priori not only the scope of its manifold content, but also the positions [SteLLe] 
which the parts [Teile] occupy relatively to one another. (A832; B860) 
This abstract definition is however supplemented by a series of metaphors drawn from the 
organic stratum: systems are "like an animal body" (A833; B861) and also--moving backwards 
through the stratum-a "germ" (A834; B862) and finally-reaching the end point of the origin 
of life itself: 
systems seem to be formed like worms [wie Gewiirme], through a generatio aequivoca 
from the mere confluence of assembled concepts. (A835; B863, translation amended)5 
This notion of system responds to the requirement that reason be the peak of the increasing 
unification of structures (from sensation, to intuition, to imagination and judgement, to the 
understanding and finally to reason). This thought is traditional in both scholasticism and early 
modem rationalism, as well as a commonplace of the faculty psychology of the eighteenth 
century. Kant thinks it in particular through his transcendental version of the scholastic thesis of 
hy lomorphism: 
Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means of concepts, so 
reason unifies the manifold of concepts [of the understanding] by means of ideas 
(A644; B672, italic added) 
The understanding works up the raw material of intuition (the manifold) to produce objective 
experience of nature; reason, in its tum, works up the manifold raw material of objective 
5The use of organic metaphors to characterise the system of pure reason becomes increasingly 
problematic in the third Critique where organisms themselves become transcendental problems. See 
below chapter 6, pp. 155. 
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concepts supplied by the understanding into a system. These productive processes are 
nevertheless quite crucially different: whereas the categories produce objective nature, the ideas 
of reason produce no object at all, but only an imaginary point of unity behind experience6 and to 
which access is rigorously forbidden by critique. This distinction is the basis of Kant's critiques 
in the negative dialectical part of transcendent idealism: of reason in general, and the 
transcendent ideas of the immortal soul, world and God. 
The notion of system seems then to be relegated to a description of the activity of reason, and 
therefore has apparently no role to play in the production of experience. The force of Kant's 
critique however is not just to reject the transcendent use of ideas of reason, but also to find for 
them an immanent use which will recuperate for them some of what had been the glory of 
rationalism, save them (as well as the thought of system) from complete decrepitude, and 
immunise them against further critique.7 This immanent use of ideas of reason is somewhat 
different from the immanent use of pure concepts of the understanding. The latter are used 
immanently if they refer to the domain of natural objects as conditions of possibility of nature. 
Ideas of reason are without any reference to experience, and can have no such immanent use. 
Instead, ideas are used immanently when thought regulatively rather than constitutively. 
This regulative use of the system of ideas of reason (which does not receive much attention in the 
first Critique) decomposes into two quite different sets of propositions. Kant summarises these 
two (regulative) uses: 
[The] function ... [of] the systematic unity of the manifold of knowledge as prescribed 
by reason ... is [1] to assist the understanding by means of ideas in those cases in 
which the understanding cannot by itself establish rules, and at the same time [2] to 
give to the numerous and diverse rules of the understanding unity of system under a 
single principle (A648; B676) 
6Kant uses the term/oeus imaginarius at A644; B672. 
7Kant saw such further critique (that of explicitly atheist empiricism in Hume, or materialism in the 
radical French enlightenment) as an undermining of all epistemological and political stability. See, for 
instance, John Zammito's account of the Spinoza controversy in The Ge1lesis of Kant's Critique of 
JudgemCllf (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press 1992), pp. 140-1. 
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[2] is readily comprehensible in terms of Kant's architectonic, it suggests that reason provides 
the ground of unity of concepts of the understanding (and, a fortiori of the unity of the 
categories). [1] however is more complicated. It can be understood by broaching a second 
distinction that Kant makes rather more implicitly. There are two sections in the first Critique 
that deal with the immanent use of transcendent ideas, 'The Regulative Employment of the Ideas' 
and 'The Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.' They are the last two 
sections of the dialectic. In the latter section Kant discusses the transcendent ideas that had been 
at issue in the rest of the dialectic (soul, world, God); in the former (from which the above 
citation is taken) however Kant treats not these ideas but rather a set of contemporary scientific 
and scholastic maxims that were-to a certain extent-guiding research, but which seem not to 
have any essential relation to the transcendent ideas that Kant has spent several hundred pages 
critiquing.8 
One thus has on the one hand the actual transcendent ideas of the dialectic, whose utility as 
hypotheses of regulation is often difficult to grasp; and on the other a set of hypotheses whose 
regulative utility is at least relatively clear (although of course contestable), but whose essential 
relation to the system of pure reason being described is, to say the least, opaque. The two types 
of systematic unity that reason mobilises~n the one hand integrating concepts of the 
understanding, and on the other supplementing the understanding where it fails--can be best 
understood by supposing that the transcendent ideas fit the description of [2] above, that is they 
are all high level conditions of unity that are clearly not derived from experience. The maxims 
provided in the previous section would then rather to correspond to [1]. They are heuristic 
principles that guide the empirical investigation of nature and supplement the understanding. 
These principles are also not grounded in empirical investigation since to provide empirical 
SHe gives the following examples: ideal-type empirical concepts or pure elements (A646; B674); the 
empirical universality of gravitational force (A649f.; B677f.); Occam's razor ("entia praeter 
necessitatem 11011 esse multiplicanda [entities should not be multiplied without warrant] " A652; B680); 
the "law of specification ... : entium varietas non temere esse minuendas [the variety of entities should 
not be diminished without consideration)" A656; B684) and the law of affinity which itself decomposes 
into law of the continuity of natural form ("noll datur vacuum Jormarum [there is no gap in forms] ... 
datur cOllfilluumJormarum [there is a continuity of forms). .. nature does not proceed per saltum [by 
leaps]" A657f.; B685f.). 
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grounding for them would presuppose the same or similar or at least some heuristics guiding that 
investigation of nature that results in the first heuristics.9 
The principles that Kant cites make this suggestion more plausible. He groups the specific 
heuristics into the general thought of making scientific knowledge simultaneously as unified as 
possible (Occam's razor) and as broad as possible (principle of specification) so that the 
investigation of nature proceeds asymptotically toward the unrealisable goal of a super-genus 
encompassing everything on the one hand, and, on the other, toward micro-species that 
themselves tend towards the impossibly minute conceptual specification of individuals 
(haecceity, in the scholastic terminology). \0 The principle of affinity permits continuous variation 
between these extremes: allowing that every general concept can always be made more general, 
and symmetrically that every specific concept can always be made more specific. To make 
science proceed in this double direction, one must presuppose that nature is so constituted as to 
allow it. Since this presupposition is universal (increasing generality and specificity cannot be 
assigned any limit in principle), it can be lent weight be empirical research, but never proven. II 
Such principles are therefore, in some sense, transcendental, and precede experience. 
They cannot, however, be thought as constitutive of experience, since what they address is the 
unity and variety of empirical laws. Empirical lawfulness is something the categories must 
remain silent about, concerned as they are with the establishment of the possibility of lawfulness 
as such within experience. If therefore, one was to try to fit them into the architectonic of 
transcendental idealism, the space of regulative ideas would probably be about the best. 
This is not, however, to say much. Kant seems clearly to operating a rhetorical fallacy of 
equivocation here. The account he gives of the heuristics is the most convincing way of thinking 
the regulative nature of ideas (and it is this notion of conditions of scientific research that is most 
9This is a familiar paradox of empiricism (addressed, for instance, by Bas Van Fraasen): that 
empiricism itself cannot be derived from experience. Kant makes the argument at A645; B673: "These 
concepts of reason [the heuristics he is about to list] are not derived from nature; on the contrary. we 
interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas." 
IOKant's terms are the securing of maximum unity and extension of system (A655; B683). 
IIThis is a standard transcendental argument in Kant: universality and necessity can never be proven 
empirically. since the empirical warrants only generality. 
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often used to explain his thought of regulation). But these ideas have made no appearance in the 
dialectic until this point. The ideas that actually do appear in the Paralogisms, antinomies and the 
attack on rational theology (soul, world, God) on the other hand, make a lot of sense within the 
dialectic, but do not have anything like the same efficacy as heuristic hypotheses in scientific 
research programs. Kant's need to recuperate the dogmatic thought of a creator God responds to 
other concerns than the delineation of the appropriate methodologies for science. Similarly, one 
can understand what it is to hypostatise the soul, a first cause, and God (and what is illegitimate 
about it); but it is very difficult to understand what the hypostatisation of the heuristic principles 
would be. And even if one could invent such a hypostatisation, Kant never addresses it in the text 
of the first Critique as one of the natural paralogical tendencies of reason. Kant's critical 
destruction of dogmatic theology works for the ideas he attacks in the dialectic; but his 
reconstruction of regulative usage works rather for the heuristics that he introduces seemingly 
just to gain credibility for some notion of regulation. The whole argument is dependent on the 
slippage from (destroyed) ideas to (reconstructed) heuristics, and these two seem to be 
completely different sets of thoughts. 
The implications of this for the concept of system are important. The bifurcation of the ideas of 
reason into two groups-those guaranteeing the unity of concepts and operating at the productive 
interface between understanding and reason; and those underwriting scientific research, and 
operating implicitly at and below the level of the understanding-also bifurcates the notion of 
system. Two, on the face of it quite separate, systems are at stake: the system of rational ideas 
critiqued in the dialectic, and culminating in the mirror image reflections of self and world, l2and 
what seems to be a novel thought of the unity of experience itself independent of the action of the 
categories. In the latter case-which is of greatest interest here-what Kant means by system is 
best brought out by considering his account of the contrast case of the non-systematic aggregate 
of nature. He writes the following: 
If among appearances which present themselves to us, there were so great a variety ... 
that even the acutest human understanding could never by comparison of them detect 
the slightest similarity (a possibility which is quite conceivable), the logical law of 
genera would have no sort of standing; we should not even have the concept of a 
genus, or indeed any other universal concept; and the understanding itself, which has 
12The image is from Kant at A644-5; B672-3. 
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to do solely with such concepts, would be non-existent. (A653-4; B681-2, italics 
added) 
This is an extremely important passage; and one that initiates the problematics that the third 
Critique was to take up. It is vital to remember two things about it. First, how radical is Kant's 
characterisation of what experience would be like as an aggregate (without the supposed 
heuristics governing its systematisation). It is not just research that would be jeopardised by this 
possibility, but perception, and hence experience, themselves. He envisages the complete absence 
of conceptuality, and therefore of any classification; an 'experience' consisting exhaustively of 
disconnected and irrecoverably singular haecceities. This anti-experience recalls the famous 
passage in the A deduction on the possible variability of cinnabar (A 100-1), a possibility whose 
rejection precisely demanded the transcendental deduction of the validity of the categories in the 
first place: 
Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find 
them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such 
a confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented itself that 
might yield a rule of synthesis. (A90; B 123) 
But, and this is the second point, this radically disconcerting possibility is supposed to be 
compatible with the construction of experience undertaken by the understanding, and theorised in 
the transcendental analytic. This discussion is simply about the role of the regulation of 
experience by (strictly) transcendent ideas of reason so that experience be a system, and therefore 
is supposed to leave intact all the argumentation of the analytic. 
Kant does not fully establish the necessary conceptual machinery to state the problem fully until 
the third Critique. Nevertheless, just before this characterisation, in the context of a discussion 
of the example of 'powers' he does briefly suggest what is to become the vocabulary of the 
problem in the third Critique. There he writes that 
... reason presupposes the systematic unity of various powers, on the ground that 
particular [besondere] natural laws fall under general laws. (A650; B678, translation 
modified to fit with Meredith's conventions for the third Critique) 
This notion of particular, and therefore empirical laws, is the crux of the matter. It makes sense 
of the passage above on the breakdown of nature. What Kant is suggesting is that the analytic 
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provided the necessary laws of experience (which are necessary precisely because they produce 
experience); but that this does not unify experience, which has, crucially, empirical laws as well. 
The understanding is of course the faculty not only of transcendental laws and concepts but also 
of empirical laws and concepts. That is why Kant can say the understanding would have 
disappeared without (what we can now call) empirical law. It should not be taken as suggesting 
that Kant is talking about some state of the elements prior to the constitution of experience 
according to the pure laws and concepts of the understanding. Rather, and this is its extreme 
importance, it is a condensed critique of the capacity of the categories to constitute anything 
properly unified at all. 
I think it is right to be extremely surprised at this contention of Kant's. Indeed, had he not gone 
on to devote the attention of a whole further critique (the third Critique) to the problem, then it 
would be difficult-from such a short passage as this-to draw the excessive consequences that 
one can in fact draw from the third Critique. Ultimately, Kant here is suggesting that the 
mechanics of the analytic of the first Critique, the program of hylomorphic production of nature 
that he there undertakes, has failed to guarantee the unity of experience. The concept of system is 
what allows this condensed critique. Whilst taken as referring to the unity of the categories, and 
hence to the productive relation that obtains between reason and the understanding (analogous to 
that between understanding and sensibility), system does not intervene directly in experience, and 
whatever the theory of system at issue, it would not impact upon the efficacy of the analytic. 
However, as we have seen, Kant's deployment of the thought of system is equivocal. This 
equivocation initiates this quite new move in the critical program under the guise of finishing up 
the destructions of the dialectic with a limited and extremely modest position for the immanent 
use of transcendent ideas. The other sense of system is applicable rather to the interface between 
the understanding and the manifold of intuition, and has to do, as we have seen, with the 
possibility of the empirical lawfulness of nature. 13 
This notion of system undercuts the analytic by surreptitiously reconfiguring what is at stake in 
the guarantee of unity-Kant's prime investment in transcendental idealism. From this it follows 
that the analytic has failed to produce relevant unity; and from that, that any possible solution 
IJThis ambiguity of position is played out in the third Critique's account of judgement that operates 
both between reason and understanding, and between understanding and intuition. 
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must occupy the space of the transcendental (or, rather more significantly, suitably re-configure 
that space). This is indeed what Kant admits. The previously cited passage concludes thus: 
If therefore the logical principle of genera is to be applied to nature ... it presupposes a 
transcendental principle [of homogeneity of the manifold] ... ; for in the absence of 
homogeneity, no empirical concepts, and therefore no experience, would be possible. 
(A654; B682) 
Whatever principle-and the third Critique expands on the paucity of solution in the first 
Critique--can be found to produce nature as system must be transcendental; without it there 
would be no experience. Clearly, in the context of a discussion of reason, Kant has to go on to 
suggest that any such principle is not really constitutive of experience (if it were it would become 
obvious that the categories had been incomplete), and that what objective validity it does have is 
very strictly circumscribed. 14 Again, however, part of the necessity for Kant to do this emerges 
from the equivocation about system and regulation: the full-blown transcendent ideas (soul, 
world, God), operating between reason and understanding are clear candidates for (mere) 
transcendence and lack of objective validity. The heuristics, if they were merely principles of 
research, would be good candidates for regulative hypotheses. When these latter are thought of 
as being responsible for underwriting the transcendental unity of experience, their regulative 
status becomes much less clear. If they remain merely regulative and have real transcendental 
work to perform in the constitution of experience qua unity, then Kant has merely relapsed into 
dogmatic idealism, by making something that is clearly constitutive of the unity of experience 
itself simply, and on his own terms, transcendent. ls 
This problem of the system of empirical nature in the first Critique-and its ambiguously 
transcendental functioning-is taken up again in the introductions to the third Critique as its 
main problematic. To understand this the First Introduction (written around May 1787) to the 
third Critique is the key text. There Kant suggests with far more force than in the first Critique 
just how devastating for the general project of securing unity the absence of empirical law would 
be: 
141n the first Critique this is described as "indeterminate objective validity" (A663; B691); in the third 
Critique, the problem is made more complex by the intervention of the new distinction between 
reflective and determinant judgement. 
15That is, transcendent independently of the decomposition argument advanced above. 
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empirical laws might be so diverse and heterogeneous [ ... es konnte die 
Mannigfaltigkeit und Ungleichartigkeit der empirischen Gesetze so groj3 sein ... ] that 
... we could never bring these empirical laws under a common principle. We would be 
unable to do this if ... these laws, as well as the natural forms conforming to theml6 
were infinitely manifold and unequal and manifested themselves to us as a raw 
chaotic aggregate without the slightest trace of a system [die Mannigfaltigkeit unt 
Ungleichartigkeit dieser Gesetze, imgleichen der ihren gemaj3en Naturformen, 
unendlich groj3 ware und uns an diesen ein rohes chaotisches Aggregat und nicht die 
mineste Spur eines Systems darlegte] (!j(4, Ak. 20:208-9) 
[there might be] disturbing boundless inequality [besorgliche grenzenlosen 
Ungleichartigkeit] [of empirical forms and laws] (ibid.) 
For suppose judgement to stumble at random about among [herumtappen] natural 
forms ... 17 (!j(4, Ak. 20:210) 
in relation to the manifoldness and inequality of particular laws, [nature] is free of all 
the restrictions [Einschrankungen] of our legislative cognitive faculties (ibid.) 
... boundless manifoldness [grenzenlosen Mannigfaltigkeit] (!j(5, Ak. 20:211-2 note) 
and also in the Second Introduction: 
particular laws and the wealth of at least possible variety and heterogeneity [might] 
transcend all our powers of comprehension (!j(6) 
16Kant here reasserts the identity of transcendental law and form that is at the base of transcendental 
idealism, but which he had problematised briefly at the end of the dialectic of the first Critique (A653; 
B681). The retraction of form from law probably responds to Kant's attempts to keep the lid on a 
fundamental problem, and could only be admitted again when he (thought he) had worked out a 
solution in the third Critique. 
17Kant describes the failure of speculative metaphysics to find a method in the same terms in the first 
Critique (B vii); and in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science at Ak. 4:478. This latter 
work, and the famous 'gap' in the critical system also witness the increasing difficulties Kant 
experienced in getting the transcendental into contact with the empirical in a productive way. See 
Eckart Forster 'Is There a "Gap" in the Critical System' Journal of the History of Philosophy 2):4 
(October 1987), pp. 533-555. 
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Kant's use of hypothetical vocabulary here (itself very problematic) 18makes it clear that Kant 
supposes this breakdown of nature to be entirely compatible with the transcendental constitution 
of nature as it was outlined in the analytic of the first Critique: that very nature (itself supposed 
definitively to secure unity) could tum out to transcend all possible attempts at classification in 
the heterogeneity and diversity [Mannigfaltigkeit] of its empirical laws and forms. In short, the 
transcendental analytic (with its transcendental hylomorphic production theory) fails to generate 
the unity of nature, fails to yield the transcendental conditions of the possibility of nature as 
experience. As in the first Critique, Kant draws something very close to this conclusion, and 
very rapidly: 
Experience ... must constitute a system of possible empirical cognitions ... <)[ But it 
does not follow from this that nature is ... a system that the human cognitive power 
can grasp, ... and hence [it does not follow] that experience itself, as a system, is 
possible for human beings (First Introduction <)[4, Ak. 20:209, final italics added) 
It is tempting to think, on the basis of the systematic distinctions that Kant introduces into 
critique in this fragment, that the categories constitute mechanical nature (nature as mere 
aggregate) and that nature as system is restricted to an extension of such a merely Newtonian 
nature in the direction of a biology (systematic nature is nature qua nexus finalis). This is 
however to misunderstand the structure of the procedure by which Kant intends to combat the 
problem of system (or its lack). Very briefly, that structure19 is to establish some transcendental 
credential for appraising purposiveness (an argument that occurs largely, but not exclusively, in 
18If what is at stake is the constitution of experience, then he is not entitled to presuppose that 
experience is actually constituted already (given) as not manifesting such terrifying heterogeneity. To 
do so, and hence to be able to think of this heterogeneity as a possibility within an already constituted 
experience, would vitiate Kant's distinction between analytic (taking what is to be proved as given) and 
synthetic (constructing what is to be proved) methods; and would also therefore vitiate Kant's most 
fundamental critical insight, that critique accounts for the production of what dogmatism takes as given. 
19It is probable that this only became Kant's argument somewhat after the beginning of his work on the 
'Critique of Taste,' around the time of the First Introduction. There can be little doubt that the extended 
period of composition of the text, and the number of very substantial changes to its fundamental 
direction, do not make it easy to extract this structure. See Zammito op. cit. on the history of the 
production of the third Critique. He extracts three separate phases of composition with radically 
different problematics at e.g. pp. 6ff. 
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the Teleology section), and then to treat the purposiveness of nature as a whole for human 
cognition as a special case. This latter purposiveness cashes out in terms of the 'fitness' of the 
manifold of empirical laws for the understanding, that is in the systematicity of empirical law . 
And this is what is at issue in the problematic of system. Beautiful objects, on this analysis, 
provide a kind of aesthetic validation of the system of nature. Such a structure implies that the 
thought of purposiveness is not at all to be restricted to the organic stratum. In fact, the general 
purposiveness of nature underwrites even mechanical nature. Kant writes: 
Thus we see that earths, stones, minerals, and so on have no purposive form whatever, 
and are mere aggregates, and yet are so akin in their inner character ... that they are 
suitable for a classification of things under empirical laws in a system of nature, even 
though they do not individually manifest the form of a system [as does the organic] 
(First Introduction <)[6, Ak. 20:217) 
and he even suggests that Linneus' classifications of rock types would be impossible without 
system (and hence purpose Kant will argue) "all he could ever hope to find would be single 
things" «lIS, Ak. 20:217 note), intractably counter-systematic haecceities. The problem of system 
is not therefore, despite some appearances, capable of being pushed into a comer of experience, 
but concerns the possibility of experience as such, the possibility of unified and stable 
experience and therefore also concerns the very basis of critique. 
To recap: the setting up of the problematic of the third Critique in terms of system follows a 
number of hints in the first Critique. There Kant radically and problematically diverges from his 
official account of the transcendence of the ideas of reason proper (God etc.) and raises, briefly, 
another set of ideas of reason that support his conception of regulation rather better than the 
ideas of God, the world and the soul that ought (architechtonically) to be regulative. These ideas, 
drawn from rationalist appropriations of scholasticism, however, far from being merely 
regulative, instead, seem to tend towards a quite fundamental reappraisal of the capacity of the 
understanding to form nature at all. In the third Critique this same difficulty is acknowledged, 
and definitively tied to the thought of empirical law and form (system) which appear to be 
conditions for the possibility of experience in any sense that preserves Kant's profound 
investments in the securing of stability, and which yet bypass the transcendental efficacy of the 
understanding. Kant's attention to this problematic constitutes a deep scepticism about the power 
of his transcendental hylomorphic production theory. 
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The idea that there should be empirical laws is so commonplace that it seems to demand some of 
the most outlandish eccentricities of systematic philosophy to convert this into a difficulty at all. 
But it must be stressed that for Kant this way of putting the problem is strictly not just a 
problem, but rather an oxymoron. Laws are universal and necessary (and hence a priori; this is 
the very first move of critique); anything empirical is a posteriori and hence neither universal nor 
necessary. An empirical law is therefore a contradictio in adjecto. '2fJ Kant's doctrine of purity 
makes the distinction between transcendental and empiricalfar wider than that between spirit and 
matter in the tradition. Spirit was after all (for Descartes) still thought as substance. The 
extremity of this distance is at the same time the mark of the impotence of transcendental forms. 
The greater their stability, their purity and transcendentiality, the less they can account for any 
actual forms encountered within experience. At the limit, Kant can account for the possibility of 
legislation in nature, but cannot countenance any actual natural law . 
Lastly, I want to point to the sheer extent of the problem of system in the third Critique. The 
thought of system covers not only the (oxymoronic) system of nature; but also, through the 
intervention of the pivotal term part [Teil], constitutes the condition of unity of the subject itself 
as a unique (unified) multiplicity of faculties. 21 This is already an extremely ambitious potential 
extension of the destructive critical machinery to its own presuppositions; the attack on the 
account of the constitution of experience in the analytic of the first Critique. But it is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the faculty of judgement itself is already dependent on its own 
activity qua Ur-teils-kraft for its own constitution as faculty. The infestive problem of 
guaranteeing systematicity attacks not only the specific regions denoted by the content of the 
third Critique (aesthetics and teleology), and not only the much more general regions of law and 
form in the first Critique, but also the very formation of the primary presuppositions of critique 
2°"These laws [of nature], being empirical may be contingent as far as the light of our understanding 
goes, but still, if they are to be called laws, (as the concept of a nature requires,) they must be regarded 
as necessary" (third Critique, Introduction, <]l4, final italics added). 
21Kant deploys the vocabulary characteristic of systematic unity (system versus aggregate) with respect 
not only the unity of the faculties (third Critique, First Introduction, <]lIc) but also concerning critique 
itself (ibid., <JI<JI3-4; 11-12). The former point had already been broached (although in much reduced 
form) in the first Critique with the example of mental 'powers' as candidates for unification at A648f.; 
B676f. 
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in its transcendental idealist mode: the unity of the faculties of the subject, and ultimately the 
unity of critique itself. 
To sum up: the problem of system is explicitly associated in the third Critique with the 
contradictory notion of empirical law and form (given the permanent association of law and form 
with the transcendental throughout Kant, one might say empirical transcendental). The 
suggestion that Kant increasingly makes is that the transcendental activity of the understanding 
thematised in the analytic of the first Critique does not produce a unified experience, and 
therefore does not produce experience at all. This is serious problem for all the mechanisms 
implicated in the production of nature there, and specifically, Kant's transcendental 
hylomorphism. The problem that he raises is of a fully transcendental scope and cannot be 
marginalised within the exigencies of an attempt to coerce a theory of aesthetics into the domain 
of critique. At least the problem is extremely broad. What the aesthetics and the teleology are 
supposed to correct is a fully transcendental breach in the capacities of the hylomorphic 
production theory of the first Critique's transcendental conditions for the possibility of 
experience. The medium for Kant's solution to this problem is the faculty of judgement, to which 
I tum now. 
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Judgement-Regression 
This section deals with the second locus of profound scepticism about the ability of 
transcendental hylomorphism: the faculty of judgement itself. The problem is that concepts seem 
always to require something counter-conceptual to get them into contact with what-in Kant-
they are supposed to form. Any attempt to formulate this counter-conceptuality demands another 
intermediary. The problem therefore tends to an infinite regression. 22 I want ultimately to 
suggest, as with the problematic of system, that the roots of this difficulty are to be found in the 
first Critique. The structure of the argument here will be to suggest (a) the similarity of the 
problems to be found in the two critiques; then (b) to draw attention to the differences that Kant 
thinks there are between the two, and finally (c) to demonstrate that in the end, the only real 
difference is that he is prepared in the third Critique to take the problem seriously. 
The general problem of judgement is stated thus in the third Critique: 
[Judgement] has therefore to furnish a concept which it can use as a rule only-but 
not as an objective rule to which it can adapt its judgement, because, for that, another 
faculty of judgement would again be required to enable us to decide whether the case 
was one for the application of the rule or not (Preface) 
and like this in the introduction that precedes the schematism of the first Critique: 
If understanding in general is to be viewed as the faculty of rules, judgement will be 
the faculty of subsuming under rules; that is of distinguishing whether something does 
or does not stand under a given rule (causus datae legis). General logic contains, and 
can contain, no rules for judgement. For since general logic abstracts from all content 
of knowledge, the sole task that remains to it is to give an analytical exposition of the 
form of knowledge in concepts, in judgements and in inferences, and so to obtain 
formal rules for all employment of the understanding. If it sought to give general 
instructions how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether 
something does or does not come under them, that could only be by means of another 
rule. This in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, again demands the guidance of 
judgement. (AI32-3; BI71-2) 
22Problems of infinite regression that recall Milton's two difficulties analysed in chapter 2. Such 
regressions are inevitable when intranstivity is glossed by means of transitivity. 
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These are clearly very important passages; and equally well known. And this argument seems 
both lucid and homogeneous between the First and third Critiques: there are rules, or concepts 
under which stand instances the specification of which is performed by the faculty of judgement; 
one cannot have concepts or (objective) rules which specify instances because for these rules in 
their tum to operate they would require another judgement of instances. And so on ad infinitum 
(and so this argument can be called regressive). It seems homogeneous also because Kant draws 
similar conclusions from it in both the First and the third Critiques; that the understanding, the 
faculty of rules, is capable of being schooled, but that the faculty of judgement (and its complex 
correlate, that of the imagination) is refractory and contumacious, and cannot. In the first 
Critique he calls unformulable and unruly (in the strict sense) judgement "mother-wit ... a 
peculiar talent which can only be practised ... a natural gift" (A133; B 173); and the third 
Critique is of course famous for its intransigent emphasis on the counter-conceptuality of 
aesthetic judgement (the reception of taste) and genius (artistic production).23 
The scope of this argument, as it appears, is extreme.24 Rules that are not sustained in their 
activity by a correlate faculty of judgement are incapable, and in principle, of ruling anything. 
This emptiness is of a different and more disabling kind than either the (properly empirical) 
23See e.g. §§43ff on genius and art; and §9 (the second moment of the analytic of the beautiful) on the 
general counter-conceptuality of aesthetic judgement. 
24The passage of Wittgenstein' s Philosophical Investigations that is known as the Rule Following 
Considerations seems to be precisely this argument: that the capacity of rules to rule is not, and can 
never be, rule-governed, and is therefore resistant to all intellectual grasp. Compare: 
" ... understanding .. .is ... the faculty ofrules ... Generallogic ... obtain[s] formal rules for the employment of 
understanding. If it sought to give general instructions how we are to subsume under rules ... that could only be 
by means of another rule. this in turn, for the very reason that it is a rule, again demands 
guidance ... Thus ... judgement [i.e. subsuming under rules] ... can be practised only ... [it can be taught only] 
through examples and actual practice, adequate training for this particular act." (at A 132-134; B 171-173) 
with "Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a rule? .. We give one interpretation [of a rule] 
after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of another standing behind it. 
What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited 
in actual cases ... hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice .. .1 teach him by means of examples and by practice .. .! 
have been trained" (Philosophical investigations §§ 84; 198;201-202;208). The textual similarities are 
quite striking. 
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possibility that concepts can be formed that, as a matter of fact, have nothing which might stand 
under them (and be ruled by them); and equally different from the emptiness of concepts which 
cannot in principle be given an intuition (transcendent ideas). This is not a question of either the 
contingent and empirical or the necessary and transcendental lack of intuitions for concepts, but 
rather of the power of the concept to assemble the intuitions the condition of whose set 
(transcendental unity) it is supposed to be. Both empirically and transcendentally empty concepts 
may, must, still be thought as concepts (in the same way that the empty set is still a set) on the 
ground that they are only problematically empty. This is obvious in the case of empirical 
concepts (there just may not be any of the relevant things); and coterminous with the negative 
impetus of critique in the second case (we may neither affmn nor deny anything with respect to 
God-to whom no intuition can in principle correspond-his concept is therefore 
paradigmatic ally problematic). 
Concepts are rather infected with the dystrophy of regressing judgement in virtue of their 
conceptuality; they are deprived of their very capacity to be concepts, of the power or productive 
force of conceptuality as such that determines the concept as the grasp.25 It is not some concepts 
that are affected with this malaise; but concepts as such. It is precisely when concepts become 
actual as concepts, when they try to reach the world and matter (whose proximal representatives 
are intuitions), when they de-virtualise, that they are struck down with an incapacity deriving 
from their very status as concepts. The scope of the restriction is entirely general: all concepts, in 
their conceptuality are marked with the feebleness of their activity. All concepts, not some sub-
set, marked out by a criterion (which of course would beg the question of the regression of 
judgement), are imbued with this attempt at activity which defeats itself in its very performance, 
this, reactivity, this narcissism of a pure power with no purchase, this perpetual hesitation of the 
abyss of performance. 
This problem is the more intense in Kant just because the power of concepts is given a new 
prominence in Kant in that concepts are the agents of his production theory. The regression of 
judgement can seem to be related only tangentially to the question of production when it is 
thought merely as the subsumption of particulars (and, of course, Kant does use this 
temlinology); but this is inadequate in Kant where concepts are the determined locus of 
25Comprehelldere; begriffen etc. 
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transcendental production, they are the morphe of hylomorphism. To deprive these concepts of 
their power is not just to deprive concepts of their conceptuality, but also to recognise the 
impotence of their production; and this is clearly of singular importance for the success or even 
the thought of critique. 
This is not quite what Kant thinks is going on: he makes a large distinction between the problem 
as it is raised in the first Critique, and in the third Critique. The very general and extremely 
disabling and, dare one say, really critical, argument, occupies only the status of an introductory 
comment in the first Critique. And, to be exegetically fair, the argument is not performing quite 
the same function, nor in quite the same context, in its appearances in the First and third 
Critiques. To fill in the gaps: in the first Critique Kant introduces the problem of the regression 
of judgement merely concerning the concepts of general logic. It is merely an introductory 
comment because the purpose of the schematism, which it introduces, is just to show that within 
transcendental logic the problem of the regression of judgement is not applicable:26 
But although general logical can supply no rules for judgement, the situation is 
entirely different for transcendental logic. The latter would seem to have as its 
peculiar task the correcting and securing of judgement, by means of determinate rules, 
in the use of pure understanding ... Transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that 
besides the rule (or rather the universal condition of rules), which is given in the pure 
concept of the understanding, it can also specify a priori the instance to which the 
rule is applied. (A135; B174-5)27 
The schematism, and the whole analytic of principles in the first Critique are the expansion of 
this supposed (and very necessary) capacity of transcendent concepts to specify what comes 
under them, and what they can thereby produce as unified. 
26The difficulties of this supposition-which is nevertheless grounding for the possibility of 
transcendental idealism in general, and especially the analytic of principles which the schematism itself 
is introducing-are evident in the necessity of appealing, once again, to a question of application 
which, primajacie, simply reinvokes the problem of judgement and its regression, even in delineating 
for it a restricted sphere of activity. 
27Similarly, although not so importantly, the activity of judgement in the assimilation of intuitions to 
empirical concepts is distinguished both from the problem of concepts in general logic as well as from 
that of transcendental concepts; cf. A 141; B 181 on the image in contradistinction to the schema. 
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The problem is also not (despite appearances, and despite Kant's use of such similar language) 
completely homogeneous between the First and third Critiques. In the first Critique, the problem 
is raised only to be immediately disposed of since it only applies to general logic, and only to that 
because the nature of general (non-transcendental) logic is just that it tells us nothing about the 
world, that it is analytic and not synthetic a priori. The regression of the possibility of 
conceptual judgement is just a consequence of the fact that general (as opposed to 
transcendental) logic is the mere form of thought and nothing besides. 
In the third Critique the problem is clearly getting substantial attention.28 What the third Critique 
shows is that the problem of judgement that was raised in the first Critique only to be 
immediately dismissed again as pertaining simply to general and not to transcendental logic, has 
become a wide-spread problem again. Whilst still accepting in the third Critique (in a more or 
less unconvincing manner) that the operating structure of the first Critique should be retained, 
Kant deprives it of its capacity to produce experience (which is now redefined as the systematic 
unity of experience ).29 The transcendental logic of the first Critique overcomes the general 
incapacity of judgement to specify rules only at the expense of not being the condition of 
experience. The problematic of judgement is re-activated in the third Critique at its entirely 
general level: how are concepts supposed to reach refractory pre-particulars that are different in 
kind from concepts, and so constitute efficacious conditions of the possibility of experience. The 
most cursory glance at the substance of the third Critique reveals the extent to which the solution 
indicates this problematic: the notion, for instance, of exemplarity is an attempt to negotiate the 
difficulties of a rule for the conditions of application of concepts which rule is itself 
unformulable. 
In conclusion, it is clearly not just the case that Kant identifies new and ancillary domains of 
difficulty for the problem of judgement (those of the aesthetic and teleological). Rather, the 
analysis of judgement vis-a-vis the aesthetic responds to a general and transcendental problem 
28 A whole critique in fact; one might think of the third Critique as a novel expansion of the section in 
the first on the schematism. It is certainly true that one must think the third Critique in relation to the 
theories of judgement and imagination in the first Critique. 
29This acceptance is purely nominal since it implies that the supposed supplement of the third Critique 
is rcally a fully transcendental condition of the possibility of experience (now construed as system). See 
above pp. 92f. 
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about judgement (like that of system). Thus the admission in the third Critique that judgement 
itself constitutes a general critical problem, and therefore has what one might call at least a 
relative critical autonomy, are supposed to be such that beauty solves the problem. Like the 
thought of system, which presents itself somewhat as if (and Kant appears to do everything to 
encourage this reception) it is supplementary to the results of the fIrst Critique, but which is 
actually fully transcendental, and a guarantor of the possibility of experience at all; similarly, the 
problem of aesthetic judgement appears as ancillary, relating only to a small sub-set of possible 
judgements, those that are of beauty (or sublimity), whereas, in fact, it is clear from the start that 
the problem of the regression of judgement is also fully transcendental and required to be solved 
not for the mere completeness of a critique of all the faculties, but as a condition for the 
possibility of experience as such. In the schematism Kant already implies this by asking a 
transcendental question of transcendentals (the categories): 
How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a 
category to appearances, possible? (AI37; B176) 
Clearly, without this question receiving an adequate solution, Kant would have, ultimately, given 
no account of the condition of possibility of experience itself, since without connection of the 
transcendental and the pre-phenomenal, there would be no synthetic a priori, and thus no 
experience. The intransigence of the general problem of the regression of rules of judgement is a 
symptom of the difficulty in which Kant places himself through hylomorphism: which dictates a 
fundamental separation of transcendental and empirical (their specifIc difference); and then 
requires their impossible re-wiring in new (transcendental) circumstances. 
Kant raises in the first Critique a somewhat summary, but on reflection extremely powerful, 
question as to what pure concepts can actually do. This question is the question of judgement. In 
the first Critique he thinks that the problem is completely soluble, and the schematism and 
analytic of principles presuppose this solution. By the third Critique, Kant has become aware 
again of the sheer scope of the problem of judgement, such an extent that it occupies the whole 
critique. This consciously re-activates the problem that was buried but still left traces in the first 
Critique. The problem is entirely general; more general even than the system problem, in that it 
deprives concepts of their productive power, their power to assemble intuitions and produce, 
transcendentally, a unified experience. 
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Active Matter 
To concede that matter has become increasingly and more radically unmanageable through the 
development of the critical enterprise and culminating in the third Critique must remain 
somewhat surprising. Why should matter be unmanageable? Form is pure spontaneity, i.e. pure 
activity; matter is pure patient, that which when acted upon by form (which is only activity) 
produces the phenomenal-empirical. Matter is patient like that precisely because it lacks form. 
This is the familiar structure of hylomorphism. Even if Kant subjects this structure to a 
proliferation by repeating it across multiple planes of application (form of intuition and 
sensation; concept and intuition etc.) in a neat modelling of the division of labour across 
industrial sectors, this does not seem to change the structure which invokes pure activity and 
pure patience at each stage despite the fact that the product of one manufacturing process is 
simultaneously the raw matter for another and higher process.30 Yet from the very first this was 
not and could not have been the case. God's matter in for instance Milton's prose theological 
account of the creation (suspending the solution) could have been, theoretically (but not 
poetically), a pure patience. But this cannot be the case with the materiality that respond to the 
demands of privatised production. 
Operating at what now of course seems to be the naive level of the cosmological and its 
degeneration into the pre-elemental and even the, hylomorphism was at least conceivable. When 
the operator of morphe has been privatised, the (sexualised) distribution of productive labour 
devolves not un surprisingly onto the subject. Now one is not faced with the grandeur of 
ontological components facing one another off (aristocratically) in the structure of 
hylomorphism, but instead with the domestic relations of private faculties. So it is in Kant that 
the structure of traditional and pre-private theological production is re-mapped onto the interior 
domain of the subject: action and passion are now distributed across the spontaneous and 
receptive faculties. 
This translation of hylomorphism is however obviously non-isomorphic. Whilst the apparent 
locus of production remains intact in the formative capacity of the higher spontaneous and 
cognitive faculties, the locus of the hyle is no longer the same as the matching component 
.lO"If the object of labour has been, so to speak, filtered through previous labour, we call it raw material 
... Products are therefore not only the results of labour, but also its essential conditions." Karl Marx 
Capital Vol. 1 trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin 1976) p. 284. 
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translated from cosmo-theological production. The lower faculties are the paired terms in the 
distribution of labour into spontaneous and receptive; but the hyle is not a faculty. The receptive 
faculties are precisely not receptive to form, the morphe, but to the hyle which lies elsewhere, on 
the outside whose exterior exceeds detennination by the spatial which is itself morphe. Indeed all 
the receptive faculties must in this sense be thought as containing occluded spontaneities: this is 
evident in the case of intuition which must deploy the forms of space and time upon sensation. 
This is most clear for the imagination in the third Critique; but it must even be so for 
sensation-the most receptive of the receptive faculties-because, even almost flush with the 
real, sensation is not identical with it. 31 It therefore follows that some operation is performed on 
the prime matter of which sensation is the product. 
And it follows from this that matter is from the very first active, and can be thought, although 
this is very preliminary, only as active. What is to-be-formed is, under the conditions of an oddly 
counter-anthropomorphic privatisation, that which the receptive faculties are receptive to, and 
therefore also that which affects32 those faculties. In the very same move with which Kant 
inaugurates the theorisation of privati sed production he also is compelled to displace the terms of 
cosmological production-creation and accede to the activity of matter. This is at least part of 
what is at issue in the radicalisation of materiality which privatisation entails along with the 
increase in the intensity of repression. It explains the inevitability for the materialist counter-
attack; curiously a function of the very act of suppression which is constituted in the 
privatisation of production. A privatisation which also generated the displacement of the 
structure of hylomorphism from its transparent and non-representational cosmological-
ontological pre-modernism to the modem cleaving of matter as patient recipient of form from 
matter as exteriority to form. The former (form itself) is annexed to the faculties of subjective 
representation and the latter (matter) spun off into the wilderness of the sheer outside. One of the 
capacities of which matter is to affect the subject; and the subject's job, at least in the initial 
31 Kant nowhere intends the assimilation of the thing-in-itself with sensation, the latter is still clearly 
phenomenal, if pre-experiential. 
12Kant's use of this term (Affektieren) is a famous evasion of the problem of the specification of the 
mode of interaction of the non-spatiotemporal and hence counter-causal and equally non-exterior 
exterior with the subject. It's relation to sensation thought as Affekt is clearly important. See above p. 
59. 
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stages, is to code this affect in order to prepare it for the reception of form at a later stage (affect 
as sensation). 
Matter is already on a par with Freud's definition of the real as the site of an exogenous 
stimulation whose intensity requires paring down to the level at which internal (perceptual) 
quanta operate (the unascribed Q of the Entwwf). Epistemology, the logos of thought as 
representation, internalises and privatises the gendered division of cosmological hylomorphic 
labour, and as a consequence leaves an orphan or parthenogenic residue of universal exteriority 
whose status as the site of a further radicalised mode of production is made inaccessible by being 
constituted-for knowledge-only negatively, as mere exclusion. 
This is only a preliminary excavation of materiality as threat for three reasons. First, Kant's 
disquiet and account of this disquiet do not directly concern the base materiality whose character 
is still only negative, but rather either its already coded representatives within the subject 
(sensation, intuition) or the faculties which ambiguously harbour and operate upon these 
representatives Uudgement, imagination). Thus the activity of matter, and the re-thinking of this 
activity, its mode of production, which the threat of matter and the displacement of terms under 
privatised hylomorphism entail, are addressed at the level of representatives and faculties, most 
especially imagination. One can already see, however, that Kant is at least attempting to deal 
only with the conditions under which (and this is of course not without interest) the apparent 
negativity of prime matter is already, as it were pre-transcendentally, produced as appropriate 
for the reception of form. This pre-production is the transcendental correlate of Milton's God's 
act of creation-repression in Book VII of Paradise Lost (see above, chapter 2, pp. 30f.). Second, 
Kant's uneasiness with the capacity of transcendental formality to perform at all, is not 
expressed in the register of production, but of legislation, and in particular of judgement.33 
Lastly, the whole problem of materiality is effaced-like every other problem-by the merely 
negative thought of the transcendental in which the noumenon is merely another synonym for the 
supersensible or God. (see chapter 3). 
33More strictly the problematic is set up in terms which derive from legislative vocabulary. but the 
performance of the response engages rather more explicitly with the register of the productive. 
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Law 
It is important to recognise that the transposition of materiality as threat does not result in the 
thought of a refractory legal matter (a case, causa) which poses a threat by being rebellious or 
proliferating illegalities. The movement is somewhat more subtle than that. Illegalities are 
precisely located within the law; that is what the law isfor. The difficulty expressed by the 
problematic of the third Critique is not that of the insurgency of the informe against a legitimate 
but tyrannical master. It is rather of the incapacity of the judge to bring the facts of the matter, 
the res facti under the res juris, under juristriction at all, and therefore to constitute out of them a 
realm. 34 The problem of judgement is that not that of determining the questions of right and 
separating them from those of fact. Assume that this disengagement, announced in the famous 
passage introducing the transcendental deduction(s) in the first Critique,35 and effected by the 
very structure of the first Critique itself,36 has already been adequately carried through; even 
then the resistance of the matter to form a case remains untouched. This resistance is effective at 
an entirely different level: that of whether the matter can be brought under a legislative case at 
all?7In a legislative space which is theoretically utterly exhausted by the disjunctions of cases 
(either this or this, or, if not, then this etc.)38 one finds that matter can be located nowhere: this 
is the problem of judgement; judgement as problem. The correct legal deduction of laws (and 
their correlate) forms is no use, if, as Kant increasingly suspects, there is no possibility of 
specifying them, that is to say, bringing them into contact with the territory over which they are 
supposed to have juristriction. Law under these circumstances is deprived of its legal function if 
it is impossible to bring cases under it. And the deprivation of this legal capacity is at the same 
time the deprivation of the capacity to act of concepts. 
Whilst it is Kant's explicit use of and implicit appeal to production that is of most interest here, 
it is nevertheless worth observing that even couched within the terms of legislation, the attempt to 
3.J third Critique, Second Introduction, CJl2. 
35 A84ff.; B 1 16ff. = § 13. 
J6In the division into legitimate (analytic) and illegitimate (dialectical) parts . 
.17 And this is again clearly distinct from a Scottish verdict of not proven which merely determines and 
legally transcribes the indeterminacy of the matter of the case. 
J8Kant, Religio1l within the Limits of Reason Alone trans. by Theodore M Greene and Hoyt H Hudson 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks 1960), p. 18 note. 
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foreclose the possibility of positivity is still a failure. The appeal to Roman Law which is all-too 
evident in the critical opus was a part of a more general movement in the Romantic period in 
Germany for the revival of Germany's nominal affiliations with Rome through the Holy Roman 
Empire?9 Indeed Wolff and Leibniz were two of the foremost Roman Law revivalists.40 
Curiously, apart from the obvious legal application of the general Romantic tendency to identify 
contemporary Germany with the classical epoch,41 this was not a completely nostalgic and 
reactionary attempt. Specifically, the calls for the development of a rational (i.e. Roman42) legal 
system for the German states was also compared by the protagonists with the development of 
common law in England and Wales. 
The logic dictating this move, is on the face of it completely contradictory. Although all the 
Western legal systems can ultimately trace a line of descent from Roman law, the largest 
accepted sub-category within the complete unity of law is that between English common law43 
and the directly Roman systems.44 The distinction might be glossed as that between a legal 
empiricism (in common or precedent law) and a legal rationalism (in Roman Law). Thus the 
development of an empiricist common law in England, and the attempted return to a rationalist 
Rome in Germany appear to be absolutely opposed. Nevertheless, their equation makes sense in 
the context of the development of capital. 
Broadly speaking, the diffusion and decentralisation of legalisms in the Feudal era (the legal 
analogue of the diffusion of political power; a kind of bastard legal Feudalism) which 
proliferated conflicting rights and claims based not only upon an already highly diffuse 
39See James Q Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: Historical Vision 
and Legal Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1990) especially pp. 66ff. 
400p. cit. pp. 47-8; 75. 
~lOp. cit. p. 81 note 71 where Whitman reports the attempt to see Rome as ultimately German! 
USee Alan Watson, The Law o/the Ancient Romans (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press 
1970) for the prevalence of this association, e.g. p. WI. 
431n England & Wales, in the Federal law of the US, and in all the state legal systems except that of 
Louisiana. 
HOf continental Europe, Scotland and the State of Louisiana. 
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distribution of geographical power,45 but also according to the differential and overlapping 
juristrictions of lay and ecclesiastical courts, clearly inhibited the development of merchant and 
then industrial capital which demanded highly centralised and internationally enforceable rights 
of contract and fiscal restitution. In England and Wales the counter-acting tendency of the Feudal 
aristocracy to assert its ancient rights as a last-ditch stand against the revolutionising of the mode 
of production which would render them obsolete, was resisted, pragmatically enough, by the 
nascent merchant-bourgeois class (who, predictably, claimed to speak for the rights of all) 
appealing to the past universal, and in this case equally ancient, rights of the member of the 
common weal. In Germany, the same demand of capital generated (although in a retarded way) a 
conscious appeal to the universalism of reason represented in this case by Rome against the, 
rather more tenacious, last stand of the Feudal aristocracy.46 This differential pattern of 
development which can be characterised by the philosophical differentiation between rationalism 
and empiricism which are both nevertheless species of modernity. 
Kant here occupies a position whose importance can be seen by the reference to (legal) 
rationalism and empiricism which distinction, in its philosophical mode, the critical thought was 
trying to surpass (whilst always attempting to favour the rationalist). The jurisprudential 
trajectory of critique from the First to the third Critiques can be seen as a transition from a 
rationalist and exhaustively Roman conception of law to an internal contestation of that legal 
model by an empiricist precedent oriented one.47 The pure rationality of Roman law to which the 
German states appealed in the Romantic and immediately pre-romantic eras was that of the 
counter-hermeneutic text. The law, in its ideal case, would be incapable of being interpreted, and 
the production of examples and commentaries strictly forbidden, there would be no need for such 
in a rational and non-parochial law which already specified all its cases internally. To specify it 
45Whitman notes the practice, which was widespread in the sixteenth century in the German states, of 
litigants demanding to be subject only to the specific laws which pertained by custom to the city of their 
birth (pp. 3-4; 7). 
460p. cit. chapter 2. 
47The attention given by Kant in the third Critique to the autonomy of the example (that it exemplifies a 
principle that has no formulation independent of the use of the example) is clearly an instance of this 
transition and one that amply demonstrates the implicit appeal to empiricist, precedent and common 
law. 
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externally would be to subject it to a degeneration (and this was a historical thesis as well) which 
would risk the return to a legal incompatibilist particularity.48 This aspiration of Roman law is 
clearly at one with the aspiration of the schematism in the fIrst Critique, and the subsequent 
theses of time-determination: law here, in its most important intervention as transcendental law 
, 
provides not only codes (categories) but also, simultaneously and out of itself, their specifIcation 
into the instances or cases which are experience. 
Case or precedent law, legal empiricism, orients itself around the (more or less) refractory nature 
of the specifIcity of the case which remains essentially under-determined by the law under which 
it can only be seen to fall after the autonomous activity of judgement. In governmental (faculty) 
terms this autonomy of the judiciary Gudgement) with respect to the legislature (understanding; 
reason) is clearly visible in the quasi-legislative interventionism of the Warren and Burger 
Supreme Courts in the 60s and 70s in the USA. Critical Legal Studies is the most extreme (but 
still legal) limit of this tendency: it suggests that codifIed (rational) law completely under-
determines cases; and that therefore the study of law should be exhausted by the study of the 
empirical (institutional etc.) factors which influence a particular judge to issue a verdict (legal 
realism).49 This failure of the (rational, codified, conceptual) law to produce its cases out of itself 
is one with Kant's problem of judgement. By the third Critique it has reached a pitch adequate to 
demand a critical attention which takes the form of an autonomous analysis of the faculty of 
judgement and its capacity to bring refractory particularity up to the level of, and therefore into 
contact with, reason and law. In Critical Legal Studies, the Wittgensteinian attempt to re-Iocate a 
stable ground (conceptually, if not politically) from which judgement can still operate misses the 
point somewhat. The external factors which are supposed to be determinative of the production 
of law are themselves open to the inspection understanding control and management of other-
than-legal rationality (i.e. sociology).5o This options are not open to Kant because there is no 
48Whitman op. cit. p. 55 on the aspiration toward hermetic hermeneutics in Germany; and see Justinian 
l1lstitutes translated and with an introduction by Peter Birks and Grant McLeod (lthica, NY: Cornell 
University Press 1987), introduction p. 12 note 19 for the same aspiration in early Roman law itself 
before the Codex. 
49For a summary of these issues see James Boyle 'The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and 
Local Social Thought' University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 133, NO.4 (April 1985). 
50The importance of a transcendental sociology is not limited to legal studies, see above chapter 4. 
119 
counter-legal rationality. Kant's problem is, as has been demonstrated, somewhat more radical 
than the politico-legal register will permit to be made visible: it involves not the failure of cases 
to be determined by the law; but of cases to constituted at all by the law out of pre-legal (and 
hence pre-political) and pre-phenomenal matter. Nevertheless, it is important to mark the extent 
to which even the rigorously legal formulations of the problematics of the third Critique-which 
do not by any means exhaust it--demonstrate the failure of the law to be lawful (as of the 
productive forms to be productive) and equally important to signal the necessity for a move 
somewhere else. 
It has already been suggested that the capacity of law to distinguish between transcendent 
(illegitimate) and transcendental (legitimate) cases is dependent on the structure of a productive 
hylomorphism which operates at its base and which distinguishes the two case according to the 
(non)availability of matter for formation. The gradual slippage that Kant demonstrates between 
the First and third Critiques from a Roman rationalist conception of law to a degenerate 
empiricist conception of case and precedent demonstrates that even when one concentrates 
attention on the super-structural formations of legislation itself, the scepticism to which Kant 
increasingly subjects the assumed productive hylomorphism of the fIrst Critique, is operative: 
that is to say even at the level of legislation. The incapacity of law to formulate cases as such is 
clearly a failure which precedes the division of cases into legitimate and illegitimate applications. 
This failure matches that of the production theory which Kant increasingly comes to see cannot 
perform the task assigned to it of the generation of nature as a system. 
The distinction made in chapter 3 between the productive and the legislative accounts of the 
transcendental suggested that it is never possible for the legislative to overcome the productive 
because production is the basis of law. 51 Whilst this is true, it simplifIes the problem. Kant 
actually attempts to make legislation productive; that is, he does not systematically use two sets 
of vocabulary but rather tries to merge the two sets. This makes their separation the more 
diffIcult. Indeed, in the third Critique he specifically aligns law with a form of productive 
hylomophism.51'he hylomorphism that he there invokes is in fact inverted. It is not that implied 
in the whole formation of the analytic of the fIrst Critique, where the formal in its multi-sectored 
51See below pp. 53ff. 
52First Introduction, «]I5. 
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interventions is forced into contact with the manifold of materiality; rather it reverses this 
formulation and regards the conceptual as a matter which is to be formed by its specification into 
genus and species, i.e. the conceptual as a matter is formed by what in the third Critique are the 
representatives of the uncontrollable refractoriness of prime materiality. Kant's identification of 
law with a productive hylomorphism therefore actually identifies the law with a hylomorphism 
which has nothing to do with the production-theory which is deployed in the productive base of 
the transcendental economy. 
There is a fallacy of equivocation silently at work in critique which proceeds by identifying law 
and production through the middle term of hylomorphism without attending to the two types of 
hylomorphism thus mobilised. The inverted type which marks Kant's explicit identification of 
law and production is almost completely irrelevant. Thus, Kant can evade the problems of the 
real identification of law and production which is actually at issue, the equation of law and 
formality. 53 
The degeneration of the rationalist Roman legal model of the first Critique into the empiricist 
model of the primacy of the unformulable rule of precedent correlates a failure of law to 
establish a juridical realm with the failure of form to produce at the level of a non-inverted 
hylomorphism which Kant is loath explicitly to acknowledge. The utility of the fallacy of 
equivocation over hylomorphism though is that Kant can present this failure in a mitigated form. 
Thus, the failure of the legislature of reason is compensated by the relative success of the 
autonomy of the jUdiciary which appropriates a quasi-legislative function. The scepticism about 
the functioning of one faculty is devolved onto an affirmation of another faculty. It would be 
possible to subject this faculty to a similar interrogation; but it is clearly far more important to 
go to the productive base itself: the economy. This is just what the vocabulary of legislation is 
intended to avoid. But the idea that the inefficacy of the legislature can be made up at the level of 
the judiciary when what is at stake is their mutual inability, not even to control, but to be the 
economy, is peculiarly risible. Whilst a certain and rather mitigated kind of scepticism is 
available even at the level of the legal, it is to production that one must tum for the possibility 
not only of a positive account of transcendental production (i.e. one which does not just 
53Kant uses this inverted fonn of hylomorphism, with the same intent of confusion, in his account of the 
genius. See below chapter 6. 
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assimilate it with negative theological production); but also for an account of the specificity of 
that mode which generates the possibility of presenting production as law under certain 
determinate conditions. 
One might go as far as to say that the retro-active reapplication of law onto the productive base 
so as to render it immune from critique by being essentially illegitimate can be reformulated as 
the suggestion that the law itself is illegitimate. The paradoxicality of this response, is not much 
greater than the general appeal to paradox in decompositional argumentation; and it has the 
advantage of giving rise to a greater sense of the sterility of the operation of negative critique 
itself. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a reading of the problematic of the third Critique which shows it to be 
engaged in scepticism toward the effecti ve functioning of the immunised mode of transcendental 
production which representational decomposition presupposes. This scepticism is oriented 
around the problems of system and judgement. To have become problems for Kant these imply 
that the production mechanisms of the first Critique must be inadequate. Specifically, concept 
and matter cannot be brought into the contact that Kant needs to constitute the transcendental, 
but which is forbidden him by the necessity of the specific difference of concept and intuition. 
This sceptiCism undercuts the subsequent theoretical sophistications of negative critique, by 
attacking the efticacy of their productive base. The origin of this scepticism has further been 
traced to a consequence of the privatisation of hylomorphic production which makes a certain 
preliminary concept of active matter, somewhat surprisingly, inevitable. The next chapter will 
address the correlate of Kant's scepticism in the formulation of the problematics of the third 
Critique: the new theory of production which he introduces, and which serves as the belated 
actual critique of the previously assumed hylomorphic production theory of negative critical 
representation. 
122 
Chapter 6: Intransitive Production 
Introduction 
Critique (in its Kantian mould) is dependent upon the construction of a more effective exclusive 
disjunction between transcendental and empirical than had ever been achieved by dogmatism 
between spirit and matter. This is originality of the concept of the transcendental. Spirit is much 
too like matter; God altogether too personal, too barbaric, rather unseemly; the soul too 
psychological. But this move clearly generates an exacerbated species of the Cartesian 
interaction problem. The specific difference between concept and intuition! makes it increasingly 
impossible for them to interact. Yet, such interaction is the basis of the Kantian production 
theory that not only accounts for the production of the (empirically) real, but also underwrites the 
distinction between transcendental and transcendent. 1his is the problematic: that the 
transcendental must be located in a (non)space forbidding contact with the soiled space of the 
empirical and pathological at the same time as being the hylomorphic operator of a 
transcendental production program. It is this problematic that motivates the scepticism about the 
efficacy of the transcendental and hylomorphic production of the first Critique that is evident in 
the third Critique. This chapter shows that alongside the scepticism about production there is 
also a positive theory of production that responds to the inefficacy of the earlier account of 
production. Thus Kant not only invented critique, but also provided the tool-kit and instruction 
manual for disengaging critique from the useless gears of transcendental idealism. 
The Structure of Production Arguments in the Third Critique 
The problematic of the third Critique is that of the generation of order: morphogenesis. As has 
already been suggested in the previous chapter, this takes the form of an interrogation of the 
condition of possibility of the empirical legislation of nature. The formulation of this as a 
problematic seriously undermines the efficacy of the transcendentals of the first Critique, and 
hence the mode of production implicitly assigned to them: transitive production. Conditions of 
possibility in the earlier critical works were equated with the transcendental production of order. 
The 'I think' that must be able to accompany all representations and is the intrusion into the 
phenomenon of the ultimate condition of all, the transcendental unity of apperception. The 'I 
I Insofar as these are temporary sites for tlle general confrontation of transcendental and empirical. 
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think' is the mark of the necessary adhesion of experience to the unity of the subject. This 
reference to the phenomenological conditions of experience being 'had' by (owned by, perceived 
through) one subject answers to the somewhat plaintive desire that Kant had already described in 
the margins of the Observations, the desire for order and coherence within the phenomenon 
(cited above, p. 93). The satisfaction of this desire comes in the thought of the hylomorphically 
productive transcendental forms that construct an experience only as ordered by arguing from the 
unity of the subject to the unity of the experience had by that subject (the deduction[s]). 
That transcendental production was being thought as an order that conditions the possibility of 
experience and of the empirically real makes the problematic of the third Critique a surprising 
one. Nature, the phenomenon, is no longer in order despite the activity of the transcendental 
production processes on the first Critique. This activity is therefore seriously in question: what 
remains for it to do if the third Critique has now appropriated the task of the condition of the 
production of order? But it is extremely important not to think that the vectors of the third 
Critique tending towards the production of a new theory of production (the extenuation of 
critique, rather than of transcendental idealism) can be simply plugged into the old structures 
(that is, transcendental idealism itself). Just as the displacement of God and His replacing by 
Man could not occur on the same matrix, so here a new theory of production changes everything, 
and cannot be inserted in the same machinery necessary for the old one. The new theory of 
production is a theory of the production of the (new) machinery. 
Nevertheless, the first way of thinking the problematics of the third Critique must be in their 
relation to the first Critique. Thus, production in the first Critique is the process of the 
production of an ordered product (experience, phenomenon) from an order that itself is given 
and not produced (transcendental forms) and which order is therefore prior to what it produces 
(the synthetic a priori). In the third Critique however production is the process of the production 
of order. Thus (although implicitly and complicatedly) the production processes of the third 
Critique are the condition of possibility of the production of the very order (this would follow a 
fortiori) that was implied by the functioning of the transcendentals of the first Critique (although 
this production of transcendent order would only take place under certain conditions). 
The strategy of the third Critique reflects this ambiguity. Kant is compelled to think a mode of 
production that does not entail presupposing order in the concept because he becomes 
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increasingly sceptical about the extent to which conceptual order responds to the order of the 
empirical. The third Critique is motorised by the idea of a counter-conceptual mode of 
production. Kant is, in effect, applying critique again to the mode of production of transcendental 
idealism as in the first Critique. However, Kant interprets the results of this counter-
conceptuality as even more formal than the concept. He thus reproduces the relation of 
transcendental idealism itself to theology and rationalism. Transcendental idealism argued that 
the traditional spirituality of God (and the subject) were not inadequate because they were 
spiritual, but because they were not spiritual enough, notformal. Kant's counter-conceptuality 
argument in the third Critique follows the same path: if the formal is inadequate, it is not 
because it is formal, but because it is not refined enough. Kant wants his new 'solution' to be 
functionally equivalent to-but more sophisticated than-the old solution, implying that the 
extent to which the third Critique provides an account of morphogenesis, is simply plugs back in 
to the old account. It does so by suggesting that the manifold is capable of receiving form (the 
problem) because it has been pre-equipped to do this (counter-conceptually) by jUdgement. To be 
formed, matter must be pre-formed. The structure is similar to Milton's account of the creation. 
Of course, this argument merely exacerbates the problem: it was, as the last chapter argued, the 
refinement of transcendental formality that made its capacity to be productive so problematic. 
Kant's solution therefore merely exacerbates the original problem. And therefore one can 
legitimately be sceptical about the extent Kant is right to interpret counter-conceptuality in this 
way. Not to do so is to think the counter-conceptual as a mode of production that may account 
for order without presupposing it, and which therefore brings into question the equation-
common in Kant- of order withform. Counter-conceptual production is informal production. 
Such production can in no way be simply plugged back into transcendental idealism. It accounts 
for order; but it critiques form-and especially transcendental form-as a hypostatisation of 
order. 
It is quite difficult to make the argument actually presented in the third Critique answer to the 
problematic suggested in the introductions and the preface. In so far as it can, then the argument 
goes like this: the critique of teleological judgement creates a transcendental space for the 
assertion of judgements of objective (although merely reflective and not constitutive) teleology. 
That is, it argues for the position that we are entitled under certain circumstances to deploy 
concepts as the final conditions of objects. In the primary case of organic life, we are entitled to 
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do this directly. One cannot even think an organism except on the basis of it being a final end, an 
entity whose existence presupposes a concept that is responsible for its production. Clearly, the 
paradigm instance of the organism is the human being. In less the primary cases, of inorganic 
nature and of nature as a whole, one is still entitled, although in a more restrictive way, to think 
objects as ultimately teleological. The restrictions operate to avoid spurious teleological thinking 
that, for Kant, must not substitute for mechanical explanation, but must only direct substantive 
research that will always be mechanical. 
The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement forms, on this view, a special case of the Critique of 
Teleological Judgement (but one with excessive consequences). The former Critique studies the 
teleological propriety of the world of nature for the human sensibility. But it is only on the basis 
of the arguments deployed in the Critique of Teleological Judgement that the thread of research 
in the aesthetics can be valid. Restricted manifoldness is guaranteed by the teleological 
conditioning of nature for human beings. 
This fitness has other consequences (which are the ones that actually occupy Kant in the text): it 
is evidenced by the fact that there are beautiful objects. The beautiful directly manifests the 
fitness of the manifold of intuition for the transcendental and conceptual faculty of the 
understanding. A beautiful object is (to paraphrase somewhat) one the intuition of which in some 
way tends towards3 a concept (although without hitting on one completely, which would 
undermine the faculty of the understanding). The existence of beautiful objects in nature shows 
that the manifold of intuition in general (matter), is itself already pre-composed, in a teleological 
manner, so as to be coherent with the higher cognitive and transcendental faculties; (under-
)nature is for us. In short, the existence of the beautiful proves that nature will be composed of a 
set of empirical laws whose unity itself will be law-like, will be a "systematic subordination of 
lower to higher.,,4 
This is the basic context within which Kant re-generates the concept of production left over from 
the first Critique. It has already been noted that the stakes of this context are high: what is at 
issue is the very capacity for productive activity of the spontaneous faculties. Such capacity for 
3This phrase glosses (over) the mode of production at issue here; the rest of this chapter will be devoted 
to expanding this gloss. 
~Third Critique, Second Introduction, 914, Ak. 5: 180. 
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production is increasingly devolved from the fully spontaneous faculties (reason and 
understanding) to what had previously been only an executive agency: the faculty of judgement. 
This move towards the prominence of judgement is contained in the terminological shift between 
the First and third Critique. The old distinction between constitutive conceptual activity 
occurring in the domain of the understanding and merely regulative conceptual activity occurring 
in the domain of Reason is devolved completely onto judgement. Thus in the third Critique what 
had been regulative concepts of reason (most notably of course the treatment of nature as a 
nexus finalis for the purpose of empirical scientific research into the biological) are re-cast as 
reflective maxims of judgement. 
The trajectory of terminological substitution from regulative ideas of reason to reflective 
judgements is of specific interest here. The locus of the new mode of production is initially in the 
faculty of judgement, and the faculty of judgement is a sensible or material faculty (albeit a 
higher one) in contrast to reason that is the paradigm of the ideal faculties. This is an important 
hint. The argument here will be that this mode of production is in fact that of matter itself. It is 
this mode of productive ordering-theorised in the third Critique-that is subjected to repression 
by Kant's attempt to equalise order and form. The equalisation of order and form is a 
paralogistic understanding of matter. 
Kant's specific argument goes from the teleological to the aesthetic. Here though the thought will 
be traced in the other direction. The most clear statements of the production mode associated 
with the specific tasks of the faculty of judgement (and correlatively with the imagination) occur 
in the Critique 0/ Aesthetic Judgement. The Critique O/Teleological Judgement however 
represents the most interesting set of applications of this idea of production: to the material 
world. 
Intransitive Production In The third Critique: First Slogan 
The fundamental statement of Kant's new theory of production is familiar: it is the central 
contention of his aesthetics. It comes in his discussion of the distinction between beauty and 
perfection (one of several passages aimed at Leibniz\ He writes: "Beauty is estimated on the 
ground of a mere formal finality, i.e. a finality apart from an end [eine Zweckmiij3igkeit ohne 
5See for instance, the long polemic in the First Introduction to the third Critique, at 'J(8. 
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Zweck].,,6 A similar definition reoccurs in § 17 in the statement of the 3rd moment of the analytic 
of the beautiful: "Beauty is the form ofjinality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from 
an end." This definition fits into Kant's argumentative structure in that it secures the autonomy 
of the aesthetic. For aesthetics to exist at all, the argument runs, it must be aesthetics, and not a 
branch of something else. It must not be capable of being reduced to something non-aesthetic. 
The aesthetic must be specifically distinct (the phrase is used hard by the slogan at issue here, in 
§ 15). Kant has two contemporary (and the arguments are still relevant today) targets in mind: a 
rationalism associated with Leibniz and his school, and an empiricism whose origin was in the 
British empiricists, and whose most recent exponent had been Burke.7 Empiricism reduces the 
aesthetic to empirical sensation and pathological desire; rationalism reduces the aesthetic to the 
rational through the concept of perfection. The structure of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 
therefore follows the structure of the antinomy elaborated in its dialectic. The thesis claims the 
conceptlessness of the aesthetic (and, to uncritical minds, the empiricism of aesthetics). The 
antithesis claims the pure conceptuality of aesthetics (and reducing it to a species of the 
rational).8 The core of the resolution of this antinomy is clearly supposed to be contained in the 
maxim 'conformity to an end without an end.' One might, however, at this stage, suspect that 
this merely substitutes for the antinomic contradiction at the level of the proposition, a more 
compact contradiction at the level of the phrase: an oxymoron. 
Kant clearly saw the empiricist option as rather less of a threat. This was on the one hand 
because his sympathies lay naturally with rationalism (empiricism disturbed him, he suggests in 
his famous image9) and the origin of the critical project defined itself by distinction from 
empiricism. On the other hand, it was because his theory was intended to defend a close relation 
between the aesthetic and the rational-moral, and it would therefore take more effort to 
distinguish his theory from rationalism than from empiricism. Of the four moments of the 
6Third Critique § 15. Meredith's translation might be more accurately, if less elegantly, rendered as 
'conformity to an end without an end'. 
7In his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of out Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, edited by 
James T. Boulton (Oxford: Blackwell 1987). 
8TIle statement of the antinomy is at §56 of the third Critique. 
'lThe ima'>e of the alarm-clocks is in the Preface to the Prolegomena (Ak: 4:260). 
C' 
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analytic of the beautiful,lO only the fIrst addresses the problem of empiricism (claiming that the 
beautiful object pleases without interest i.e. not pathologically, on the basis of mere sensation). 
All the other three contain references to the absence of fInality and conceptuality to which a 
rationalist 'aesthetics' would reduce the aesthetic. The non-fInality of the beautiful object is 
therefore central to Kant's aesthetics: it fIrst opens up the space in which an aesthetics is 
possible. 
Moreover, in a general way one can see that this autonomy of the aesthetic relates clearly to the 
central problematic of transcendental idealism as such. The mounting upon which the destructive 
armaments of critique are set is a thought-of the transcendental-which is irreducible either to 
empiricism or rationalism. I have already argued that his must be thought of as a mode of 
production irreducible either to the empiricist or the rationalist. The aesthetic is also similarly 
irreducible (see above pp. 62f.). If it can be shown that the aesthetic is a mode of production of a 
specific and characterisable type, then it will not be implausible to suggest that it represents the 
'fIlling out' of recessive transcendentalism of the first Critiques. This would therefore be a kind 
of positive critique, responding to the scepticism that Kant entertained about the ability of the 
transcendental to perform the productive task assigned it. 
Kant saw the transcendental itself as specifically distinct from both the empirical and the 
rational, from the antinomy of the empirical and the rational. But the internal mechanics of the 
transcendental (the details of its mode of production) ended up reduplicating, although 
displacing, the same dichotomies: this time between transcendental and empirical or, at the real 
battlefront, between concept and intuition. The real import of the attempt to compel aesthetics 
into the occupation of a site reducible neither to rationalism nor to empiricism, is that this site is 
more properly one irreducible to concept or intuition, irreducible to Kant's transcendental 
versions of rationalism and empiricism. The polemic in the third Critique is as much about the 
difficulties Kant has generated for himself by displacing the dichotomies that he had sought to 
eradicate to transcend as it is about the school of Leibniz and the work of Edmund Burke. The , , 
polemical orientation of the critique towards rationalism reflects the fact, on this view, that the 
transcendental is a form of rationalism. It is therefore to be expected that the attempt to push 
!OIntended, not very successfully, to correspond architechtonically with the four groups of categories. 
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critique further will be oriented towards attacking the reduplication and reproduction of the 
rational side of the dichotomy, that of the (pure) concept. 
The autonomy of judgement and of aesthetics therefore answers not only to an attempt to refute 
contemporary pre-critical reductionist theories of aesthetics, but also to an internal attempt to 
refute--or at least refine-the related (but displaced) dichotomies of the transcendental idealism 
of the first two Critiques as well. 
The first slogan---conformity to an end without an end-also fits into the more specific 
argument of the third Critique, that referenced in the introductions, and most important here: the 
problem of (the production of) order, or in terms a little closer to Kant, the production of 
formality. This is clearest in the First Introduction. There the grounding distinction of the third 
Critique, between reflective and determinant judgement is made out in just these terms. For the 
Kant of the first two Critiques, the destructive axe of criticism had been wielded against the 
thought that objects were given. He there, as has been demonstrated in chapter 3, instead gives 
an account of the production of objects. The 'given' which is opposed to production is then 
crucially displaced onto the very raw material of the Kantian pathological. In this First 
Introduction to the third Critique however, Kant now acknowledges that raw material is not the 
only factor of production that is given within the system of transcendental idealism. Judgement 
"is merely the ability to subsume under concepts given from elsewhere." (<]I2, Ak. 20:202). This 
is clearly true; but only applies to determinant judgement. The new thought that is being 
introduced is that of reflective judgement. Kant characterises it-by contrast with determinant 
judgement-as the capacity to subsume (bring factors of production into productive contact) 
under concepts that are "not given" (ibid.). The association of the given with a dogmatic object 
of critique was established from the start of the critical enterprise, and one would expect that this 
distinction between a production that operates from given concepts and one that does not would 
be filled out in terms of the production of concepts or order. 
This expectation is not disappointed. In the highly charged lI <]I4 of the First Introduction Kant 
makes the distinction between determinant and reflective judgement like this: 
IISO charged because it is where Kant explicitly addresses the consequences of a merely transcendental 
ordering. "nature as a crude chaotic aggregate without the slightest trace of a system ... [in which] we 
could only grope about aimlessly [herumtappen]" etc. This is one of the most important passages used 
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For judgement is not just an ability to subsume the particular under the universal 
(whose concept is given), but also the other way round, an ability to find the universal 
for the particular. 
Clearly, 'find' [finden] here cannot be taken to mean looking around for something already given, 
for then the contrast would be vitiated, but must mean made. In the next section (<][5), whose title 
is 'On Reflective Judgement,' this is made obvious. He writes, glossing the same contrast for a 
third time: 
Judgement can be regarded either as merely an ability to reflect, in terms of a certain 
principle, on a given presentation so as to make a concept possible, or as an ability to 
determine an underlying concept. 
Here the connection is not just made to a theory of the production of concepts (order), but right 
through to a transcendental constitution of order (which would have to be radically distinct from 
the transcendentiality of the first two Critiques, in which concepts as the stores of form are given 
and not produced). The same provocative terminology re-occurs in the passages of the First 
Introduction concerned with teleological (or objective) applications of reflective judgement: these 
"make a concept possible" (<][9). The terminology is preserved in both the Preface to the third 
Critique, where Kant writes that judgement "has ... itself to furnish a concept," and in <][4 of the 
Second Introduction where reflective judgement has "to find the universal." 
In fact, this broad gesture towards the persistence of a mode of production answering both to a 
scepticism about the transcendental production of the earlier critical works, and to a 
destructuring of production away from transitivity is only provisional. It will be the task of the 
rest of this chapter to draw attention to-and to the significance of-a whole range of 
characterisations of production associated with judgement and the imagination in the third 
Critique. It is, however, important not to lose sight of the fundamental problematic of the third 
Critique-scepticism about the efficacy of transcendental production-and important therefore 
to think the various productions at stake in the third Critique in relation to this problematic. The 
provisional concentration on the production vocabulary of the Introductions focuses attention on 
this relation to the main problematic. 
in chapter 3 to demonstrate the level of Kant's fear about lack of order, and the extent to which he 
thought transcendental formality impotent in this respect. 
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A key passage at § 12 of the third Critique brings together these points, introducing a specifically 
distinct mode of production-answering to the characteristic of intransitivity (or non-finality)-
which is explicitly sited at the heart of the project of delineating the autonomy of judgement. In 
this passage Kant first outlines the modes of causality that the first and second Critiques 
respectively attempt to ground The one is properly causal and a posteriori, the other a causation 
by means of freedom (i.e. pure desire) operating a priori. He then introduces a third kind of 
causality, what he calls "an internal causality [eine innerlich Kausalitiit]" specific to the 
aesthetic and to judgement. It is distinct therefore, he writes, both from "the pathological ground 
of agreeableness [i.e. a potential empiricist reductionism of the aesthetic]" and from "the 
intellectual ground of the represented good [i.e. a potential rationalist reductionism of the 
aesthetic]." This passage therefore directly associates the third Critique with a new type of 
causality that will negotiate the problems of the dichotomy of the rational and the empirical; and 
hence the problems of the transcendental rationalism propounded in the first and second 
Critiques. The new type of production is differentiated not only from the modes of production 
grounded as Kant says in the previous critical works, but also from the mode of production that 
does the grounding (rational transcendental production by means of [pure] concepts). 
Kant's explicit theorisation of an autonomous aesthetics emerges from the need to give an 
account of an empirical order (that of the hierarchy of natural laws) that cannot be referred to 
conceptuality or formality. The independence of aesthetics breaches the elision of form and 
order. However, in giving an account of the production of order, Kant raises the issue of whether 
the forms themselves might not be otiose. He might be taken as reapplying the critical axiom that 
objects must be produced and not merely given. In this case, the assumption of order in 
transcendental idealism is implicitly subjected to critique when Kant gives an account of the 
imagination suggesting that the imagination is morphogenic. The importance of this move cannot 
be easily over-estimated because it also raises the possibility of applying a second axiom of 
critique: that the objects of critique ought not to be sublated, criticised at one level, to be secured 
on another. The mode of production of the imagination-the immanent construction of arbitrary 
traits of order unassimilable to a concept-provides an eliminative account of the production of 
transcendental order, not a redemptive one. Formal order is a paralogistic misunderstanding of 
immanent order, which hypostatises part of a product, and then posits that part as an independent 
factor of production: a mOlphe, a synthetic a priori concept. 
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Intransitive Production In The third Critique: Second Slogan 
The first slogan, Zweckmaj3igkeit ohne Zweck, pertains to judgement. The second pertains to the 
imagination. In the remark attached to §22 of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, but intended 
to refer to all the previous text, Kant writes that in aesthetic experience (and most particularly of 
poetry) the imagination manifests "conformity to law without a law [Gesetzmiij3igkiet ohne 
Gesetz]." Reference to a mode of production here is explicit: Kant writes that the imagination 
here must be taken in its productive and not its reproductive guise. The productive imagination 
he then defines as "exerting an activity of its own [selbsttiitig] (as originator [Urheberin] of 
arbitrary forms of possible intuitions)." This production occupies the zone not only of the 
transcendental aesthetic of the first Critique (the forms of intuition) but also the conceptual 
formality of the categories themselves. Kant contrasts the case in which "the imagination is 
compelled to follow a course laid down by a definite law" in which "the form of the product is 
determined by concepts" with that in question with the productive imagination operating without 
a law. Clearly in the contrast case, the imagination manifests an independent and autonomous 
tendency toward the production of concepts (without ever attaining to a definite one). 
This passage is a dense one. To understand it one must first note that 'freedom' has undergone a 
shift of meaning. In another formulation of the second slogan from the same section Kant writes 
of the ''free conformity to law [die freie Gesetzmiij3igkeit] of the imagination." This formulation 
could, as it stands, come from the second Critique, where free conformity to law is the essence of 
the moral. 12 It is, however, essential to Kant's task here to differentiate this free conformity to 
law of the imagination from that of reason in the second Critique. The autonomy of the aesthetic 
depends on its differentiation from determinate conceptuality, formality or (as in the first slogan) 
conformity with ends. This differentiation is made the more difficult because Kant still wants to 
resolve the issue at the level of the formal. That is to say, Kant's gloss on the meaning and 
significance of both the slogans under consideration here refers end (and law) conformity without 
end (or law) to theform of finality (end-orientedness) and law (see, e.g. §17). One can see the 
trouble particularly with the second slogan: this is precisely Kant's solution to the problem of the 
heteronomy of law (pathology) in the second Critique. The law is itself autonomous only when it 
takes nothing for its object except itself, that is, when it is nothing but the form of the law. The 
12In the First Introduction to the third Critique, but concerning the second Critique, Kant writes of 
"freedom under laws." (9{ I). 
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form of the law would seem to be the formality of the formal, and therefore the epitome of the 
formal. Not only will this do nothing to achieve the autonomy of judgement, the imagination and 
the aesthetic that Kant intends, but it will clearly only exacerbate the problem of the condition of 
interaction of transcendental and empirical at stake in the problematic outlined in the 
introductions. 
Kant's solution involves the curious disruption of the productive hylomorphic model (the 
disruption that has already been briefly discussed, see above pp. 120f.) to which he usually 
adheres. In §35 he appears to invoke the passage in the First Introduction (<][5) in which, by way 
of comparison with a certain Roman legalism finding its root in Aristotle's Metaphysics, the 
concept is treated as the raw material [roh Materien] of a process of judgmental specification. In 
§35 he argues from the premise that "the concepts in a judgement constitute its content [lnhait]" 
to the conclusion that "[taste] can only have its ground in the subjective formal condition of a 
judgement in general" via the premise that "taste is not determinable by means of concepts." 
The difficult move comes in the final piece of reasoning: "But, the subjective [formal, one is to 
suppose] condition of all judgements is the judging faculty [das Vermogen zu urteilen] itself, or 
judgement [Urteilskraft]." The formality that Kant invokes in his expansions of both the slogans 
for the operation of judgement and imagination escapes from the usual identification of the 
formal with law, conceptuality and fully fledged transcendentiality in two of these moves. It does 
so first by the inversion of hylomorphism (which aligns materiality with conceptuality; and hence 
formality at least not with conceptuality); and second, by the appeal to the/acuity or power itself 
(Vermogen or Kraft) as subjective form. 
Kant goes on to make more specific and more concrete what he means by treating formality as 
faculty: 
Taste, then, as a subjective power of judgement, contains a principle of subsumption, 
not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations, under 
the faculty of concepts, i.e. the understanding, so far as the former ill its freedom, 
accords with the latter ill its cOllformity to law. 
The redefinition of freedom is completed in this phase. The freedom of the imagination is no 
longer the same as the freedom of reason and concept. The latter is (as Kant himself notes) rather 
a "restriction [Einschrankung]" (§9) on the freedom of the imagination. All three faculties 
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(reason, understanding and imagination or jUdgement) can be said to be free. (In the case of the 
understanding this freedom is more properly spontaneity, the most general attribute of all the 
transcendental faculties, the higher faculties, activity.) And all can equally be said to be 
conformable to law, form or concept. But this conformity happens in quite different ways. 
Reason is freely conformable to law practically and with absolute purity from any passivity, 
receptivity, pathology or materiality. The understanding is free (or spontaneous) by contrast only 
insofar as it acts on something else (precisely proximal representatives of materiality, sensibility 
etc.). The imagination is free in its non-subordination to the concept, formality (understood in 
the usual Kantian sense) etc. which are thought as restriction. This notion of freedom is 
distinguished from the others in its use in the phrase "free play [freies Spiel]" as opposed, in the 
citation from §9 above, to "restriction." This is an important departure because it characterises 
precisely the productive, i.e. spontaneous, activity of the imagination (not its receptive 
reproductive aspect), and therefore reconfigures the primary term of activity in Kant's thought, 
the activity associated with the transcendental. 13 
However, Kant clearly intents-somehow-that freedom in this quite new sense (aligning with a 
new mode of production in the highly significant contrast of transcendental labour versus 
aesthetic play) should still be subordinated to the formal. This is his gloss on the slogans: 
intransitive production must be thought asformal production in the traditional transcendental 
sense, and not as the informal production of the formal (with all the attendant complications for 
the notion of the formal or order that this would entail). The argument demands some 
investigation and evaluation. 
First it must be said that it relies on a fallacy of equivocation on the term 'formal.' His use of the 
term in §35 is derived from inverted hylomorphism. This is deployed specifically to generate a 
temporary contrast between concept and form that he can then go on to use it to legitimate a 
notion of formality that is still formal (or has the theoretical resources of formality) but which is 
s i mul taneousl y counter-conceptual. 
13This redefinition is essentially Schopenhauer's conception of freedom: freedom of the will/rom 
transcendental representation. See The World as Will and Representation 2 Vols. trans. by EJF Payne 
(New York: Dover 1969), Vol. 1 §55. 
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Second, the attempt to reintroduce formality in his understanding of the mode of production of 
the imagination and judgement is a particularly difficult example of the general difficulty of the 
third Critique, outlined in chapter 5: regression. Analysis of this problem addresses the meaning 
that Kant is really attempting to attach to this equivocal formality. This regression has three 
aspects that will be investigated in the following section. 
The Regression Problem 
Faculty Regression 
Taste is 'formal' insofar as it pertains to the faculties, that is to the "subjective formal conditions 
of a judgement in general." (§35). Thus in taste judgement operates (and taste is the operation of 
judgement as such, when it acts autonomously) not to subsume particulars under concepts, but 
to subsume the faculty of particulars (or intuitions, the imagination) under the faculty of 
concepts (the understanding). This move is summarised in §36 with the suggestion that 
judgement is in this (privileged case, when it is most itself) "object as well as law." This is a very 
difficult claim to understand. It, however, follows from Kant's initial bid staking out the territory 
of the third Critique. There he argues, from a type of analogy, that if the schematism mediated 
between universal and particular, then the faculties must be in the same relation, i.e., judgement 
must mediate between understanding and sensibility. 14 
But one has to ask how it is that Kant thinks that a faculty can take itself (or another faculty)15 
as an object? The difficulties appear almost insuperable: faculties are not the sort of things that 
can be treated as objects. They are not objects at all. The faculties are transcendental, as Kant is 
at pains to point out. The whole critique of Hume rests on this; Kant is not psychologist. The 
tendency of negative critique-which itself exacerbates the tendency in Kant to establish an 
increasingly rigorous specific distinction between transcendental and empirical--only makes this 
problem worse. The more rigorous one makes the distinction between transcendental and 
empirical, the more inept it seems to treat the transcendental capacity marked by the term 
14He uses the analogy to argue further that judgement must have a priors principles. Kant's conception 
of analogy is quite rigorous and will be analysed below in the section on the 'as if.' See below pp. 146ff. 
15In the first formulation of this hypothesis (§35) Kant suggests that the faculty of judgement subsumes 
one faculty (the imagination) under a third (understanding). But in the next section (§36) Kant suggests 
that judgement takes itself as object. 
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Vermogen as itself an object manipulable by those very capacities. Kant is seeking here to exit 
peremptorily from the loop of regressions envisaged in the schematism and the preface to the 
third Critique (see above, chapter 5, pp. I07ff.). 
This regressive series is a testing problem for the third Critique. Evading the regression of 
judgement and ensuring adequate contact between transcendental and empirical has become, by 
the third Critique, the central project of transcendental idealism. Kant recognised that the 
application of concepts could not itself be conceptual, that the application of rules could not be 
rule governed. But it had to be governed. Thus he instituted the distinction between objective and 
subjective rules, and the apparatus of reflective judgement that is governed but not in terms of 
explicit and determinate formality, conceptuality or rule-orientedness. Kant's aesthetics responds 
to this problematic by being the first to theorise what has become a commonplace today, that 
aesthetic judgements are neither fully arbitrary nor fully objective. 16 These are the options, 
respectively of aesthetic empiricism and rationalism. But they go beyond the project of a critical 
aesthetics in clearly referring also the problem of judgement with the system of transcendental 
idealism itself. In this instance, the general one, the two options which aesthetic judgement must 
negotiate are those of the transcendental rationalism of the first Critique, and empiricism. 17 The 
autonomous capacity of judgement to bring transcendental and empirical into contact-and resist 
the regression of the formal that is the symptom of their separation-through its privileged mode 
of action as aesthetic judgement is, however, complicated. Kant is, from the start, aware that 
aesthetic judgement is difficult: 
[Aesthetic] judgement has to face unavoidable difficulties which do not face logical 
judgement ... [in the case of aesthetic judgement] sUbsumption may easily prove 
fallacious (third Critique, §38, remark) 
One has to remember that this is not a minor difficulty associated with a special problem in a 
specific area of the architectonic of the system, but the problem o/the system (see above pp. 
92ff.). 
16Kant might indeed be credited with the invention of the notion of inter-subjectivity. 
17The lack of symmetry between the situations emerges from the fact that Kant does not explicitly 
contemplate a transcendental empiricism. The work of this chapter will be to suggest that he does so 
implicitly. 
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Kant theorises the difficulties of aesthetics through the distinction between objective and non-
objective rule. But the difficulty is still acute. Kant repeatedly argues that the (merely empirical) 
difficulties of actually generating agreement on an aesthetic judgement in no way detracts from 
the universality (although not the objectivity) of the judgement: 
If any mistake is made ... this can only touch on the incorrect application to a 
particular case of the right which a law gives, and does not do away with the right 
generally. (§38 remark, note)18 
This is, of course, generally true for Kant. Legislation is transcendental, and not open to 
refutation by empirical instances. It would be a mistake of failing to recognise the specific 
difference between transcendental and empirical even to think that this were possible. But the 
autonomy of judgement itself is what is supposed to ground the general applicability of 
transcendental concepts to the empirical, and in that case it seems distinctly unreliable to require 
the ground of a use of judgement that is, as Kant admits, unstable, and for necessary reasons. 
The law that Kant invokes here is one whose capacity to be applied at all is in the process of 
being legitimated; but the grounds of the legitimisation require that it refer to a mode of 
application that is empirically unstable. 19 Were the application of judgement really deducible 
from a formal law, then regression would be the result; this law too would require another law 
for its application. But to avoid this Kant has to appeal to some mode of application that is 
essentially dirty and unpredictable: aesthetics in part responds to this need. The very difficulty 
that Kant invokes (albeit briefly, and to be rejected quickly) is the solution. 
We would be able to count on [universal] agreement [i.e., the legitimacy of the law] 
provided that we were always assured of the correct subsumption of the case. (§ 19; 
italics added) 
"Correct sUbsumption of the case," however, is just what is at issue, what Kant is trying to 
prove: the capacity of transcendental laws to construct the empirical, and therefore to be immune 
from empirical refutation, is exactly what is at issue in the aesthetics. Kant has set himself a dual 
18Kant makes the same point at §8: "Such [universal] agreement it [judgement] does in fact [ill der Tat] 
require from everyone for each of its judgements of taste-the persons who pass these judgements do 
not quarrel over the possibility of such a claim, but only fail, in particular cases to come to terms as to 
the correct application of the faculty." 
19Indced it is the very instability of the ground that generates the legitirnisation. 
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problem. On the one hand, it would appear (from the structure of the regression of jUdgement) 
that the contact between formality and materiality cannot be achieved on the basis of the formal. 
One cannot, without regress, establish a rule for the application of a rule. Judgement therefore 
appears as counter-conceptual etc.20 But, it cannot be arbitrary. 
Kant however attempts to recuperate the thought of judgement in terms of another formality. 
Judgement still operates de jure even though it is the jus that is at stake in judgement. The 
apparent intervention of a mode of production irreducible (except under special circumstances) 
to the hylomorphic and transitive-summarised in the two slogans-is interpreted as yet another 
intervention of the law formal production. This intervention is supposed to avoid the regress 
already suggested as the fundamental problematic of the late phase of critique. It does this by 
appealing to judgement not as the form of the relation of transcendental and empirical, but as the 
form of the relation of the faculties of the transcendental and the empirical (the higher and lower 
faculties) . 
The problem of how to get formal rules (concepts, laws etc.) into contact with what they must 
form is side-stepped in this argument of the third Critique. An evasion that is particularly 
awkward because the problem-generating formality intensifies as formality recedes into 
transcendence. 
The problem of regression is not so easily foreclosed. The capacity of judgement to bring 
understanding and imagination into contact is more problematic that that of bringing concept and 
intuition into contact. This capacity could only be even begun to be understood in terms of the 
production theory of the slogans of intransitive production. Instead though, the meta-
transcendental capacity of judgement to manage the faculties is presented by Kant as the 
explanation for these slogans, and as the reason the slogans should not be taken productively but 
formally. 
20UI stop my ears: I do not want to hear any reasons or arguments about the matter. I would prefer to 
suppose that those rules of the critics were at fault, or at least had no application, than to allow my 
[aesthetic] judgement to be determined by a priori proofs." (§33) 
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Production Regression 
The first Critique brought together the refractory transcendental components by configuring the 
interzone of judgement and imagination as a site of exchange. Since all representations are of 
inner sense, time was suggested as that which was common to both concept and intuition, and 
therefore that which could serve as a neutral medium of exchange between the two, readily 
converting concepts into intuitions through the process of subsumption, and ensuring 
transcendental liquidity . It has been suggested that the whole of the' Analytic of Principles' can 
be seen as a third deduction (supplanting both others, and only questionably coherent with them). 
The constitution of experience is only finally consummated in the rigorous demonstrations of its 
time-determination through judgement as site of exchange.21 
The problem with this strategy is that it permits the communication between the formal and the 
material to take place only on the basis of the formal, in this case, the form of inner sense. It is 
this presupposition of the formal, as the basis on which interaction between the formal and its 
representatives can occur at all, that Kant comes to see as increasingly problematic. It emerges 
as particularly important when Kant tables the objectives of the third Critique. In the 
introductions he suggests that transcendental forms, thought in the way of the first Critique, are 
not able to introduce that order into matter that would allow experience to be constituted at all. 
This scepticism about the efficacy of transcendental formality implicitly attacks the basis of the 
efficacy of the transcendental. This basis is in the doctrine of the schematism posing a site of 
exchange in and through which the privileged representatives of form and matter come into 
productive contact. Further, this site is itself based on the supposition that form and matter come 
into contact only on the basis ofform. Form acts both as object of exchange (concept) and 
medium of exchange constituting a "common form" or currenc/2 operating between form and 
matter. If there is, in the third Critique, a critical interrogation of the production capacity of the 
formal, then this attack must be based in an interrogation of the ground of this production, the 
site of exchange that straitjackets becoming into formal exchange. 
21Paul Guyer in his Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987) 
argues that the thesis of time-determination performs a far more successful 'deduction' than the 
deductions themselves. 
22Kant makes the comparison between continuous magnitudes (most especially time) and money 
thought as independent from its instantiation in a particular symbolic medium at A 170-1; B212. 
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What is role of this site of exchange? The material (or its proximal representatives) must-and 
this must is a transcendental one according to the arguments of the First Introduction to the third 
Critique-be marshalled appropriately by the formal, and it can only be so on the basis of being 
already pre-constituted as formal or formalisable. In the first Critique, this preformation of 
matter is associated with the gender characteristics of sensibility. Labour is distributed sexually 
throughout the first Critique according to a disjunction between male / female = spontaneous / 
receptive. The first Critique opens however with a problematic shifting of this the exclusive 
nature of the disjunction. The transcendental Aesthetic is the demonstration that even the lower 
receptive faculty of sensibility has formal characteristics. In many ways the aesthetic is one of 
the more compelling of the specific transcendentals Kant suggests, through its rigorous 
connection with geometry as synthetic a priori science. Nevertheless, the imputation of relative 
activity and spontaneity to the essentially receptive faculty of intuition, is paradoxical in view of 
the need for an rigorous specific distinction between spontaneous and receptive as representatives 
of form and matter, transcendental and empirical. 
This paradox is, however, very necessary, because it performs the readying matter for its 
productive interaction with form enabling it to generate experience as a system (that is as 
experience at all). It is a form of intuition that smoothes out the edges of contact and lubricates 
the process of exchange by pre-submitting matter to form. This is the core of the issue: to be 
formed at all, matter must be pre-formed. This preconstitution of the material on the basis of the 
formal is itself the basis of the problem of regression. 
Three things show that it was a problem how form and matter could come into contact at all. 
First, the need for the schematism in the first Critique. Second, the-possibly complete-
rethinking of the deductions on the basis of a theory of formal time-determination of 
experience.23 Third, the whole problematic of the third Critique. To the extent that this problem 
is a problem then it is not at all solved by suggesting that form must come into contact with 
BOn Guyer's hypothesis. Guyer demonstrates that the time-determination thesis had been active in 
Kant's thought for some time, and was hijacked by the deductions only at a relatively late stage. OnE 
might also add that Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science can be seen as performing 
even a fourth attempted deduction, this time using spatial-determinations (and getting closer to 
Newton). 
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matter at another (difficult) level before the primary contact can be thought. The first Critique 
glosses this issue over by demoting the problem from the status of an effective specific 
distinction to a sub-problem fit only for notes. It moves from the central transcendental 
distinction between concept and intuition to the level of a question of the internal constitution and 
differentiation of the faculty of intuition, itself a de-valorised faculty of sensibility, a 'lower' 
faculty. 
The third Critique clearly acknowledges the failures of the first Critique in this respect by re-
instituting an interrogation into the interaction of form and matter. But the solution that Kant 
attempts to give when he interprets the two slogans of conformity to end and law without end and 
law as representing the form of law and end, is the same solution as the first Critique. The 
question of prime interest-the resolution of the scepticism about the transcendental and 
production-is evaded again by proposing that form may be brought into contact with refractory 
matter on the basis of matter having been previously subjected to form. Kant writes in §22 
(remark) of the third Critique that whilst in poetry the imagination enjoys complete freedom, in 
the plastic arts, which presuppose a given aesthetic object, it is to some extent constrained. He 
goes on the suggest that the objects of plastic art 
may lend to [an die Hand geben konne] the imagination just such a form of the 
arrangement of the manifold, as the imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely 
project in harmony with the general conformity to law of the understanding. 
(translation amended). 
This passage is a crucial turning point. From this account of maximally free art (poetry) Kant 
can go in two directions. First, he could go on to suggest the vital importance of the self-activity 
of the imagination in constructing forms of intuition with all the consequences this would have 
for the very idea of formal order. Second, he could go on to suggest that this formality is still 
given. It is the latter course that he takes. In the citation, it is the object that "gives" the order, 
but this is merely a special case of a specific art form. In general, the order is formally given as 
the form of the transcendental relation of the faculties ("free play"). In the case of the mimetic 
arts, the form of the object is given as just that form that the imagination ("in its freedom") 
would have produced itself. In the case of the beautiful as such, the form that the imagination 
produces is (out of all the "arbitrary possible forms of intuition") just that which is capable of 
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conforming to the pre-given law of the understanding, and therefore to transcendently ordered 
fonnality in general. 
At the beginning of the analytic of the sublime Kant, contrasting beauty and sublimity, writes 
that: 
Natural beauty carries with itself a conformity to ends in its form through which the 
object appears to be as if predetermined for our power of judgement (§23, translation 
amended) 
The slogan for the activity of the imagination engaging automatically in this free production-in 
its counter-conceptuality-is rendered merely as a tenn for the preformed nature of matter. 
The system of pure reason in the first Critique is an organism (see above pp. 92f.). By the third 
Critique, this system is explicitly the systematicity of an experience with an ordered hierarchy of 
empirical laws and forms, the possibility of such or any experience; and it has become a 
transcendental problem. The special character of the organism is stated, in the Critique of 
Teleological Judgement to be that it "first prepares the matter that it assimilates" (§64). 
Transcendental production is underwritten by the preproduction of matter to make it amenable to 
the reception of form, as much in the third Critique, and in the first Critique. 
This is, of course, just the structure of argument that emerged from the analysis of the creation 
scene in Milton's Paradise Lost (chapter 2). The regressive tendency of the creation gives way to 
another implicit theory of production whose efficacy has to be suppressed in what passes for the 
creation and is rather a repression-destruction. There (as a summary) the argument went on the 
show the possibilities for explaining what actually goes on in creation; here the point is that even 
this prefonnation presupposes what is to proved, viz. the effective activity of fonn in the 
hylomorphic model. Whilst an account can be given of what does go on in this process, it needs 
the support of a counter-hylomorphic production theory that Kant is on the verge of giving, but 
which he fails to acknowledge in the end. The later results of this chapter will be used to show 
for critique and its subjective privati sed theology what Milton shows for pre-critical 
cosmological theology. Critique will then have provided the resources for the demonstration of 
another transcendental illusion. 
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Systematic Regression 
The last regression that Kant's attempt at the formal recuperation of the production of the 
imagination involves is also the most general.24 Judgement is the faculty that makes possible 
systematic division into parts: Urteilskraft. As such, it oversees not only, as has already been 
argued, the constitution of experience (which Kant argues must not only be a unity, but a 
systematically or organic unity) but also several other even more significant parts of the 
architectonic of transcendental idealism. These include "philosophy as a system" (the title of <)[1 
of the First Introduction to the third Critique) which must be divided into parts ("einteilen"). It 
also includes even critique itself, or "our faculty [Vermogen] to cognise a priori through 
concepts" as opposed to "doctrinal philosophy" (<)[2). Kant is particularly insistent about this last 
point. In <)[3 of the introduction Kant directly suggests that an empiricist aesthetics, linking the 
parts of the mind with each other only empirically, would reveal that "the mental powers form no 
system but only an aggregate.,,25 This vocabulary is very familiar throughout the third Critique, 
but especially so in the First Introduction. It usually pertains to setting up of the problem of 
experience as a system (and not as an aggregate) which demands the (apparently enclitic, but 
actually primary) action of judgement to be finally legitimated. For it to be used again in <)[3 
makes it clear that the stakes are still higher than the replacing of transcendental conditions: 
judgement makes possible the systematic division of the powers of the mind, the system of 
critique and doctrinal philosophy. 
Judgement acts autonomously (in aesthetic judgements), according to its own a priori principles, 
and in inter-articulation with the other faculties (between which it forms the link). This is 
equivalent to saying that judgement is, as the condition of possibility of division into 
systematically articulated parts, therefore the condition of possibility of the division of the mind 
into its transcendental parts. It follows afortiori from this that judgement is the condition of 
possibility of its own articulated position in that division of the mind. The autonomous activity of 
judgement as a faculty with its own principles presupposes its prior activity in the constitution of 
the system of the mental powers. The activity of judgement in underwriting systematicity 
presupposes the prior activity of judgement in constituting the first activity. The operation of 
judgement presupposes its prior application. 
24This regression was broached briefly above p. 105. 
25The same vocabulary is repeated in TI[11-12 of the First Introduction. 
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Everything in Kant's account of the mechanism that aesthetic judgement deploys to effect contact 
between transcendental and empirical turns on his account of the guidance mechanism that is 
irreducible to concepts. We have already seen to what extent this mechanism fails to avoid 
regress by re-invoking formality at the crucial moment (of the interpretation of the production 
slogans); and in fact compounds the problem by misrecognising the nature of the transcendent 
and appealing to a faculty psychology. Things are, however, even worse than this. This very 
faculty psychology-even on the most charitable reading that makes the confusion of 
transcendental and empirical a necessary confusion--dearly requires the systematic interaction 
of the faculties as a pre-condition. This pre-condition itself presupposes the prior activity of 
judgement. It is just this type of presupposition that Kant critiques in his account of Hume. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of an informal mode of production in judgement and imagination is vitiated by 
Kant's attempt to re-enclose this production within the formality that caused the problem in the 
first place. The impossibility of this re-enclosure is manifested by the set of regressions (based 
on the primary regression of judgement) that it entails: regressions of faculty, production, and 
self-presupposition-regression of system. To re-submit judgement to the strictures of formality 
is to re-duplicate the hylomorphic structure of transcendental production that Kant himself came 
to mistrust by the third Critique. 
It is worth noting Kant's attempts however because the tactic is a highly general one. In the 
analysis of the production regression above it was suggested that Kant's solution involved the 
substitution of a site of exchange for one of production, a market for a factory. As Marx has 
demonstrated, this movement is a historical one. There have always been markets and there has 
always been production; but they are fractions mixed in a variety of proportions. Marx recounts 
the movement into capitalism proper as one from a phase of manufactures that preserved feudal 
production techniques and whose main characteristic was increasing marketisation, to a 
revolutionisation of the means of production (in fact the institution of perpetual revolution) in an 
industrial-productive phase. The novelty of this phase-the novelty of its mode of production 
and of its perpetuation of revolution-is masked by its apparent continuity with manufactures 
and the feudal through the continuity of exchange. The market generates nothing on its own but 
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the fetishism of the commodity through which production relations are covered over by exchange 
relations. 
Just such a fetishism is at stake in Kant. Kant effaces the novelty of the means of production-
broached briefly in the two slogans for the functioning of judgement and the imagination-by re-
ferring it back to a site of exchange (the schematism or the faculty relations of jUdgement) that 
attempts to present itself as the paradoxical source of productive energy. Production is never 
successfully occluded in Kant's work; but it is restricted to a hylomorphism (corresponding to an 
artisanal mode of production most recently historically located in the feudal) that engenders an 
impossible regression of production into transcendent formality. 
None of the productive problems that Kant raises can be solved by his attempt to shove the in-
formal mode of production of imagination and judgement-that he is compelled at least to con-
template by the counter-conceptuality of judgement-back into the formal box of transcendent 
hylomorphic production. What then can be made of thinking the slogans for the activity of 
judgement and the imagination in terms of production, terms to which they clearly lend 
themselves? 
The 'As If 
The encounter of the counter-conceptuality of imagination and judgement with production occurs 
under the aegis of the 'as if'. It is the 'as if' that negotiates the problematic attempt to think the 
mode of production of nature as system: nature must be thought as if it were an intentional 
product. The 'as if' therefore contains the whole thought of a mode of production that is morpho-
genetic and yet whose morphogenesis cannot be referred to an actual concept, existing as 
conscious intention (desire production). The 'as if' itself is guided by a more general theory in 
Kant, that of the analogy. This theory is well worked out (although subject to a series of 
distortions mapped in the following sections), and should not be reduced to the operation of an 
ambiguous literary tropism. 
Analogy in Kant has to do nearly always with production. It is the thematisation of the limitation 
of Kantian critique: that transcendental production is never itself explicitly thought. Analogy 
determines that although the subject of a production may be unknown (even unknowable), 
nevertheless, the relation between the unknown and its product is still the same as the relation 
between some known (the analogon) and its product. This is to say that the non-empirical 
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(characteristically the transcendent, but I shall argue also the transcendental) may still be thought 
as having an empirical mode of production. The distortion of the theory of the analogy 
undertaken in the third Critique is an index of the extent to which Kant began to contemplate 
another mode of production than phenomenal production. 
The Theory of the Analogy 
Kant treats analogy as a rigorous determination of relations. He defines analogy in three places 
in the critical works. The most important comes in the section of 'Analytic of Principles' in the 
first Critique that derives significant transcendental results from the notion of analogy, the 
'Analogies of Experience' themselves. There Kant distinguishes the philosophical analogies from 
the more rigorous mathematical analogies: 
In the latter they are formulas which express the equality of two quantitative relation, 
and are always constitutive; so that if three members of the proportion are given, the 
fourth is likewise given, that is, can be constructed [konstruiert werden kann]. (A179; 
B222) 
The point is simple: in a quadrilateral of proportion where A is to B as C is to x, x is exactly cal-
culable. This has transcendental significance in that the first two sections of the Analytic outlined 
the functioning of two mathematical schemata (the 'Axioms of Intuition' and the 'Anticipations 
of Perception') that are constitutive in the transcendental sense, constitutive of experience. The 
Analogies (and the Postulates) however, are dynamic, and not mathematical, and hence are 
"merely regulative" (AI80; B223). What is this regulative, transcendental and philosophical 
thought of analogy? Kant goes on the say: 
In philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative 
relations; and from three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the 
relation to a fourth, not of the fourth member itself. (A179-80; B222) 
It is not clear how Kant means to apply this to the case in hand ("Experience is possible only 
through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" A176; B218). The most 
plausible suggestion however is that the general logical unity of a concept is to what is contained 
under that concept as (in a qualitative sense) the unity of the transcendental schemata of a 
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categorical concept is to the manifold of intuition.26 The same relation obtains between the pairs 
(and the relevant schema is necessary connection). 
By initially contrasting the philosophical analogy with the (more rigorous) mathematical analog y, 
Kant risks giving the impression that the philosophical analogy is somewhat less precise. This is 
not at all the case. In the Prolegomena Kant specifically distinguishes his analogy from this less 
rigorous contrast class: 
... knowledge by analogy ... means not, as the word is commonly taken, an imperfect 
similarity between two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between quite 
dissimilar things. (§58; italics added) 
Analogy is therefore distinguished from proportion in that it is not a quantitative relation, and 
from mere inexactitude by the fact that it is not the dissimilar entities that are analogous, but the 
"completely similar" (§58 note) relation. 
The argument here has, up to now, been that the third Critique makes the mechanics of the first 
Critique impossible to sustain. This is something of a heuristic. In fact the theory of analogy 
(which is nevertheless deployed in the third Critique in such a way as to create serious 
difficulties for the first Critique) makes the first Critique problematic even to itself. Guyer's 
hypothesis of a 'third' or substitute deduction in the 'Analytic of Principles' (one reverting to 
Kant's pre-critical thesis of time-determination) already suggests a scepticism on Kant's part 
about the efficacy of the first deductions. What differentiates this 'third' deduction from the other 
two is that it no longer attempts directly to deduce the objective validity of the categories (and 
hence their capacity to be applied productively to experience) from the most abstract agent and 
ideal of transcendental managers, the transcendental unity of apperception. The time-
determination thesis proceeds from the lowest level of transcendental formation: the form of inner 
sense. From the specific difference of concept and intuition (or more generally, transcendental 
and empirical) one could easily suppose that Kant is also sceptical about the extent to which the 
categories are able to interact with the empirical that they are to form. This supposition seems 
validated when Kant writes that 
26Kant writes: "we are justified in combining appearances only according to what is no more than an 
analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts. In the principle itself we do indeed make use 
of the category, but in applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema ... " (A181;B224) 
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the category expresses a function that is restricted by no sensible condition. 
(A 181 ;B224, italics added). 
More generally, the whole doctrine of the schematism can only be understood in relation to the 
rest of the first Critique as an add-on that effects the problematic productive contact, and 
without which contact would not be possible. 
The theory of analogy however vitiates the capacity of the schematism to do this job. The 
analogy obtains between the schema / intuition relation and the concept / instance relation. 
Expanding Kant's account of analogy implies that although the relata are different nevertheless, 
the relation is "completely similar." In this case the relata are as different as possible: the 
analytic a priori of general logic, and the synthetic a priori of transcendental conditions, the 
specific difference constitutive of transcendental idealism. It is however just this relation that 
cannot be the same because empirical concepts can (so Kant argues) refer unproblematically to 
their instances, and transcendental ones cannot. Transcendental concepts need schemata to do 
this for them. However, if the relation between schemata and radical empirical of intuition is the 
same as the relation between general concept and particular, how can it help? Kant writes: 
Appearances therefore have to be subsumed not simply under the categories [i.e. 
concepts] but under their schemata. (AI81;B223) 
The schemata can contribute nothing to this process if they are thought, as the rigor of the 
analogy dictates, as subsuming in just the same way as concepts of logic: they would themselves 
need another schematism for proper application. This is just the regression problem that Kant 
had used to introduce the necessity for the schematism and hence for the 'third' deduction; the 
regression problem whose extent is so vastly increased by the third Critique. It is important that 
even in this early instance of the use of the analogy, it fails. The analogy is Kant's attempt not to 
think transcendental production at all; and its breakdowns attest to the importance of such a 
thought. 
In the third Critique-awkwardly, given the importance of the term, very near the end of the 
Critique o/Teleological Judgement-Kant gives another definition of the analogy that sum-
marises both the previous definitions as well as bringing out what was implicit in them; that 
analogy has to do with production: 
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Analogy, in a qualitative sense, is the identity of the relation subsisting between 
grounds and consequences-causes and effects-so far as such identity subsists 
despite the specific difference of the things, or of those properties, considered in 
themselves (i.e. apart from this relation), which are the source of similar 
consequences. (§90) 
In the first Critique, the 'Analogies of Experience' are concerned with legitimating the objective 
validity of necessary connection, that is, with the (transcendental) production of empirical 
production as mechanical causation, that is, with the production of production. In both the 
Prolegomena and the third Critique, the definitions occur in the context of understanding the 
mode of production of God the creator, that is, the (itself strictly, although with Kant more 
problematically, transcendent) mode of production of the transcendent. In the Prolegomena 
Kant directly connects this with the 'as if:' 
When I say, we are compelled to regard the world as ifit were the work of a highest 
understanding and will, I am really saying nothing more than: as a clock, a ship, a 
regiment is related to the artisan, architect, commander, so the world of the sense ... is 
related to the Unknown. (§S7) 
This is a provocative juxtaposition: the same analogy warrants both the connection between 
logic and schematism and that between God and artisanal desire production. It becomes very 
clear here to what extent the mode of production of the transcendental is modelled on that of 
production through intentional desire, and what some of the implications of that model are. The 
analogy (in all its rigorous definitions, mathematical-quantitative and philosophical-qualitative) 
specifies the relation of a known to an unknown = x via the identity of this relation with the 
relation of a known A to another known B. This is evident in the case of God's production. It is 
less obvious in the case of the transcendental production of the unity of experience through the 
necessary connection of perceptions. Nevertheless, Kant is quite explicit: even in the case of the 
first Critique, the "fourth member" is neither given, nor can it be constructed from the other 
three members (this happens only in the quantitative instance). This fourth member is the (strict) 
analogue of the unity of the logical concept; it is transcendental unity, the "unity of experience" 
(A 180;B222). The transcendental operator is itself transcendent in just the same way as God the 
creator must be thought as transcendent in his productive relation to the world of sense. 
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Distortion of Analogy in the third Critique 
The third Critique makes this connection the stronger. There, the problematic of the first 
Critique 'Analogies', that of getting the empiricity of intuition into productive contact with the 
unities of the ideal, is transformed into the problem of underwriting a system of nature, i.e. 
nature as such. This is supposed to be solved with reference to an extended an on-going analogy 
between nature and desire. Nature qua system (nature as such) must be thought on the analogy 
of rational desire production, must be thought as if intentional. In the very first section of the 
First Introduction Kant writes that the technic of nature is that where: 
We judge objects of nature as if they were made possible through art [Kunst] 
In its initial formulations this ought to mean that there is something (the Unknown) that stands in 
the same relation to nature as the conscious intention stands to the product of a conscious inten-
tional performance.27 This expansion of Kant's statement sounds too strong. He is, after all, very 
clear that judgement operates only reflectively here (and not in a determinative manner), that the 
compulsion is strictly subjective and not objective and that reflective judgements answer to 
merely regulative ideas, and not constitutive concepts. The strong result is however generated 
just by plugging in the theory of analogy to the 'as if. Kant does indeed use the terms 
synonymously in the third Critique: in the very same section as previously cited he is equally 
happy to make the point by saying that nature is judged "by an analogy with art [Kunst]." The 
analogy demands, provisionally at least, that its terms be thought in a quadrilateral of relation. In 
the case of the Analogies in the first Critique, Kant does not make much of the fourth term 
(Unknown = x). This is doubtless because it forces confrontation with the transcendent nature of 
the transcendental; but in the case of God, clearly one term (God) is not and cannot be known. 
The force of the theory of analogy that Kant uses is always in claiming that the relation may still 
be known-and may therefore be empirical-in the absence of knowledge of the primary 
relatum. 
This view is however provisional; and Kant has good reason for introducing the problematisation 
marked by the distinction between reflective and determinant. The theory of the quadrilateral of 
analogous relations is subjected to a certain topological distortion and translation during the third 
27The later formulations are more complex because Kant clearly has a theory of art which is on the face 
of it irreducible to intentionality; a theory that is itself based on analogy. 
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Critique. These distortions range from instructive confusion to almost complete abandonment. 
One can see the necessity for these distortions from the association between the use of analogy in 
the first Critique, that in the third Critique (which marks an expansion of the problematic raised 
by the first Critique) and the guiding primary exemplar of the analogy: God. Kant maintains his 
'critical' posture toward God through the analogy: God may not be sensibly determined, but 
God's (productive) relation to the sensible may, and it is artisanal. When the analogy is 
reapplied to describe transcendental production, in the 'Analogies' of the first Critique, this 
becomes unsustainable. The way in which transcendental and conceptual unity processes 
perception to become experience is supposed, if the theory of the analogy is taken seriously, to 
mean that transcendental production is of just the same type of logical production. The 
imposition of the formal unity of the concept of necessary connection (and especially cause and 
effect) is just the same as the formal unity of a logical concept. The only difference, on the theory 
of analogy, would be that the agent of transcendental unity would itself be fugitive (temptingly, 
transcendent). This clearly does nothing to address the specific difference between analytic a 
priori (and the subsumption of particulars under purely logical concepts) and the synthetic a 
priori (and the production of experience through the imposition of the transcendent[al] unity of 
the categories). It is difficult to think of a more foundational distinction for transcendental 
idealism: without the difference between general and transcendental logic, critique regresses to 
dogmatic rationalism. 
In the third Critique it is the divine desire version of the analogy that is in question: nature 
thought as product of art or desire. Again, it is clear that the rigorous theory of analogy that 
Kant maintains will not do the job. If the theory of analogy is again applied in its rigor, one 
obtains the proposition that there is something unknown that stands in the same relation to the 
world (and most especially to its ordered parts) as and intentional agent stands to the product of 
acting upon that intention. There is only one possibility for such an unknown. It would have to be 
God. If it is God, then Kant has effectively regressed to the pre-critical: explaining not anything 
like the transcendental constitution of nature (taken either reflectively or determinately), but 
simply appealing to a God who is himself transcendent as the origin of order. 
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Instinct 
This is not a result that seems much better than the attempt to make the mode of production of 
the transcendental that of logic; and Kant clearly wants to avoid it. The only way of doing this is 
to compromise the rigor of the analogy. Kant's fIrst attempt to do this comes in his account of in-
stinct [Instinkt], which, if not a central concern of the third Critique, does emerge at strategically 
signifIcant moments; in the section of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement entitled 'Art in Gen-
eral,' for instance. This account compromises and distorts the analogy by eliding the supposedly 
distinct members of the quadrilateral of agents and products: 
By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places 
reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art. For, although we are 
pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constructed cells) a work of art, we 
do so only on the strength of an analogy with art; that is to say, as soon as we call to 
mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that 
it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and it is only to their Creator that we 
ascribe it as art. (§43; italics added) 
The instinctive production of form by animals other than the human is clearly an important in-
stance of morphogenetic production without the ideality of concepts; an instance of production 
that conforms to an end (a morphic product) without an end (concept of that product) being 
present. Kant's account of it also accords with his general theory. We judge ("are pleased to 
call") the products of instinct art not because they actually are, but because we have the 
components needed for technical production (concept and product) although they are not 
distributed in the usual way. The agent of the productive act whose result is the ordered product 
is not the same one as that in which the concept (which alone makes this product artistic or 
technical) is located. 
This move is, of course, just the one that Milton preformed in Paradise Lost: the recession of 
ineffIcacious concepts to a transcendent God coupled with the location of a blind effIcacy at the 
sublunary (or empirical) level (see above pp. I1f.). 
Kant's position is a little more diffIcult, and a little more sophisticated. In general, the theory of 
analogy is not going to be adequate to the task Kant assigns it because it leaves intact the mode 
of production between relata, whilst allowing one of the agents to virtualise (become 
transcendent). But it is the mode of production that is precisely at stake. Thus, the distortions of 
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the analogy. This first distortion makes a preliminary attack on the fundamental problem for 
Kant of the mode of production of the transcendental. Application of the analogy to instinct 
ought to have resulted in a quadrilateral in which some unknown (= x = God here) bears just the 
same relation to the product (of instinct) as a conscious agent does to the product of that 
conscious intention. This is not quite the case in the account that Kant actually gives. If the 
unknown = God were related in just the same way to the product of instinct as desiring agent to 
product, then God would actually produce the produce (this is the implication of the general 
analogy of God's production to intentional production). Here though, God does not do anything. 
The animal is the actual or effective agent; God supplies only the concept, and (to adopt the 
vocabulary introduced in the chapter on Milton) is merely the virtual agent of the action. 
Whatever mode of production can eventually be ascribed to the relations in the second pair of 
relata in the analogy (God and the product) of the analogy, it is not and cannot be identical with 
that in the first pair (agent and product). The responsibility for production has been crucially 
split, as in Milton, between a transcendent manager providing the concept of the form of the 
product, but only that, and an immanent actor, blind, but actually productive. 
The analogy is deeply implicated in Kant's response to the difficulties of specifying the mode of 
production of the transcendental. The existence of distortions of the analogy tells us that Kant 
has at last become sensitive to the inadequacy of leaving the mode of production the same. The 
specific distortion at issue here tells us that transcendental production is first to be thought as 
riven between an inactive formal component and an active informal component. As the 
transcendental marks out its specific ground, distinction from the empirical, it thereby gets 
proportionately more difficult to see how it could ever soil itself with contact with empirical to 
perform its formative labour. What has changed is that Kant is now explicitly addressing a mode 
of production that is irreducible to the (merely) empirical, and, if it is inadequate as yet, is not 
merely transcendent. Kant makes explicit here all the problems that had been implicit in his early 
formulation: that concepts are empty and intuitions blind. Kant's recognition of the problematic 
nature of the analogy is his recognition that transcendental production must be thought and not 
either reduced to another form of empirical or assimilated with the a priori analytics of pre-
critical rationalism. 
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Nature as System: the Organism 
The most extensive shift in this direction of interrogation of the mode of production of the tran-
scendental, the mode of production of order in general, comes at the beginning of the Critique of 
Teleological Judgement. There Kant broaches the problem of the organism. The organism has 
been a constant and excessive difficulty for critique. It is the most striking instance of the sort of 
empirical order that holds Kant's attention increasingly as it becomes impossible to refer such 
order to the transcendental as its source. 
It is also the primary register of vocabulary for describing the relation of reason to itself, and 
hence for the whole guiding conception of the system as opposed to the mere aggregate (see 
above pp. 92f.). After a long discussion about the mode of production of organisms, Kant is 
finally able to conclude that this mode of production can only be thought 
by remote [enifernten] analogy with our own causality according to ends generally, 
[but that] ... [s]trictly speaking ... the organisation of nature has nothing analogous to 
any causality known to us. (§65) 
This passage-at the point of the supposed explanation of the most intense of the problematics 
of (transcendental) order that Kant is addressing in the third Critique, as a result of his 
scepticisms about the efficacy of the forms of the first Critique-breaches the theory of the 
analogy completely. There is no analogue of the causality of the organism. There is no 
producti ve relation of terms (cause / effect; ground / consequent; intention / product; logical 
concept / instance) which relation is identical to the productive relation of the conditions the 
possibility of organisms to the organisms it conditions. Kant finally and explicitly rejects the 
suggestion, so crucial for critique, that the transcendence of a productive term does not mean that 
its mode of production is also transcendent. 
The theory of instinct and that of the organism mark opposed limit-cases of the disruptions of the 
theory of analogy. In the former, a new mode of production is envisaged which merely splits the 
responsibility for morphic production between virtual and actual agents; in the latter a relation of 
the production of organisms to empirical production is denied. The more famous applications of 
the theory of analogy-especially the thought of nature on the analogy of art-provide a context 
for the more compelling positive characterisations of the mode of production of order already 
broached here in the slogans for imaginative production. 
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Judgements of Taste 
The theory of instinct corresponds to what was named as irresponsible creation in Milton's 
Paradise Lost. It provides a starting point for the thought of a mode of production that is on the 
one hand differentiated from the models Kant has been using via the analogy to characterise 
transcendental production, but on the other hand, does not merely suggest that such a mode of 
production is unknowable. Instinct occupies an important position in the third Critique it is 
referred to not only in the theory in §43, but also in the context of God's production at §85 and is 
implicit in the whole account of artistic creation. Kant is aware of the difficulties. To relocate the 
concept in God, or indeed in the transcendent(al)-the formal as such-simply does not solve the 
problem of the capacity of form to act to be the guarantor of order. The whole impetus of the 
theory of analogy changes in the third Critique so that the insufficiency of the persistent 
relocation of fugitive concepts is broached. The demand to which the theory of the analogy now 
responds is that of thinking counter-conceptual production through the inadequacy of the 
analogy of art as desire production. The 'as' in 'Nature as art' means therefore that reference to 
a concept in the production of natural forms is strictly illegitimate, but that such forms can only 
be thought in this way if their traits of formality are to be accounted for at all. 
We have already seen how the two apparently productive slogans of conformity to law and end 
without law or end are recuperated by a reduplication of a transcendental psychology of form. 
We have also seen to what extent this recuperation launches Kant back into the very difficulties 
that he had needed to solve from the first Critique. Conformity to an end without an end is 
thought as the form of end-orientedness; and form is thought as the relation between faculties, 
pushing Kant back into a psychologism that he had warned against in the first Critique. This 
move can only perform the task of recuperation by a slippage of meaning between merely 
psychological form (which the argument suggests) and fully transcendental form. The argument 
uses the first to gain superficial plausibility, but really needs the second to keep the reference to 
the formal. The second however engenders the regressive problems caused by the original 
identification of the transcendent with the formal. For Milton's (and the tradition's) account of 
the cosmological regress of concepts-which Kant himself addresses in the theory of instinct-
he substitutes a more properly modem regress of psychological formality. This regress vitiates 
the novelty of the transcendental by boxing it up again in the formalist-psychological 
interpretation of the productive slogans. Given the inadequacy of both of these moves (even 
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within the terms of the problematic that Kant has set up: that of the empirical order) one is 
entitled to suggest the breakdown of the analogy. This breakdown marks the extent to which 
Kant attends to the novelty of transcendental production, and attempts the positive 
characterisation of this mode of production. Such a characterisation begins with the breakdown 
of the analogy in the core of the third Critique, in the theory of aesthetics and aesthetic 
production. 
The slogans should therefore be thought not only as registering the impossibility of thinking em-
pirical order on the basis of transcendental ordering (along with the resigned necessity of doing 
so), but also as suggesting a new mode of production, and hence a new thought of order 
disarticulated from formality. Thus the productive activities of what Kant names as imagination 
and judgement, encapsulated in the two slogans, should be represented not as a mysterious ca-
pacity to approximate to transcendent(al) law and end governed by a metaformality of transcen-
dent(al) psychology-and invoking the necessary preformation of the manifold and the danger of 
regression. Rather they should be understood as references to a mode of production that is 
autonomously morphogenetic. Conformity to an end without an end describes a mode of activity 
that produces immanent morphic structuring and organisation which does not lack a formal 
concept of its order, but has no need of one. 
Reversal: Artistic Production 
This can be seen most clearly in the next distortion to which the theory of the analogy is 
subjected. The beautiful in nature must be regarded as art; the ordered in nature (that is nature as 
ordered) must be investigated as if it really is art. Using the analogy one would expect that this 
must be interpreted as suggesting an Unknown that has just the same productive relation to 
nature as the artisanal producer does to their product, even if this can be thought only 
reflectively. However, we have seen from the analysis of organisms and teleological nature that 
this mode of production is not the same as that of the artisan-though there Kant is blankly 
negative about what this mode of production might actually be. In the analysis of instinct we 
have seen further that one (in fact quite traditional) possibility is that the concept needed 
transcendentally to guarantee order is sundered from its capacity to do anything. A mode of 
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production is therefore tabled within which productive activity is itself split between an inactive 
management and an executive activity that does not know what it is doing.28 
Kant treats the slogans for informal production (conformity to end and law without end or law) 
as expansions of the new mode of production whose presence he acknowledges in the 
breakdowns of the theory of analogy. To regard nature as art is therefore for the site of the 
production of nature (what Kant calls the imagination) to be the site of a mode of production that 
operates without a formal concept of order and without thereby being purely chaotic, in 
accordance with the slogans. 29 To the extent that the strictness of the theory of the analogy 
breaks down, the exact identity between this mode of production and that of art (= requiring a 
concept) is already flawed. That Kant is compelled to go right through to the productive 
interpretation of the slogans for imagination and judgement is made clearer by the next distortion 
(after instinct) that the theory of analogy undergoes. 
When Kant ventures art or technics as the model for understanding nature he often appears to do 
so on the (implicit) assumption that both of these represent simple desire production: the 
production of objects by means of lucid concepts.3D This assumption is however very clearly not 
carried over into the body of the text of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. There Kant has a 
justly famous and completely explicit theory-the theory of the genius-of the mode of 
production of objects of art that precisely does not involve lucid subjective desire production. 
Fine art, the art of the genius, as Kant puts it: 
cannot itself think out [ausdenken] the rule through which it is to bring about its 
product [nach der sie ihr Produkt zustande bringen soil] ... Where an author owes a 
280ne might easily take this for a definition of reflection: as Kant becomes increasingly aware of the 
problems of getting transcendental formality to (inter)act, the transcendental becomes increasingly 
thought only as reflective and strictly transcendent; and transcendental thought is left positing a 
transcendent space for the concepts of order thought as unity. A space from within which they not only 
cannot get their hands dirty, but cannot even perform the relatively clean task of managing. The take-
over of transcendental idealism by reflection is the admission of its inability to account for order in 
terms of conceptual unity. 
29The contemporary term of art for this is antichaos. 
3Dnis is done most often in the First Introduction ('J('J( 1 ;2;5;9; 12) which has very little to say about the 
mode of production of (fine) art. 
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product to genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered his 
head, nor can he ... communicate them to others in precepts (§46, translation 
modified) 
Given that the problem is that of the transcendence of formal and conceptual unity in producing 
formal traits, it is evident that it is this definition of art rather than that of lucid production that 
should be taken as the model for the mode of production of the imagination. To opt for the latter 
is not only to reduce the imagination to operating according to the theory of instinct, but will also 
bring with it all the problems of regression? 
One of the useful consequences of Kant's theory here is that he admits that the very problems he 
identified with pre-critical rationalism apply equally (or at least still apply) to his critical 
transcendental rationalism. Rationalism is, on Kant's reading, condemned to the analytic a 
priori, to saying nothing about the world by reducing sensibility to (confused) conceptuality. 
Variation, particularity and all the functions of a finite sensibility, in a word, the empirical, are 
all counted out. Kant's account of the opposite of genius, the "spirit of imitation" (§47) or 
mannerism, is an account of purely technical lucid desire production, production by means of 
conscious concepts. This means of production is the primary model of the mode of production of 
the transcendental, prior to the third Critique. It permits no originality, and gives no account of 
the empirical formal variety of nature. Without this account, the conceptual forms fail to do their 
job of underwriting the unity of experience. 
More interestingly, Kant actually tries at the same time as attempting to recuperate the formal by 
way of the form of the faculties, to perform the exact opposite of the strategy of the theory of in-
stinct. He refers the rule of the faculty of genius, the residue of formality, precisely not to the 
putative contents of the transcendent divine mind, but to nature: 
Genius is the talent (gift of nature) ... which gives the rule to art (§46, translation 
modified) 
31 Kant, of course attempts a recuperation of this suggestion. Whilst the theory of instinct relegates the 
problematic concept of the order of the product to the avowedly transcendent space of the divine, the 
theory of the genius follows the more sophisticated (more 'critical') path of referring this order to 
psychological formality of the harmony of the faculties. The inadequacy of this has been covered in the 
account above of this harmony in the case of judgements of taste (reception not production). 
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Where the theory of instinct referred the formal guarantor of order qua unity to the 
transcendence of God's concept, the theory of genius refers formality, in a way that means that it 
can no longer be thought as equating order and unity, back to nature. 
This is a complex thought in Kant. Nature is modelled on art. But art should be construed not as 
intentional and dominated by a concept of its product, but as counter-intentional (the work of 
genius). But again, the extent to which this mode of artistic production is governed at all is 
supposed to be the extent to which is natural again. Kant sums up the paradoxical movement of 
this argument by juxtaposing two aphorisms: 
Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be 
termed beautiful where ... it has the appearance of nature. (§45) 
Art is the analogue of nature and nature is the analogue of art. It is clear why Kant has to make 
this move. The terms of his aesthetics demand that beauty be reducible neither to empirical 
sensation nor to rational concept. This demand must evidently be satisfied whether the putative 
beautiful object be natural or artificial. However, this demand obscures some of the complexities 
of Kant's position. The beautiful is a special case of the general supposition that even the 
manifold of nature is produced in accordance with human cognitive powers. This supposition is 
necessary even in the perception of inorganic (and unbeautiful) nature. This general accord is 
thought on the basis of the teleological propriety of manifold nature for humans. Teleology is 
thought on the basis of desire production or art. The harmony of the faculties that determines the 
disinterested pleasure of aesthetic contemplation is at issue in every judgement of nature, and 
even in the very perception of nature. The whole of nature, not some specific part of it, must be 
thought on the analogy of art. The production of nature must be thought, reflectively, on the 
basis of art. 
Similarly, the modelling of artistic production on nature responds to a whole set of 18th century 
aesthetic responses concerning 'naturalism' in art. Kant's theorisation is again more problematic. 
He is again constrained by theory to differentiate the production of fine art from merely 
conceptual production; and his only alternative seems to be nature. The juxtaposition of the two 
thoughts-that nature must be thought on the analogy of art, and art on the analogy of nature-
vitiates both the terms of the analogy. The nature to which Kant appeals as the analogue of fine 
art is already art; and the art to which Kant appeals as the analogue of nature is already nature. 
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There is clearly nothing that could function in either case as the a strict analogue. There is 
nothing that stands to nature in the same productive relation as conceptual intention to product 
(artistic production) because art is itself not conceptual production. There is nothing that stands 
to products of art in the same productive relation as cause to effect (natural production) because 
nature itself is not only a causal nexus, but also a final nexus. 
The use of the 'as if in the third Critique has broken down the stricture of the analogy of the 
first Critique. Kant can no longer suppose that the transcendental tum may leave the productive 
relation of transcendental and empirical to be thought on the basis of phenomenal modes of 
production. Some other thought of production is necessary. The relation of transcendental to 
empirical can no longer be identical with some (analogous) relation of empirical to empirical. 
In the case in point here, Kant is evidently attempting to juggle the only two modes of production 
that are permitted him: mechanical causation and desire production or teleology (God's desire 
production). The mutually question begging status of the double analogy between nature and art 
demonstrates that neither mode of production will suffice either for nature or for art. The only 
other options explicitly open to Kant are either to split the activity between the impotent 
managerialism of the concept and the active blindness of the agent (in the theory of instinct) or to 
resort to the blank negativity of the theory of the organism. 
Neither of these options however suffices. The theory of instinct is useful for suggesting a first 
stage in the dissipation of the theory of analogy. It reconfigures the relation of transcendental 
concept to what it forms into a relation of eviscerated managerialism to senseless activity. One 
might easily say that God's concept represses the immanent activity of animal morphogenesis, 
guiding, controlling, canalising it into the form of the production of objects. Clearly though, the 
impotence of concepts cannot in all rigor allow them even a managerial role. What is more 
important, Kant specifically distinguishes the theory of instinct from the theories of the operation 
of reflective judgement and the productive imagination. In this he goes beyond Milton's analysis 
of irresponsible creation. Judgements of beauty, and products of genius, do not entail any 
reference to determinate concepts; not even to concepts that are episternically inaccessible (God's 
concepts). The problem addressed in the production of nature and of fine art is incapable of 
solution at the level of the theory of instinct. 
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The second limiting option, the theory of the organism, specifically attacks the exteriority of the 
concept in the model of desire production. Until the account of genius in the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement, this exteriority was also an issue in the analogy of nature with art. 
However, after the account of the production of fine art as the art of genius, it becomes clear that 
the relevant analogue of nature is (problematically) not with technical or mannerist art, but with 
genius. The mode of production of genius is one that operates without concepts. Reference to art 
in the understanding of production does not therefore imply exteriority of the concept. The 
resignation of the theory of the organism holds only in the absence of Kant's theory of fine art. 
That there is no mode of production that can account for the production of organisms (and hence 
for systematicity at all) is true only if artistic production is restricted to technical production. 
Kant's own theory of art denies this. One must look again at the peculiar circle of analogies 
condensed in the relations of nature to art. 
What Kant needs, both in the case of the production of nature as system and in the case of fine 
art, is a mode of production that is morphogenetic without subordinating morphogenesis to 
conceptuality and formality. It is the impotence of transcendental form that demands this thought 
of a new type of transcendental production. Kant, however, theorises just such a mode of 
production in his account of the activity of the productive imagination. The Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement goes beyond the Critique of Teleological Judgement in that the former offers at least 
some tentative account of this mode of production. The subjective nature of the finality of nature 
for cognition allows Kant the structure within which to constrain this production to mere 
reflection and to attempt to recuperate it at the level of the subjective form of finality. We have 
already seen the extent to which this reproduces the problems associated with form that it was 
supposed to solve. It also, however, engages him in the positive task of characterising the 
productive capacities of the relevant faculties: imagination and judgement. To which list we may 
now add the mode of production associated with the genius. All three represent forms of 
production in which the origin of order is divorced from conceptuality; or, in the terminology 
Kant develops in the sections on genius, the rule for the production of order is divorced from a 
concept of that order (see §§46ff.). 
It is genius that is the strongest of Kant's characterisations. The scope of imagination and 
judgement is always constrained by the faculty topology. Ultimately what judgement and 
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imagination do is approximate to the understanding and reason. The strategy of such constraint 
is doomed to reproducing the problem of formality, but with genius it is entirely absent. 
Kant's account of genius is famously a compromise between the excesses of the Sturm und 
Drang school and the unoriginality of the mannerist schoo1.32 But the mechanism of that 
compromise, the constraint upon genius, is a surprising one. It is not conceptuality that 
constrains genius.33 Rather, it is taste. Kant's theory of taste is, of course, equally as counter-
conceptual as his theory of genius. The immanently morphogenetic production of form is 
constrained only by the counter-conceptual reception of the aesthetic. 34 This suggestion that 
counter-conceptual production is capable of producing its own constraints is very significant, 
and will be dealt with later in chapter 7. 
The theory of genius is the most developed of Kant's accounts of intransitive production. It 
remains, in contrast to the productive slogans of judgement and imagination, untrammelled by 
formal, transcendent and conceptual constraint. It is, more explicitly than imagination and 
judgement, an account of the production of form without concepts. It begins to complicate the 
thought of intransitive production broached in the slogans by opening it out onto a notion of 
auto-constraint. It is more defmitively located on the side of the material than the faculties. In it, 
nature operates through the human. 
32Ernst Cassirer describes Kant's theory of genius as a "critical solution to the old conflict between 
'genius' and 'rules"'. See Rousseau - Kant - Goethe: Two Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1945), P 87. 
33Kant argues that a concept is indeed required for the production of an artistic object (afortiori, since 
all production of objects requires a concept §§46-8). He goes on, however, to suggest that this objective-
conceptual form to which products of fine art are destined in virtue of being products at all detracts 
from their status as objects offine art (§48). There is a similar passage on the reception of art at § 16 in 
which he distinguishes free and dependent beauty, and argues that dependently beautiful objects (which 
have concepts of ends) are not aesthetic objects at all to the extent that they are dependent on concepts . 
. 14Kant attempts to ignore his own theory of taste when it is acting as a brake on genius. He goes so far 
as to suggest that taste "may belong to useful and mechanical art ... as a product following definite rules 
that are capable of being learned" (§48). This is in complete contradiction to his account of taste in the 
'Analytic of the Beautiful.' 
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The Breakdown of Analogy 
Transcendental idealism is a production theory. Nature is no longer given; it is a product. 
Chapter 3 has already shown that Kant's critical account of empiricism is compelled to think a 
mode of production distinct from mechanical production. Kant went some way, in his critique of 
Hume's account of causation, to effecting this distinction. Transcendental production must 
indeed be specifically distinct from any empirical production. This chapter has shown the extent 
to which Kant's model of transcendental production is lodged in another kind of familiar 
production: desire production, production by means of concepts. The means by which Kant 
insulated transcendental production from critique was the analogy. The structure of the analogy 
constrains transcendent(al) agents of production into empirical productive relations with their 
products. This section has shown the breakdown of the theory of the analogy. This breakdown 
emerges in the third Critique from the reconfiguration of the analogy into the 'as if.' The 
breakdown of the theory of analogy is Kant's recognition that transcendental production must 
also be thought critically, and not modelled on any phenomenal production. 
Kant's first attempts to think a mode of production outside the empirical scope of cause and 
desire-teleology oscillate between merely negative determinations (in the theory of the organism) 
and a traditional displacement of activity (in the theory of instinct); but the theories of 
imagination and genius are serious attempts at least to position an account of another mode of 
production, provided only that they are removed from the recuperative formalism that surrounds 
them. 
Conclusion 
From the start, the rigor of Kant's specific distinction of transcendental and empirical demanded 
the re-application of Kant's critical insights to the architectonic that Kant also developed. As the 
transcendental is at base an account of production, this re-application evidently tends toward a 
re-evaluation of the type of production that Kant uses in his delineation of the transcendental. 
Chapter 3 has already shown the extent to which this question of production can be effaced by 
attending to the exigencies of transcendental difference only in order (problematically) to equate 
transcendental and transcendent. On this argument, the transcendental is merely the impossible 
beyond of an experience or world conceived as homogeneously phenomenal. The impropriety of 
a transcendental production grounded in empirical models is similarly acknowledged only insofar 
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as it follows a fortiori from the general recession of the transcendental into the transcendent. 
This, I have suggested, can only cover up the presupposition of transcendental production; a 
presupposition equally at stake in the re-identification of transcendent and transcendental as in 
their differentiation. 
In chapter 5, I showed that Kant himself was, from around the middle 80s, following another line 
of thought. This line was one of a general scepticism about the efficacy of the particular model 
of production that Kant had up to that point elaborated. What strikes Kant is a compelling 
double-bind: the more refined become the instruments of production, then the more problematic it 
becomes to explain how the instruments can perform at all in the depths of the sub-lunary, in the 
under-depths of the pathological noumenon. Kant here demonstrates an alertness to the alignment 
of the concept of the transcendental with the traditional theological thoughts of spirit, an 
alignment operating along a trajectory of increasing refinement. Thus, the limits of 
transcendental formality in producing an ordered product of nature are severely circumscribed in 
the problematic of the system of nature broached as the primary problematic of the third 
Critique; and the general necessity of the avatars of transcendental formality increasingly to 
delegate actual performance is shown in the problem of the regression of judgement. 
The model of transcendental production that generates these problems for Kant is that of desire-
production; the key issue, that of the origin of form, or as Kant would have it, stability. Just as 
the product of artisanallabour is formed by the concept of that product in the mind of the artisan 
(Kant's definition of desire), so the form of nature, or forms within nature, are produced by 
transcendental concepts that imprint their form on nature. This is hylomorphism. The order of 
nature is explained by referring to an isomorphic transcendental order at the level of law, concept 
and form, projectC?d from transcendental subjectivity. The mode of production of the order of 
nature as product is artisanal. Kant specifically differentiates the mode of production of the 
transcendental from mechanical causal explanation only at the cost of the primary invocation of 
another familiar model: desire. 
This chapter has shown that Kant's dissatisfaction with this mode of production led him not so 
much to capitulate to the identification of the transcendental with the transcendent, but to 
introduce another mode of production: intransitive production. This operates with a tendency 
toward morphogenesis without the morphe being determined by a prior mental or transcendental 
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concept, and without regression to a merely mechanical production. Clearly the potential of this 
thought for disruption of Kant's architectonic means that ultimately Kant tries to subordinate 
this thought to desire production. But this chapter has also shown that this can only happen 
through re-implicating production in the very formality that stimulated Kant's own scepticism in 
the first place. 
To understand the significance of this new mode of intransitive production, two types of 
empiricism must be distinguished. So far I have followed the general pattern of argument 
outlined in chapter 3 by suggesting that Kant's appeal to empirical models for the transcendental 
begs the question of the transcendental. This is the way that critique can be re-applied to Kant's 
(uncritical) architectonic. This very general rubric covers two quite distinct tendencies. On the 
one hand there is the general assimilation of empirical with the world of objects, what Kant calls 
specifically the phenomenon. In this schema, the transcendent(al) is just the (effacedly 
productive) condition of the empirical (phenomenal, on tic ), and is itself not empirical at all. The 
rigorous application of this axiom to Kant's work generates an identification of transcendental 
and transcendent, since the transcendental is nothing empirical, and the empirical is all that there 
lS. 
On the other hand, there is the argument that critique is an account of production, and that such 
an account fails in general if it presupposes its own products. Thus, Kant's critique of Hume can 
be simply summarised as saying that Hume presupposes the prior constitution of causation (in 
the causal tendency of the mind to spread itself) in his attempt to account for the production of 
causation. Or: Kant's account of the production of nature fails if and to the extent that such 
production is modelled on (and therefore presupposes) empirical products (of nature) that it is 
supposed to explain. Kant is well aware of the fact that transcendental production cannot be 
mechanical and goes some way to avoiding regression to British empiricism; the theory of the 
analogy demonstrates the extent to which he nevertheless felt that appeal to desire was 
appropriate in the contexts of transcendental (critical), transcendent (theological) and empirical 
(voluntary) productions. 
In the first case-the alliance of representation theory and negative critical theology-the 
empirical is equated with the phenomenal and the transcendental is simply its impossible and 
impossibly conditioning other. According to this alliance, empiricism is simply the failure to 
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observe the (impossible) necessity of the transcendental, and is always naive and pre-critical. In 
the second case, it is the presupposition of products in the account of the production of those 
products that it at stake. Where empirical nature or the phenomenon is the product, then the uses 
of phenomenal models for the production of nature qua phenomenon need to be rooted out. But 
where transcendental is equated with form, concept and law, the empirical is not at all exhausted 
by phenomenal products. The empirical is (also) the informe. There are thus two empiricisms: 
dogmatic pre-critical empiricism, that operates only at the level of the phenomenon, and critical 
or transcendental empiricism: materialism. 
This is important here because of the differential trajectories of the two interrogations of 
Kantianism. I have already remarked at length how Kant's concept of the transcendental is in a 
line of refinement from the theological concept of spirit. The first line of development continues 
this process of refinement. Refinement of the subjects of transcendental theology however only 
exacerbates the problems that Kant finds with the efficacy of his transcendental production. The 
second line, on the contrary, sees this refinement is the source of the difficulty, and is confronts 
the project of deciphering a production that neither presupposes its own products, nor operates in 
the vector of theological refmement. 
The structure of neo-theological refinement is the presupposition of order. Empirical 
(phenomenal) order is explained by the 'hypostatisation' of order at the level of the theo-
transcendental. The transcendental thus presupposes its products because its agents of 
production are distillations of phenomenal formality (the form of the phenomenon as such, or 
formed phenomena). Critique-not presupposing products in their production-thus involves 
simultaneously a mode of production that is not phenomenal, and one that whilst not itself formal 
produces form, is morphogenetic. The production of nature is the production of the form of 
nature in a sense that negotiates the space between the production of the form of nature as a 
whole (in a transcendental sense mobilised by Kant in the first Critique) and the production of 
form in nature (in the quasi-transcendental sense mobilised in the third Critique). The production 
of form makes uncritical presuppositions to the extent that the production of form is 
presupposed (derives from the product) and to the extent that the production ofJorm is 
presupposed (distilled from the product). 
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This is the mode of production that Kant summarises in his accounts of the functioning of the 
imagination and genius. Their mode of production is not modelled on any phenomenal 
production; but nor are they refined transcendentals producing order in the phenomenon only by 
being pure order themselves. Not being based in the phenomenon here in no way implies 
recession into the transcendent (although Kant tries quite hard to put the imagination into a 
super-formal transcendental realm of faculty refinement). Kant always aligns such production 
with the more informal, with sensible faculties. Such empiricism can only be thought on the 
basis of a pre-phenomenal empiricity (rather than a phenomenal one), or as the re-configuration 
of the noumenon. 
In this respect Kant is similar to Milton. Both start from a premise of materiality shorn of 
activity and morphic traits, only to end up compelled to think a kind of active materiality. In 
Milton's case the Chaos and wilde erness) of the poetry, as opposed to the dead matter of the 
theological writings; in Kant's case the spontaneously morphogenetic activity of the sensible 
faculty of the imagination in the aesthetic writings as opposed to the dead matter of the 
theoretical writings. It is Schopenhauer's great merit to have concluded from the structure of 
Kant's aesthetics a noumenology of the will. 35 
Kant's objections to hylozoism (the tradition's name for active matter theory) can be understood 
in this context. Hylozoism is defective in that it attributes material activity to the phenomenon. 
This would clearly presuppose the constitution of the phenomenon in its own production, in the 
same way as modelling transcendental production on desire does. Kant is right to object to this. 
No such objection however functions against transcendental or noumenological active matter 
theory. 
Clearly such a mode of production cannot produce a transcendentally ordered and stable nature 
of the kind that Kant sought from the start to use transcendental idealism to underwrite: 
intransitive production cannot simply be inserted into the position previously occupied by 
transitive production in the first Critique. 36 This raises the question of accounting for and 
explaining the status of apparently stable structurings, and of their theorisations in 
35Although Schopenhauer misrepresents the influence of Kant's aesthetics on his developmentr4" ~e. 
concept of the will. 
J6This is something that Schopenhauer was perhaps flot so attentive to. 
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transcendental idealism. Active matter or intransitive production must first subject itself to auto-
repression to form the dead matter that in tum demands the spiritual or transcendental as a 
source of pure order, and which must then be applied to dead matter to underwrite stability. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: General Economy. 
Production is intransitive when it no longer takes an object. What such production produces is 
not the object. It does not presuppose either a prior matter out of which to produce nor a prior 
form which is the operator of production. Intransitive production is that production which is the 
material. It is the production of the genius that makes law and form; laws and forms, which if 
they are followed instantiate only reproduction and not production. The laws of the genius are 
for only another genius that breaks them to make new forms. Intransitive production is the 
production of the imagination as material faculty, as the power of matter. The producti ve 
imagination is intransitive and hylozoist; the reproductive imagination is transitive and 
hylomorphic. Reproduction presupposes production. Transcendental idealism is reproductive. 
Transcendental production is intransitive production; it is wild or wanton synthesis. 
Law and desire are from the first transcendentally ideal. They already, even in their 'empirical' 
formulations as jurisprudence and intention, presuppose a spirituality divorced from the 
empirical whose limit case is the full negativity of the transcendent. Transcendental idealism is 
the truth of law and desire: the complication of theology operating in a trajectory of infinitised 
refinement. Transcendental production was only differentiated, in Kant's architectonic, from 
empirical production on condition that empirical production be thought as mechanical cause, and 
transcendental production modelled on desire production under the general rubric of production 
of objects by means of concepts and guided by the theory of the analogy. These thoughts of the 
empirical themselves presuppose a whole history of material production. 
Production by means of concepts is a mode of production identical with that Milton characterised 
as responsible production: it is simultaneously lucid (conceptual) and efficacious. The 
transcendental faculties, as sources of concepts, suffer from the same incapacities as Milton's 
Socinarian God: pure lucidity of reason (emptiness) at the price of narcissistic loss of productive 
contact with the real or a productive efficacy increasingly devolved on a base faculty, the 
imagination, whose production is essentially akin to Kant's description of intuitions: blind. 
The exacerbation of the tendency towards refinement marks out the modernity of Kant's 
manoeuvre: even an impotent lucidity is too much to hope for in the end. But equally, by the 
third Critique, the blindness of the imagination is no longer the result of a blinding which then 
demands vision from elsewhere (concepts, reason). It is, as we have seen, a produclh'e blindness. 
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It is difficult to disengage this thought in Kant from his attempts to nullify it, and to re-introduce 
formality (desire) as the primary operator of production. To the extent that one can perform this 
disengagement, the result is that the notion of transcendental production that Kant sets up from 
the start as his problematic, is to be identified with the mode of production not of the 
understanding but of the imagination. But this has severe repercussions on the critical system. In 
Kant's aesthetic vocabulary, transcendental order is mannerist: it involves merely the following 
of rules, not their production. It is reproductive. An account of the production of rules, which 
does not just presuppose such rules or order at another level of refinement, refers order to a 
morphogenetic informality that can produce only levels of transience. Order is produced only so 
that it can be the raw material of another and new production of order: the audience for a genius 
is another genius. 1 
This mode of production cannot underwrite just that transcendent formality after which Kant 
lusts. Insofar as this mode of production is the result of a critique of what Kantian critique leaves 
unproduced (formality), it cannot therefore be identified with Kantian critique. Kantian critique 
criticises ancient, cosmological and dogmatic attempts to underwrite stability; but it objects not 
so much to the attempt but to its naive execution. The soul, for instance, is subject to criticism 
only to have its function taken over by a pure form: that of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. This kind of critique redeems what it purports to critique, but at a higher level of 
sophistication. Critique of formality does not support transcendental formality, as a simple 
extension of critique, but attacks it. I propose that this critique be called eliminative2 as opposed 
to redemptive. 
Concepts are, according to eliminative critique, paralogistic understandings of the immanent 
morphogenetic capacity of matter, separating matter from what it can do. To put the point in 
another, but not less Kantian, way: pure concepts are a fetishism of exchange that presents media 
as productive by masking their industrial-productive base. Eliminative critique responds to the 
modern explanatory anxiety generated by the cognitive hegemony of mechanical causation-its 
incapacity to even notice complexity-not by repeating refinements of the argument from design, 
ISee Gould, Timothy 'The Audience of Originality' in Cohen & Guyer (Eds.) Essays in Kant's 
Aesthetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) pp. 179-93. 
2The term is intended to resonate with the analytic philosophical project of eliminati\'e materialism. 
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but by rethinking the notion of the empirical. God and the concept are not recuperated at another 
level by this, but explained elirninatively. The importance of the critical notion of a production 
that does not presuppose the products it is supposed to constitute lies in the extent to which it 
brings Kant's formalist recuperation of theology into question. Hylomorphic production 
presupposes the formal or ordered constitution of nature that it is supposed to explain. It does 
this almost by its concept: the morphe. Clearly imaginative production cannot be identified with 
mechanical-causal production. But that is not the primary issue. From the start of Western 
thought, order has always been thought as concept: morphe or eidos. Kant does essentially the 
same: arguing from ordered products to a form lucidly and efficaciously responsible for that 
formality. This is barely distinct from the argument from design: God and the concept are merely 
the repositories for an order that cannot be assigned to nature. 
Natura naturans worries Kant: it is the nature that threatens Kant's system, and provides the 
problematic for the third Critique. It is 'Nature wild above rule or art', Milton's paradisiac 
complexity. This nature cannot be God's nature, cannot be responsible, cannot be nature 
subordinated to the concept. The mode of production of this nature is that of the imagination: 
immanent morphogenesis. Kant points to some appropriately Miltonic exemplars in his analytic 
of the beautiful: most particularly the morphic but irregular nature of foliage. 3 The history of the 
English garden-Milton's model for Eden a century earlier-is instructive in this respect.4 The 
requirement of a constant expenditure of energy for the maintenance of the classical horticulture 
of the 17th century is evident. Nature tends to decay away from externally imposed-
-'''Flowers, free patterns, lines intertwining simultaneously without any intention-termed foliage-
mean nothing, do not depend on a definite concept, but are nevertheless pleasing" (§4, translation 
amended). 
~The example is by no means trivial. It has been argued that the history of English landscape gardening 
is a specific prolepsis of the general tendencies of European romanticism: "Landscape gardening ... 
seems a topic fairly remote from philosophy; yet at one point, at least, the history of [it] becomes a part 
of any truly philosophical history of modern thought. The vogue of the so-called "English garden" ... 
was after 1730 ... the thin end of the wedge of Romanticism ... , In one of its aspects ... Romanticism 
may not inaccurately be described as the conviction that the world is an englisher Garte" on a grand 
scale." Arthur 0 Lovejoy The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1936 & 
1964) pp. 15-16. 
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transcendent--orderliness, but not in the direction of a simple and linear transition to a state of 
maximum entropy. Rather, the 'decay' of the garden in the absence of an effort to order is 
'chaotic' only from the point of view of that order. The English tradition of landscape gardening 
harboured this notion of morphogenetic decay, especially in the grotto. Kant mentions precisely 
this aspect of the English garden in the important transition passage from the beautiful to the 
sublime. There he writes: 
Thus the English taste in gardens, and fantastic taste [Barockgeschmack] in furniture, 
push [treiben] the freedom of the imagination to the verge of the grotesque--the idea 
being that in this divorce from all constraint [Zwang] of rules the precise instance is 
being afforded where taste can exhibit its perfection in projects of the imagination to 
the fullest extent. (§22 Remark) 
Such gardens display a " ... wild [wilde] and in its appearance quite irregular [regellose] 
beauty ... " (ibid.) and manifest 
... nature subject to no constraint of technical rules [keinem Zwange kiinstliche Regeln 
unterworfen ist], and lavish ... in its luxuriant variety [Mannigfaltigkeiten] (ibid.) 
The suggestion is that a beautiful object displaying a formality or orderliness reducible to a 
concept of form, is the less beautiful. Corresponding to the slogan of purposiveness without a 
purpose, one must add the slogan of an order irreducible to form. Such order-immanent 
order--can be presented as homologous with transcendental order only in virtue of abstraction 
from change. Kant's attempts to reconcile this mobile order with the demands of the 
transcendental order-that order "which is the constant requirement of the understanding" 
(ibid. )-have already been detailed. In fact he attempts not only a reconciliation, but tries to 
make the productive imagination--correlate with wild nature-the very form of formality. 
Having seen intricacies of the failure of that attempt, it is now possible to see how globally 
misplaced it is. This emerges particularly from the arguments of the analytic of the sublime, 
arguments that exacerbate the wilderness of nature addressed above in Kant's comments on the 
irregularity of the beautiful. 
Kant's arguments in the sections on the sublime are scandalously inadequate, and betray further 
the inadequacy of his arguments about the beautiful. This scandal is only proliferated by the 
recent fashion of assigning the sublime the role of key-stone not only of Kant's critical work, but 
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also of a painterly high modernism construed as an essentially stymied fonnalism. 5 The scandal 
of the sublime is that it vitiates the point of the analytic of the beautiful. The point of the 
beautiful is to show that, and under what productive conditions, there is systematic order in the 
empirical contingency of natural laws. That there are beautiful objects demonstrates to us that 
the manifold is teleologically fit, final, for our faculties. Beauty is the unfonnulable but 
irrefutable evidence we have that science is possible and nature domesticated in our own hearth. 
The manner of this final fit is that beautiful forms in nature is that it stimulates just that 
resonance of unemployed (non-final) faculties that produces fmality and conceptuality (order). 
But the sublime is, Kant says, the reverse of this. Far from being final for our faculties it is 
"contra-final" (§23 as opposed to just not final), it perpetrates an "outrage on the imagination." 
(§23) The essence of the argument of the sublime is that even in this case-and it appears to be 
just the worst one possible-nature is final for our faculties: final in virtue of its very contra-
finality.6 
But Kant cannot have it both ways: if the analytic of the beautiful is to be doing something, is an 
essential and not peripheral part of critique, then it cannot be simply trumped by the sublime 
which appears to show that nature is final for us anyway, in the worst case scenario. And if the 
real argument is in the sublime-and this is very unlikely because sublimity is merely subjective, 
and not even reflectively subjective-then the beautiful is otiose. But if it is a real question-
and elsewhere Kant certainly seems to think it is, in the introductions, Kant paints a viscous 
• 
5The notion of the sublime as the presentation of the unpresentable (condition of presentation) was 
already a theme of Longinus, and clearly appeals not only to Kant, but to the extenders of negative 
critique. See Longinus On the Sublime trans. with commentary by James A Arieti and John M Crosset 
(New York: Methuen 1985) and, for example, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 'Sublime Truth' in Jean-
Fran~ois Courtine [et all Du Sublime (Paris: Editions Berlin 1988) trans. by Jeffrey Librett as Of the 
Sublime: Presence in Question (Albany, NY: State University of New York 1993), pp. 71-108, 
especially p. 74: "the canonical definition of the sublime: the sublime is the presentation of the 
nonpresentable." 
6Kant writes that: "the want of finality in our faculty of imagination is still represented as final for ideas 
of reason." (§27). Similarly, the faculties, in the estimation of sublimity are "harmonious by virtue of 
their very contrast" (§27). 
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picture of what experience would be like without such fmality, it wouldn't even be experience-
whether nature is final for us, the argument of the sublime is extremely unconvincing. 
The productions of the imagination cannot be just those forms which the understanding already 
harbours. If they were, they would not need to be produced by the imagination; and the aesthetic 
would be irrelevant. Kant admits this when he writes: 
Self-subsisting natural beauty reveals to us a technic of nature that show nature in the 
light of a system ordered in accordance with laws the principle of which is not to be 
found in the range of entire faculty of understanding. (§23) 
Kant can legitimate morphogenesis only on condition that the order he characterises is no longer 
that of the transcendental. But the importance of nature as imaginative art (that is as art without 
a concept) is greater than this. The contra-final effects of what in nature gives rise to the feeling 
of sublimity are described in terms almost identical with those that in the section preceding had 
described the mutations of the beautiful in the englisher Garten: "nature in its .. wildest and 
most irregular disorder [wildesten, regellosten Unordnung]" (§23). Nature as beauty and nature 
as sublime are in a continuum. The specific difference that ought to obtain between them 
(finality / contra-finality) obtains rather between the transcendental as such (the understanding) 
and nature. The understanding is order thought as transcendent formality. Nature as 
morphogenetic imagination is itself a capacity to produce order thought as immanent to nature. 
This order, even at its maximal extent, is irreducible to a transcendental geometry of form (from 
which concepts would be constructable); it is, as Kant shows in the comments at the end of the 
analytic of the beautiful, an always mobile order. This order descends smoothly to zero (the 
sublime) but is always positive: it is the intensive gradient of the fluid. 7 Whatever frightens Kant 
in the sublime, is equally at issue in the beautiful. 
7In §27 of the third Critique Kant argues that "in an aesthetic estimation of magnitude the numerical 
concept must fall by the wayside or undergo a change" (italics added, translation amended). This new 
notion of number had already been introduced by Kant in the first Critique where he argued that the 
real in experience (sensation) must be thought as an always positive continuous magnitude capable of 
graduated diminution to zero (,Anticipations of Perception' A166f; B207f). This continuity Kant names 
imensive. Its first association is with the dynamics of fluids, and most especially that fluidity that is 
time. (A170; B212). 
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The fluid dynamics of Milton's wilderness / ocean are therefore by no means absent from the 
critical works. In the first Critique Kant writes of the critical task that the nihil ulterius must be 
inscribed 
on those pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the voyage 
of reason may be extended no further than the continuous coastline of experience 
reaches-a coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which, 
after alluring us with ever deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as 
hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour. (A 395-6) 
The most enticing idea in this passage is the paradoxical one of an ocean which is at once 
shoreless and yet has a coastline accessible to us. Milton's Chaos is in a similar topologically 
impossible state, at once boundless, and yet with a gate on the hell-side and a safe vantage-point 
on the heaven-side. God and His attendants "stand on heavenly ground" and view the "vast 
immeasurable abyss" (VII 210-2). Critique, like Milton's God, is equally as hydrophobic as 
hylephobic. The fluidity of the material is anathema to the transcendent(al). 
What is at stake in this phobia? Kant suggests that the disinterested and critically correct 
position from which to appreciate the sublime is one of safety: we may judge the sublime wenn 
uns nur in Sicherheit befinden (§28). This safety is properly transcendental: "a self-preservation 
of quite another kind [i.e. specifically distinct, i.e. transcendental] from that which may be 
assailed and brought into danger by external nature." (§28). But it is associated with that 
difficult interface between the empirical and the transcendental: culture. The necessity of culture 
for the proper appreciation of the sublime is a persistent motif of romantic thought. Kant cites 
the alpinist Saussure in the third Critique, who reports that his aesthetic appreciation of the wild 
mountainous scenery was derided as ridiculous, if not foolhardy, by those who actually lived in 
them, "the Savoyard peasants" (§29). This experience was repeated by the agents of European 
high culture on the expeditions to America in search of such aesthetic experience. De 
Tocqueville remarks in his Journey to America of 1831: 
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In Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds of America, but the Americans 
themselves are insensible to the wonders of nature and they may not be said to 
perceive the mighty forests around them till they fall beneath the hatchet.s 
Kant notes therefore that "without the development of ... preparatory culture that which we call 
sublime would be merely terrifying" and this is what guarantees that "our own position is 
secure" (§28). One must be remote, by means of culture, from the pathologically interested 
condition of possible immersion in the wild; what the early puritan settler John Eliot called 
"wilderness temptations.,,9 
The ocean also features prominently and problematically in Kant's account of the sublime in the 
third Critique. In §23 he asserts, categorically, "the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be 
called sublime," and reasons that "its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored in one's mind 
a rich stock of ideas [culture in other words] if such an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a 
feeling which is itself sublime". But in §29 he asserts, equally categorically: "as to the prospect 
of the ocean, we are not to regard it ... with our minds stored with knowledge [culture again] ... 
as a realm of aquatic creatures or as a reservoir ... but as disturbed, as threatening to overwhelm 
and engulf everything." Culture ("ideas ... knowledge") but equally capital ("stock ... store") is 
necessary for the experience to be sublime in that it ensures the repression of the terrible; at the 
same time it is a repression of the very sublimity of the sublime, in that it deprives the sublime of 
its terrible aspect and reduces it to the banal, the utilitarian, the "commercial.,,10 
One must be, like Milton's God, away from the ocean, at a vantage-point, secure. Yet the very 
existence of such a position already implies the bounding of the ocean which must be 
"unbounded" (§27); which must be a sea without a shore, and opening out onto a coastline, a 
realm, reservoir. The topological ambiguity of both Milton's and Kant's oceans-that they be at 
once unbounded and bounded-responds precisely to this problematic. For there to be a space 
from which even the action of the transcendental God can be performed is for the act already to 
have taken place. That there is a safe place-heaven-side; on the Pillars of Hercules-on which 
S n p. 74; cited in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind Revised Edition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press 1973), p. 23. 
9 Cited in Nash op. cit. p. 29. 
IO§29, and Kant adds, importantly, the effeminate. 
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Kant and Milton may stand is for the wilderness of the ocean already to have been 
circumscribed, preformed. The respective pre-formations of the material that Milton and Kant 
suggest-the circumscription of the universe and the delimitation of the territory from the 
ocean-already presuppose the efficacy of the action of the transcendent agents that is the result 
of the pre-formation. 
Culture is the expression of this impossibility, as Kant's historical writings attest. Culture, or the 
Enlightenment as striving (perpetual task), is, effectively, the historical empirical story of the 
constitution of the empirical: the story of the transcendentally unthinkable emergence of the 
transcendental from the wilderness, of the state from the state of nature. For Kant's history to be 
even possible, the transcendental opening must already, a priori, have taken place. Culture is the 
name for that which is transcendental, but which must appear, per impossibile as empirical. 
Time, history and change within the empirical are thus already subject to the concept. Culture 
elides between that which specifically differentiates the human animal (and is therefore the 
perquisite for the sublime) and that which is only an empirical manifestation of the 
transcendental (and therefore hinders the fully transcendental nature of the human over mere 
nature as such). The opposing currents of causality manifest in the notion of culture-between a 
transcendental causality associated with the concept or telos and an empirical causality-operate 
in different senses. The latter from past to future, the former on the outside of time that is both 
arche and telos simultaneously. The impossibility of reconciling two such accounts haunts 
Kant's history as much as Saussure' S.lI The empirical is always pre-formed for the 
transcendental; that pre-formation is the very pre-act of the transcendental. 
This pre-emptive action of the transcendental has a whole real history inaccessible from the 
position of transcendental security. Milton's God's circumscription of the ocean and Kant's 
(God's) unthinkable teleological propriety of natura naturans for transcendental stability 
(guaranteed as much by its unfitness as its fitness, as befits the irrelevance of the empirical for a 
transcendental argument), are both instances of the pre-condition of ideal production: that it have 
first separated out (in thought, but obviously not in re) matter from its activity: transitivisation. 
It is on the basis of this separation (witnessed by the vocabulary of purity) that the ideal is able 
at least to pose as the source of that energy that it has constitutively appropriated from the 
IISee above chapter 4. 
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material. Although the problem has been at issue since thinking has be °t h dOl 
en, 1 reac e a partlCU ar 
pitch of intensity with Newton. Newton's mechanics definitively theorised dead matter; and the 
correlate of this mechanics was always the God of Abrahamic theology, even before Kant re-
theorised this on the basis of the transcendental. 
Two philosophical models are best suited to understanding this primary separation. The first is a 
version of Freud's hypothesis of narcissism. In the famous essay Freud interrogates his own 
presupposition of the dualism between the ego-drives and the libido. 12 The hypothesis of 
narcissism is that the former are strictly derivative, and not an original source of conflict. Rather 
the ego itself (as the locus of the supposed ego-drives) is constituted by a libidinal investment of 
a particular type to which Freud gives the name of narcissism (this would be the act of primary 
repression); and hence the ego-drives are themselves species of libidinal investment. The 
application here is that God, the representative of the ego, the space of the ideal, the domain of 
pure reason are constituted as a certain type of proto-matter. This provides a way of thinking the 
origin of the supposed efficacy of the ideal. It operates, as does the ego in a later formulation of 
12The whole issue is a complex one basically because Freud's profound sense of conflict, it seemed to 
him, demanded a dualism of the instincts as its explanatory foundation. Thus, although he notes, in the 
paper 'On Narcissism' (1914) [Pelican Freud Library Vol. 11, p. 70] "A differentiation of libido into a 
kind which is proper to the ego and one which is attached to objects," these declarations of an effective 
monism are retracted as "speculative" (p. 69). However, when Freud had managed to develop another 
dualism (between Eros and Thanatos), he was prepared to say what had been at stake in the hypothesis 
of narcissism: in 'The Ego and the Id' (1923) he admits that "[Eros] comprises not merely the 
uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the aim-inhibited or sublimated nature derived from it, but also 
the self-preservative instinct, which must be assigned to the ego and which at the beginning of our 
psychoanalytic work we had good reason [to explain conflict] for contrasting with the sexual object-
instincts" (ibid. p. 380, italics added). Ernest Jones draws attention to Freud's axiomatic reliance on the 
principle that conflict requires dualism in his The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud edited and abridged 
by Lionel Trilling & Steven Marcus (New York: Basic Books 1961) pp. 402ff. Even Jean LaPlanche' s 
otherwise rigorously Lacanian reading admits that: .... .toute sa [Freud's] theorie est fondee sur Ie 
conflict et que conflict implique dualite; il faut bien que quelque chose s'oppose a la sexualite, meme si 
ce terme oppose est defini differemment a tel au tel moment de la pensee freudienne .. o" Vie et mort ell 
ps)'challalyse (Paris: Flammarion 1970) pp 46-7. 
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Freud's, on borrowedforces. 13 But, more importantly, the very zone which is the ideal, is itself a 
torsion of primary matter. Consciousness (the ego) is an auto-induced modification of the 
unconscious: God and the ideal are an auto-induced modification of the wild(erness). Indeed, 
these are the same hypothesis; God is narcissism on the scale of the cosmos. 
Deleuze introduces the vocabulary of synthesis to describe this hypothesis of Freud's: the 
automatically and immanently morphogenetic capacity of the unconscious is synthetic, but 
passive in that it has no transcendent operator. This corresponds with what Freud describes as 
binding. It is only the basis of this synthesis that the active synthesis of the ego is able to get 
started. 14 It is not immediately clear that such a distinction can be made with propriety within 
Freud's texts, but a case-perhaps not quite as rigorous as Deleuze's--can be made. There I~ .'0 
question but that Freud considered the unconscious as active: there is no hint of dead matter. But 
often enough he views it as a pure chaos: that is he associates all organisation (synthesis) with 
the ego, and treats the unconscious as non-synthetic activity: "the repressed is now, as it were, an 
outlaw; it is excluded from the great organisation of the ego,, 15This transcendental distinction 
between consciousness = organisation and unconscious = unorganisation is however never stable: 
Freud goes on, in the passage just cited to suggest that despite its status as outlaw, the 
unconscious is nevertheless "subject only to the laws which govern the realm of the 
unconscious." The id is an outlaw nevertheless subject to its own laws, even "repression does not 
hinder. .. the unconscious from organising itself further, putting out derivatives, establishing 
connections .. .!t proliferates in the dark.,,16 This distinction corresponds rather to two thoughts of 
organisation: the one operated by the ego, and therefore subject to intentionality and the concept 
I3Itself borrowed from Schopenhauer who writes that the will is active; and reason is so only insofar as 
the "will imparts to it the activity that is not inherent in it" especially from the genitals (The World as 
Will and Representation 2 Vols. trans. by EJF Payne [New York: Dover 1969], Vol. 2 § 19, and see also 
§§4;8). Freud's comment comes in 'The Ego and the Id' (1923) ibid. p.364). 
14See Difference and Repetition trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press 1994) pp. 96f. 
Deleuze is analysing Freud's late monism, when even the Eros / Thanatos distinction is on the verge of 
breakdown (from 1920), rather than the 1914 trauma. 
IS'Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety' (1926) op. cit. Vol. 10 chapter X, p. 311. 
16'Repression' (1915) op. cit. Vol. 11, p. 148. 
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(transcendent, active synthesis); the other, outlaw only from the point of view of the ego, having 
no operator and organising itself(immanent, passive synthesis).17 
God is the apparent agent of a repression of prime matter (the real agent being prime matter 
itself, under certain specific conditions) whose result is rather akin to the world of stable 
consciousness and equally stable (genital) libidinal object investments: this is the world of the 
territory and not Milton's ocean / wild(emess). Indeed, the parallel goes right down to the basic 
level. Freud conjectures that the fundamental model for the narcissistic investment constitutive of 
the ideality of consciousness is that of the paranoid libidinal investment of the penis on the part 
of the male child under the threat of castration. It is commonplace amongst Milton commentators 
to pay close attention to the cluster of vaguely structural notions (high and low, up and down, 
rising and falling) surrounding the thought of the fall which recur throughout both the epic and 
its companion; it seems, however, that the spatial geo-semantics of this gesture neglect a primary 
inflection which might be put in terms of flaccidity and turgidity. That is to say that the primary 
contrast with the flabby weaknesses of the fallen in the epic is the erect -standing firmness of 
Jesus's resolve. Milton makes it clear: the loss, the fall is effected by "man's effeminate 
slackness" (XI 634), which is the fall(ing off); the regaining by "one man's firm obedience" 
(Paradise Regained I 4). 
At the same time as the creation is made possible by the repression of an immanent energy whose 
name, Chaos, is only today-with the recent developments in mathematical theory-no longer a 
mere paranoia, and as it becomes evident that God's creative potency is derived, borrowed from 
the energeticism of matter at the moment when the ocean becomes reservoir, at the same time as 
this, the fall is presented on the absolutely primary model of Freudian narcissism: utter paranoiac 
libidinal investment of the penis, erection. What is feared: energetic, active matter and impotence, 
I70f course it would not be possible for Freud to maintain the transcendent equation of unconscious = 
chaos, since the science of psychoanalysis is predicated on understanding the (immanent) laws of the 
unconscious. Most pointedly, the very organisation of the ego itself is just a "modification" of the id 
('Inhibitions etc.' op. cit. p. 248), and therefore even its transcendent organisation is ultimately 
immanent to the unconscious. The merit of the Lacanian school is the rigor with which they deploy the 
search for the organisational capacities of the unconscious. Unfortunately, this rigor leads back to an 
assimilation of order to structure, and hence to a Kantian notion of transcendental organisation. 
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ultimately castration. God is there to provide the resource of an eternal erection against the 
teeming flows of the wild ocean on which it nevertheless depends for its support. 18 
It is not too anachronistic-bizarre as the hypothesis might initially seem-to attribute this 
thought of the unconscious to Milton. Milton has a theory of faculty psychology and its 
empirically (re)productive capacity vis-a-vis experience already alluded to. The ease, aplomb and 
tacit irrelevance with which Milton deploys what was to become the main axiomatic of modem 
thought attests primarily to an instance of unawakened paranoia: faculty psychology in Milton is 
simply not attached to the negative rigor of a theory of representation, it is just a modest part of 
the cosmos. Milton is still feudal enough that ontology stands without necessary reference to 
epistemology. These residual instances of faculty psychology and the (re )productive efficacy (or 
otherwise) of the subject are clearly nothing compared with the vast resources of Satan. As the 
Romantics have repeatedly emphasised, it is Satan who bears the full weight of nascent 
subjectivity. However, it seems to me that the examples of Satan's grand or ideological 
interiority tend rather in the direction of the unconscious. To take some instances of this great 
inside: 
The hell within him, for within him hell 
He brings, and round about him, nor from hell 
One step, no more than from himself, can fly 
By change of place (IV 20-3) 
Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell (IV 75) 
Hell heard the insufferable noise; hell saw 
Heaven ruining from heaven, and would have fled 
Affrighted; but ... (VI 867-9) 
The hot hell that always in him burns. (IX 467) 
... within himself 
The danger lies. (IX 467) 
There is no escape: this is just how Freud characterises the intensity of the unconscious drives 
(as opposed to exterior stimulation): "since it impinges not from without but from within the 
18Milton's misogyny is a relatively asinine reproduction of his God's massive cosmo-patriarchy. 
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organism, no flight can avail against it".19 Moreover, apart from this, Freud's only theorisation is 
in terms (which he, irresponsibly enough, attributes to Fechner) of bound or freely mobile energy 
(a later development of the hypothesis of narcissism). Thus it is that he is able to specify the ego 
as "the great reservoir of libido" which should not be opposed to a reservoir elsewhere (in the id 
as Strachey has it) but rather to the ocean. This, the intra-energetic theory of narcissism, 
demonstrates what must already be perceived to be the case in Milton; that the ego (God) can 
only get its capacity for activity (even if that activity is mobilised only in order to delimit) from 
the unconscious: it operates, again, with "borrowed forces". 
The ego is constituted immanently to the unconscious: it is, as Freud notes, in fact "identical with 
the id."20 But the ego is subject to self-overvaluation which results in it understanding itself as 
specifically distinct from the id. On the basis of this differentiation view itself as the source and 
origin of activity and organisation. Thus the ego takes itself not only as exhausting all mental 
life, but, in the more general cases at issue here, as the model for form, order and stability. 
Milton and Kant are even unusual in the tradition for the extent to which their infinitised 
consciousnesses (God and reason) are explicit about the necessity of a precondition to their 
action: the extraction of energy from material, which is then supposed to be re-imposed on the 
now dead matter as transcendently formed. But the essential point is that the movement of 
extraction is self-presupposing in exactly the way that makes it the object of critique: the 
appropriation of energy by the transcendent presupposes that the transcendent is already 
energetic. This cannot be the case. The transcendence of formality is a philosophical error. 
The second philosophical model for explaining the structure of the relation of the material 
imagination to the transcendence of reason, and to which allusion has already been made, is that 
of Marx. The model at issue is that of the appropriation of surplus (labour or production) by the 
dominant class. Under feudalism, this appropriation is simply obvious; and this motivated my 
choice of a pre-modem avatar of production theory with which to introduce my problematic.21 
19 Freud 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes,' (1914) ibid., p. 115. 
2°'Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety' (1926) op. cit. chapter III, p. 249. 
21Marx writes, for instance: "The wage-form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the 
working day into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid labour and unpaid labour. Under the 
con'ee system it is different. There the labour of the serf for himself, and his compulsory labour for the 
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Under capital, however, this appropriation is masked by the fetishisation of the commodity or 
-, 
more generally, the bilateral constitution of exchange, or, more generally still, by representation. 
It is by no means insignificant that the theoretical primacy of production is also masked-not 
least in Kant-by a set of processes that answer to the necessity of time-money as the form of 
exchange. 
But Marx's theory is compromised for the purposes here. Marx's productive base line is 
irredeemably nostalgic, and, more saliently here, clearly hylomorphic: the arti san al labourer 
engaged in what Marx describes as "purposive activity aimed at the production of use-values .... 
[T]he universal condition of the metabolic embrace between man and nature.,,22 If there is a 
concept in Marx's analysis that responds to the nature of intransitive production, it is not the 
gallant labouring of the proletariat, but rather the movement of capital itself. In terms famously 
derived from Aristotle's definition of chrematistics, Marx describes the flow of capital as the 
inversion of the C-M-C formula into the characteristic M-C-M' formula. (pp. 247f.) The former 
is lodged in production for use-value, and therefore in a bottom line of need, desire, teleology and 
metabolic hy lomorphism; the latter produces without purpose-but not thereby without 
system-and therefore endlessly, intransitively. Marx writes that this movement is "limitless ... a 
boundless drive ... [and is] transformed into an automatic subject." (pp. 253f.).23 
In Marx, however, intransitive production (capital) is said to be itself essentially inert and 
impotent, and to get its energy from a form of transitive production (labour). In terms of the 
mobilisation of production theory, only one thing has changed in this view from Kant's view: 
lord of the land, are demarcated very clearly both in space and in time." Capital Vol. 1 trans. by Ben 
Fowkes (London: Penguin 1976), p.680. 
22lbid. p. 290, translation slightly modified. Reprising Kant's analysis, Marx points to a similar 
example: "What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the 
cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax." (p. 284) 
23Howard Caygill, in The Art of Judgement (Oxford: Blackwell 1989), suggests this through the 
intermediary of Adam Smith: "[Smith's] definition of beauty as the pleasure of perceiving the rightness 
or proportion of a means to an end apart from any consideration of the end-a phenomenon Kant later 
described as Zweckmaj3igkeit ohne Zweck. The pleasure in a means apart from its end transforms 
itself into the drive towards endless accumulation of means characteristic of an expanding commercial 
civilisation." (p. 85). 
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(apparently) intransitive production is at least explicitly acknowledged as a problematic, and the 
victory of responsibility is postponed into the indefinitely receding future of the revolution. The 
consummation of hylomorphism is entirely virtual. 
Marx indeed presents both these modes of production is quite traditional ways. Capital is treated 
as essentially dead matter (fixed capital = dead labour); and labour as the only ultimate source of 
activity (or value in Marx's equally traditional vocabulary) that there is?4 But the autonomy of 
capital stares Marx in the face: he is unable to deny either the organisational effects of capital, or 
its actual incapacity to subordinate itself to proper responsible production. The "circumscription 
of the universe," the subordination of the wilderness-imagination to the concept, the production 
of dead from live matter, far from being pre-creative moves on which a hylomorphic structure is 
then able to pretend to appear, are, in Marx, little more than political dreams; in fact, the dream 
of politics. 
Capital as a mode of intransitive and auto-organisational production does not appropriate its 
productivity from the transcendental dignity of the artisanallabourer. The concept of production 
that Marx uses as the basis for his critique-the autonomy of human intentional production; 
production by means of concepts-is itself evidently susceptible of critique. Marx is in a position 
analogous to Kant's. He activates a conception of intransitive production-arguably the most 
important one, capital-but demands that it be kept within the ambit of an essentially feudal 
mechanism of control, which control operates in the traditional hy lomorphic mode of 
production. But it is rather the case, as the rest of this thesis has shown, even the thought of ideal 
240ne might add that Marx is able to show that capital produces nothing (a prima facie bizarre 
hypothesis) only by driving an absolute (that is to say transcendental) wedge between price (empirical) 
and value (transcendental). This move is essentially Kantian. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals trans. by HJ Paton (New York: Harper & Row 1964) Kant argues that "In the kingdom of ends 
everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an 
equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity. '![What is 
relative to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price; ... but that which constitutes the 
sole condition under which anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value-that is, a 
price-but has an intrinsic value-that is, dignity." (p. 102). The inadequacy of the labour theory of 
value and the whole distinction between use- and exchange-value might be interestingly addressed in 
terms of this juxtaposition. 
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and responsible production is dependent on an irresponsible base. Moreover, as has also been 
argued here, the appropriation of energy by responsibility always fails. 
Genius is that gift of nature through which nature gives the rule to art (third Critique §46). Art 
means production by means of concepts or rules. To say that nature gives the rule to art is to say 
that in the products of fine art, nature acts organisationally (is rule-bound) through a human 
agent (the genius); but it is also, further, to add that this rule or organisation is irreducible to 
concepts. The genius is an immanent modification of nature through which nature expresses self-
organisational capacity irreducible to the transcendent organisations corresponding to the explicit 
rule or concept of lucid consciousness. The productions of genius are misunderstood by a kind of 
paralogism if they are subordinated to human technical capacity. Capital is that immanent 
modification of nature through which nature self-organises (gives the rule to) what appears 
(paralogistically) as human technical production. Economic organisation is not the result of a 
metabolic embrace in which nature is subordinated to the human; but a modification of primary 
nature effected through the human. 
In this context, Marx's remarks on the constitution of capital as the "organised body of labour" 
(Capital op. cit. p. 466) deserve to be taken seriously, and not treated as either as merely 
metaphorical or read only through Marx's moralistic objections: 
It is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, but the means of 
production that employ the worker. Instead of being consumed by him as material 
elements, they consume him as the ferment necessary to their own life-process. (p. 
425) 
The machine is similarly a: 
vast automaton ... [a] self-acting prime mover ... [a] self-actor ... [an] automatic 
system ... a mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories and whose demonic 
power, at first hidden by the slow and measured motions of its gigantic members, 
finally bursts forth in the fast and feverish whirl of its countless working organs. (pp. 
502-3) 
. . . . h· b·· . m" (p 517)· machinery "asserts its 
"Human matenalls mcorporated mto t IS 0 ~ectlve organls . , 
independence of the worker" (pp. 526-7), and, most succinctly: 
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In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the 
machine makes use of him (p. 548) 
Of course the situations are not directly homologous (and neither does Marx think they are): 
capital is not just another subject-organism writ large, it is not just "a productive mechanism 
whose organs are human beings" (p. 457). Capital is an automatic subject (p. 235). It is 
intransitive production, not productionfor use-value, nor production controlled by utility. Its 
organisation is paradigmatically immanent, and irreducible to either the metabolic embrace of 
human and nature or to the conceptual-bureaucratic control system of the state. Capital does not 
use the worker as the worker would a tool (indeed this is part of what Marx objects to) because 
capital does not operate according to the domination of the concept or end which is the defmition 
of instrumentality. 25 
The thought of fetishism is nevertheless still a sound one. But contra Marx's explicit use of it, it 
denotes the attempt to constrain intransitive production within the form of transitivity. This 
process involves the intervention of a (formal) element that acts as mediator between 
incommensurables, the form of exchange: productive mercantalism. Marx approaches with some 
irony the dim capitalism who supposes that the accumulative nature of capital should emerge 
merely from the exchange of equalities (p. 297). But the same thought is at stake in Kant's 
attempt to use the "common form" of inner sense; in Saussure's attempt to set up langue as a 
site of productive exchange; and in that bourgeois economics which supposes the clearing of 
markets as the primary economic phenomenon .. 26 
Ultimately, this move corresponds to that of the pre-formation of the material: matter is able to 
be formed hylomorphically only on the basis of a pre-formation that renders it impossibly 
commensurate with a formality designated as incommensurable. The operator of this pre-
formation is just the form of equality: exchange. The impossibility of even this act can be 
theorised only through a version of Freud's theory of the relation of narcissism. The theory of 
25Deleuze and Guattari suggest the term 'technological vitalism' to describe the self-organising 
capacities of technology under capital. See A Thousand Plateaus trans. by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987) p. 407. 
260ne might even compare Kant's famous abyss-spanning bridge with that constructed by Satan in 
Book X of Paradise Lost. 
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exploitation-deprived of its attempted defence of hylom h· . . orp lsm-pomts to an Important 
mechanism, and provides a useful heuristic for the investigation of the problems associated with 
hylomorphic production. But finally, even the power of appropriation (like that of pre-
formation) begs the general question of the presupposition of production. Only the hypothesis of 
narcissism provides the possibility of both accounting for the paralogistic illusion of hylomorphic 
production, and detailing the particular modifications of primary production to which the illusion 
answers. 
This brief excursus into the tools of active materialism is not intended to be a fully worked out 
argument. The drift of the thesis has been not to work from productive materialism upwards 
(synthetically) but to detail the internal decay of hylomorphic production. All this chapter has 
sought to establish is that the notion of transcendental production as imaginative production 
cannot be treated merely as a substitute for the transcendental production that Kant requires for 
his project. The imagination does not just provide the filling out of the very production that 
would be operated by the transcendental. Kant's transcendental production always presupposes 
the prior constitution of the products it is supposed to explain. Intransitive production must 
therefore be in a position not to provide a Kantian redemption for the transcendental, but must 
provide an eliminative explanation of the transcendental itself as paralogism. Marx, and 
especially Freud provide the theoretical materials that could organise into such an account. 
The goal of that canonical strand of Western thought that leads from Plato through Christianity 
into transcendental idealism has been to refer the production of order (taken in the broadest 
sense) to the transcendent. Productive capacity is allied inconceivably with transcendence. In 
ancient thought, transcendence was primary, and the impoverishment of matter, reproduction and 
becoming were defined in relation to primary transcendence. In modem thought, the successes of 
the material sciences, and most especially the invention of dynamic modelling by Newton, meant 
that emmiserated matter was primary, and transcendence was defined negatively in relation to 
matter. The problem of morphogenesis was more acute for modernity, but the essential is that 
dead matter (the limit case of emmiseration) and transcendence imply each other. They are a part 
of the same system. With a materiality that cannot do anything, that has been paralogistically 
separated from what it can do, the only resort is an immaterial activity: the spontaneity of pure 
reason, occupied with nothing but itself. The burden of this thesis has been to show that the more 
productive capacity is distanced from the real, the more it becomes impossible to think of it as 
188 
prosecuting fonnative activity at all; and to argue that the impossibility of getting the atemporal, 
the fonnal, the conceptual etc. into productive contact with the matter they are supposed to 
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